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Abstract 
This thesis is a historical investigation of how British governments in the late twentieth century 
defined and responded to disability. It uses official records and publications, the archives of 
prominent voluntary organisations and some oral histories. The period between 1965 and 
1995 saw the rise of pan-impairment organisations campaigning for the recognition of disabled 
people’s financial needs and, later, for civil rights. It was therefore a time of great political 
change, resulting in extensive reforms to both social security and anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
Examining Deborah Stone’s ‘distributive dilemma’, I argue that government policies towards 
disabled people centred on their poverty rather than encouraging their equal participation in 
society. Although voluntary organisations successfully brought public attention to, and concern 
for, the needs of disabled people, they were unable to secure legislative change to the extent 
that they had hoped. Internal bureaucratic momentum in the British government resulted in 
the extension of disability benefits in the 1970s and their retention in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, such reforms were piecemeal and constrained by the economic problems during the 
period. Within these confines, governments did take on board arguments by disability groups, 
but understood and reinterpreted them within their own political traditions. 
Existing histories of this period are either incomplete or written by the very activists involved. 
A concentration on the “social model” of disability has led to highly politicised accounts which 
both obscure the context of government policy and the motivations and constitution of 
lobbying organisations. I argue that existing ideal types for voluntary groups are problematic in 
the field of disability. Further, while there may appear to have been “consensus” of disability 
policy at various points, understanding the difference between social democratic, liberal and 
neo-liberal approaches to disability allows us to construct a more nuanced history of the 
period.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
For the 2010 United Kingdom General Election, the Conservative manifesto promised that: 
We will reassess all current claimants of Incapacity Benefit. 
Those found fit for work will be transferred onto 
Jobseeker’s Allowance. Recipients of Incapacity Benefit who 
are genuinely disabled will continue to receive the financial 
support to which they are entitled.
1
 
Building on regulations introduced by the New Labour government, the Conservative-
Liberal-Democrat coalition controversially went on to further restrict access to disability-
related benefits in a time of financial crisis.2 The debate over how to define categories of need 
is not new. Disability, however, is a relatively young bureaucratic entity in Britain’s welfare 
state. While today we might talk about disability policy as if it were a natural part of British 
politics, this has not always been possible. By examining government policy and the demands 
and responses of voluntary organisations seeking to represent disabled people, I show how 
“disability” emerged and evolved as an object of government concern. 
The scholarship on disability and disability policy has been growing for the past thirty 
years. Following from assertions that disability is a product of a discriminatory society and not 
a medical diagnosis,3 ‘disability studies’ has emerged to tackle the theoretical, social and 
political issues which the concept raises.4 It contends that, like issues such as gender and race, 
disability and disabled people have been marginalised as topics of research. Much of this 
literature comes from the discipline of sociology, with the humanities providing healthy 
support. Its focus has been on exposing disability as discrimination and in finding practical 
                                                          
1
 The Conservative Party, Invitation to join the government of Britain : the Conservative manifesto 2010 
(London: The Conservative Party, 2010). 
2
 Gareth Millward and Peter Border, Assessing Capacity for Work (PN 413) (London: Parliamentary Office 
of Science and Technology, 2012). 
3
 Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and The Disability Alliance, The Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation and the Disability Alliance discuss Fundamental Principles of 
Disability, Online ed. (Leeds: The Disability Archive, 1997); Michael Oliver, The politics of disablement, 
(London: Macmillan Education, 1990). 
4
 For example, see Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman, and Michael Bury, Handbook of disability 
studies (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2001); Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver, and Len Barton, 
Disability studies today (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Lennard J. Davis, The disability studies reader 
(London: Routledge, 2006). 
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ways to defeat it. More recent histories have focused on the lived experiences of disabled 
people and the cultural constructions surrounding disability.5 This is seen as important because 
it illuminates the struggles of a minority group which has been historically hidden from public 
view.6 Even then, very few have examined the experiences of disabled people from the more 
distant past.7 Further, there have been few histories of state policy with or towards disabled 
people in its own right. As Anne Borsay has argued, history is a missing piece of the jigsaw in 
disability studies.8 Notable exceptions include Borsay’s own Disability and Social Policy in 
Britain since 1750,9 Julie Anderson’s War, Disability and Rehabilitation in Britain,10 Helen 
Bolderson’s Social Security, Disability and Rehabilitation11 and the seminal The Disabled State 
by Deborah Stone.12 The focus of these histories, however, has tended to be the period 
roughly from the industrial revolution up to the years directly following the Second World War. 
Borsay ends her survey in the 1970s; Anderson the 1950s; Bolderson the 1940s. Stone, from a 
political science background, continues her analysis up to her “present” of the early 1980s. 
Other than concise chronological and sociological overviews of twentieth century disability 
policy as parts of larger studies and textbooks,13 histories of the period have tended to be 
                                                          
5
 See the historiographical reviews in, Catherine J. Kudlick, "Disability History: Why We Need Another 
"Other"," The American Historical Review 108, no. 3 (2003); David M. Turner, "Introduction: approaching 
anomalous bodies," in Social Histories of Disability and Deformity, ed. David M. Turner and Kevin Stagg 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
6
 Paul K. Longmore and Lauri Umansky, "Introduction: Disability History: From the Margins to the 
Mainstream," in The New Disability History : American Perspectives, ed. Paul K. Longmore and Lauri 
Umansky (New York: New York University Press, 2001), pp. 12-14. 
7
 An exception is Michael Mantin, 2010. Educational Experiences of Deaf Children in Wales: The 
Cambrian Institution for the Deaf and Dumb, 1847-1914. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Swansea 
University. 
8
 Anne Borsay, "History, Power and Identity," in Disability Studies Today, ed. Colin Barnes, Mike Oliver, 
and Len Barton (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). 
9
 Anne Borsay, Disability and Social Policy in Britain since 1750 : A History of Exclusion (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
10
 Julie Anderson, War, disability and rehabilitation in Britain : "soul of a nation" (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2011). 
11
 Helen Bolderson, Social Security, Disability and Rehabilitation (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1991). 
12
 Deborah A. Stone, The Disabled State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984). 
13
 Robert F. Drake, Understanding Disability Policies (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Michael Oliver and 
Colin Barnes, Disabled People and Social Policy : From Exclusion to Inclusion (London: Longman, 1998). 
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written by the very activists participating in the events.14 Professional historians have 
neglected disability this period, which is intriguing given the wealth of material on the welfare 
state and British social policy.15 
B. J. Gleeson has criticised the ‘statist’ approach to disability history because it risks making 
disabled people look like the passive recipients of state charity.16 This has been a common 
attitude to “history from above” in general over recent decades. However, I fundamentally 
disagree that this has to be the case. The history of the late-twentieth century shows how 
disabled people were far from passive. Their involvement in political campaigns and creation 
of new organisations shows how assertive they were in securing legislative change. On a more 
fundamental level, however, even if one accepts the argument that disabled people were 
constructed as passive recipients, one cannot understand this construction if one does not 
study the concepts which underpinned those policies and how they were practiced. The 
processes by which the government, largely composed of non-disabled people, sought to deal 
with the problems it saw with disability and disabled people are crucial in understanding how 
disability was constructed in the late-twentieth century. This thesis is not about whether these 
policies were “good” or “bad”, but rather how disability was understood and the reactions of 
those seeking to represent disabled people’s interests. 
This project begins to fill these gaps. It analyses the disability policies of the British welfare 
state from 1965 to 1995 to ask a short, yet complex question: what was the government’s 
construction of disability? I provide some answers by investigating the debates on policy 
decisions within and outside government. I do so by analysing the policy discussions and 
                                                          
14
 Jane Campbell and Michael Oliver, Disability Politics : Understanding our past, changing our future 
(London: Routledge, 1996). 
15
 Just a few include Maurice Bruce, The coming of the Welfare State (London: Batsford, 1968); Pat 
Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1996); Nicholas Timmins, The five 
giants : a biography of the welfare state, 2nd ed. (London: Harper Collins, 2001); Rodney Lowe, The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Howard Glennerster, British 
Social Policy, 1945 to the Present, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the 
British Welfare State - A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
16
 B. J. Gleeson, "Disability Studies: A historical materialist view," Disability & Society 12, no. 2 (2010): 
esp. pp. 190-91. 
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actions of the British government, with a particular focus on social security policy. These are 
contrasted with the demands of leading pan-impairment voluntary organisations representing 
disabled people. As these organisations attempted to define disability and press the 
government for reform, the interactions and arguments between the two offer a view of the 
underlying concepts that government officials and departments had with regard to disability. 
This introductory chapter outlines how I approached this study and the concepts I have chosen 
to adopt. 
Literature review 
To explain my approach to this study and the concepts contained within, this literature review 
analyses the existing material on the history of late twentieth-century disability and the 
welfare state. This thesis examines the British government’s concept of disability through 
internal and external debates around key policy decisions. This section therefore outlines 
existing approaches to disability, welfare states, policy formation and the role of voluntary 
organisations in the policy process.  
Disability 
Before studying disability policy, a working definition of disability is needed. This is 
problematic, and was just as difficult for policy makers in the past as in the present. The 
traditional approach has been to define disability medically. The World Health Organisation’s 
(WHO) model for disability in 1980, for example, posited that impairments (medical 
conditions) lead to disabilities (functional limitations) which could become handicaps 
(discrimination or barriers to full participation in society).17 This places disability as a fault 
within the individual, and has come under increasing attack from disability studies and other 
disciplines since the 1960s. Using Lemert’s ‘labelling theory of deviance’, Lorber shows that 
society has provided the medical profession with the power to label people as ‘deviant’, or 
                                                          
17
 World Health Organization, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps : a 
manual of classification relating to the consequences of disease (Geneva: World Health Organization, 
1980). 
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‘sick’.18 Logically, therefore, it has the right to decide “normality”, and can sanction the 
abnormal – or “the disabled” – to comply with its prescribed regimen. Those who cannot be 
rehabilitated or cured remain in a perpetual state of abnormality.19 The ‘stigma’20 associated 
with this led to a “social model” of disability amongst British activists and academics. Initially 
developed by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation in 1975, they argued 
that disability was discrimination imposed upon people with impairments.21 Policies which 
focused on the individual were considered inadequate because they failed to tackle structural 
inequalities in society. Over the 1980s the model was developed,22 and articulated most 
notably in Mike Oliver’s Politics and Disablement in 1990.23 Included in these attacks on the 
“medical model” was the idea that disability policy was kept in the control of non-disabled 
“experts” and philanthropists in order to contain disabled people and advance their own 
careers. As we will see, this led to fraught relations between charities which provided services 
for disabled people, and “democratic” organisations which were run by disabled people. 
Similarly, private sector care services, which grew in number considerably over this time, were 
seen as being run in the financial and political interests of non-disabled people rather than 
reflecting the needs and desires of service users.24 
The social model is problematic for historians because its strength lies as a political call to 
arms rather than an analytical tool for historical processes. The historical narrative of social 
                                                          
18
 Judith Lorber, "Deviance as Performance : The Case of Illness," in Medical Men and Their Work, ed. 
Eliot Freidson and Judith Lorber (Chicago: Atherton, 1972), pp. 414-19. See also Carol Thomas, 
"Disability and Impairment," in Disabling barriers - enabling environments, ed. John Swain, et al. 
(London: SAGE, 2004), p. 23; Eliot Freidson, "Disability as Social Deviance," in Medical Men and Their 
Work, ed. Eliot Freidson and Judith Lorber (Chicago: Atherton, 1972). 
19
 For discussion on “normality” see Waltraud Ernst, "The normal and the abnormal: reflections on 
norms and normativity " in Histories of the Normal and the Abnormal : Social and cultural histories of 
norms and normativity, ed. Waltraud Ernst (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
20
 Erving Goffman, Stigma; notes on the management of spoiled identity (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963); Paul Hunt, Stigma: the experience of disability (London: G. Chapman, 1966). 
21
 Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation and The Disability Alliance, Fundamental 
Principles. 
22
 Victor Finkelstein, Attitudes and disabled people : issues for discussion (New York: International 
Exchange of Information in Rehabilitation, 1980). 
23
 Oliver, The politics of disablement; Michael Oliver and Colin Barnes, The new politics of disablement 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
24
 Gary L. Albrecht, The disability business : rehabilitation in America (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992). 
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modelists is that disability grew alongside industrialisation. As individuals were forced to sell 
their labour, impaired people became excluded. This led to physical and social segregation 
through the workhouse, asylum and hospital.25 Further, charities which “cared for” disabled 
people segregated individuals by reifying their status as second-class citizens, forbidden from 
taking control of their own lives through political representation, paid employment, sexual 
relationships and so on.26 This materialist, politicised approach sought to place disabled people 
as organic intellectuals in their own struggle against non-disabled hegemony.27 As Borsay has 
explained, however, this totalising narrative does not adequately explain historical processes. 
The interplay of other individual characteristics such as gender, sexuality, class and race are 
often lost.28 More recent disability studies scholars, particularly those of a postmodern bent, 
have also argued that it neglects personal experiences of impairment.29 Disability as an 
identity, and the interaction between multiple identity groups, have been presented as 
possible alternatives.30 Barnes and Oliver continue to defend the political worth of the social 
model, accusing the postmodern critique of being ‘ahistorical’ and lacking ‘any committed 
vision of what could be and indeed what ought to be’. They make no apology for their 
commitment to a political ideal.31 Indeed, Oliver goes so far as to lament the inaction of 
disability studies over ‘the past 20 years’ in spending ‘too much time talking about the social 
                                                          
25
 Oliver, The politics of disablement; Borsay, Disability and Social Policy. 
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model and its usefulness... and not enough time actually implementing it... in practice’.32 
However, ‘a critical synthesis of the postmodern deconstruction of monoliths and a feminist 
commitment to radical politics’ would, for Corker, create an ‘emancipatory project... based on 
active and engaged dialoguing across difference, not the suppression of difference’.33 Other 
“social” definitions which include the disabling effects of the environment and society have 
also developed in other traditions. Research on poverty by Townsend, for instance, focused on 
the structural inequalities which impoverished certain groups, including disabled people.34 The 
newest WHO model stresses the interplay between personal and societal factors beyond 
simply medical impairment in determining the efficacy of disability schemes.35 Social, de-
individualised definitions of disability can therefore be used to investigate historical processes 
without subscribing whole-heartedly to the social model. 
These are useful debates when understanding the motivations and experiences of 
disability activists during the late-twentieth century, but they are not appropriate for 
explaining what disability policy was or how it was understood by the British government. For 
this, Deborah Stone’s Disabled State remains authoritative. Stone speaks of a ‘distributive 
dilemma’ in capitalist societies, where wealth is dispersed via systems based on work or on 
need. States must decide how to provide security for those in need whilst avoiding moral 
hazard.36 Thus, “disability” can be seen as the drawing of the line between “eligibility” or 
“desert” for state aid on the one side, and the compulsion to work on the other. The social and 
legal limits of this boundary have shifted over time. Moreover, the bureaucratic systems for 
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defining eligibility have not been static, nor have the boundaries between “work” and 
“welfare” always been mutually exclusive. This process has also not simply been about 
systematic, post-enlightenment oppression, or the panopticon of surveillance medicine.37 
Borsay has argued that eighteenth and nineteenth-century policy merely codified informal 
practices which had existed in pre-industrial Britain.38 Shakespeare, too, has been keen to 
stress that there is a certain reality to impairment, and policies which seek to compromise with 
those in power to provide help to individuals rather than seeking wide-scale structural change 
are not necessarily oppressive.39 Like Jameel Hampton, whose recent PhD explored disability 
policy in the British welfare state from 1948-1975, I argue that it is important to see disability 
policy as more than simply exclusion versus inclusion, professional self-interest or economic 
rationality.40 Shades of grey are revealed as policy makers sought to help disabled people, but 
within their own, skewed understandings of what disability was. By the same token, these 
issues cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly, there are and have been elements of disability policy 
which have sought to “normalise”, segregate, or even destroy disabled people who were seen 
as deviant.41 In trying to explain the actions and motivations of government policy makers and 
the voluntary organisations which lobbied them, the social model provides important critiques 
of modernity and the welfare state. 
Given my research questions, it is clear that this thesis requires a bureaucratic definition of 
disability to understand welfare state policy towards disability. The Stonean ‘distributive 
dilemma’ is an excellent starting point for this, as one can investigate how the limits of 
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eligibility for disability schemes were defined in law. However, it is not the only approach. 
Branson and Mille have claimed that governments have to create disability in order for there 
to be a policy about it. Following from the tripartite definition of disability in the WHO’s 1980 
scheme,42 they argue that ‘disability’, ‘handicap’ and ‘policy’ are constructs. People with 
‘handicaps’ (or “problems”) have a ‘disability’ – this disability requires a rational, 
bureaucratised response (or ‘policy’). Thus, disability, once defined, is self-generating and 
actually serves to further segregate disabled people, even when the overt goal of ‘policy’ is to 
integrate disabled people into the wider community.43 This builds on social model claims that 
disability was created by and central to the development of capitalism.44 Stiker, for example, 
has argued that disability policy is about segregating the “abnormal” from the “normal”. The 
segregated are then forced through a variety of disciplinary techniques to be “rehabilitated”, 
otherwise they are not allowed to participate fully in society.45 The argument is that such 
segregation was physical in institutional environments in the Victorian period, but since the 
Second World War the medical gaze has shifted into society in general through the use of 
health care professionals.46 Dean goes further to suggest that the social security system is 
designed to do this to “the poor” in general, with disabled people one of a number of groups 
the state seeks to discipline. In this context, ‘poverty’ is treated the same as ‘criminality’ in 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, as a ‘technology of power’. Poverty moved from being a 
circumstance of birth in feudal societies to a personal failing (compounded by the market 
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economy) in capitalism.47 Thus, disability policy is simply part of this disciplinary technology. 
For Piven and Cloward, welfare is created to provide poverty relief in times of crisis, but carries 
with it a stigma so that workers will accept low pay and poor conditions rather than “go on the 
dole”.48 
“The welfare state” 
Following from Stone’s ‘distributive dilemma’, the British state has tended to be concerned 
with disabled people without the financial resources to provide for themselves – i.e. those 
without work or those in poor households. Before the Second World War, this led to 
institutionalisation,49 but, as Borsay has argued, the majority of disabled people lived in their 
own homes and participated (to varying degrees) in society.50 Disabled people could therefore 
apply for support from local parishes through “out relief”.51 These were strongly policed to 
maintain the work ethic, avoid creating “sturdy beggars” and ensure that limited resources 
were directed at the “deserving’ sick”.52 This has historically entitled disabled people to certain 
benefits, although they were also denied certain rights. A standard of behaviour was expected 
of those who received aid, and those who refused to be rehabilitated or cured became 
considered deliberately deviant. 53 The concept of desert could also provide greater support for 
those considered more worthy. Most notably, significant resources were directed towards the 
rehabilitation and income maintenance of war veterans, especially after the two world wars.54 
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Philanthropic endeavours were seen as “natural” ways of providing for other deserving groups, 
with a number of charities providing welfare services, such as education in special schools.55 
While these systems do not constitute the modern British welfare state, they do provide 
context for the developments after the Beveridge settlement of 1948. Though the “welfare 
state” is difficult to define, Rodney Lowe provides ‘three immutable characteristics’. First, a 
welfare state ‘actively accepts responsibility for the welfare of its citizens’; second, welfare 
states grew out of the aftermath of World War II; and third, ‘they have an inalienable core of 
universal services’.56 In the 1950s and 1960s, Asa Briggs and T. H. Marshall saw the welfare 
state as a phase of development in human society, with Marshall defining it as the expression 
of ‘social rights’ to a guaranteed income alongside the political and civil rights won in previous 
centuries.57 These teleological or “whiggish” interpretations have since been rejected. While it 
is clear that states spent far more on welfare services after the war, this does not have to be 
seen as “progress” or “inevitable”.58 Douglas Ashford has used the history of ideas to attack 
the ‘myth of coherence’ applied to welfare states, even criticising the use of “welfare state” in 
the singular as naively simplistic.59 Esping-Andersen has shown that welfare states in different 
countries developed individual characteristics based on those nations’ particular histories and 
political situations. He described welfare state regimes, producing three models. The United 
Kingdom is classed as a ‘liberal’ state, with little state intervention in economic policy, low 
taxes and low benefits designed to encourage personal responsibility. This is in contrast to 
‘corporatist’ states in which blocs representing sections of society negotiate service provision 
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and taxation priorities (such as in France or Germany), and the ‘social democratic’ states in 
which well-funded comprehensive services are provided to all in return for high levels of 
taxation (such as in Scandinavia).60  
The “progress” narrative has unravelled since the 1970s. Welfare and its associated 
concepts are products of their time. Harris’s work shows that ‘unemployment’ only appeared 
in official policy documents in 1895 and was not seriously considered part of the government’s 
remit until after the Great War.61 Indeed, Wilding has argued that whiggish interpretations 
have been politically damaging; because contemporaries found the welfare state so inherently 
natural and unproblematic, very little attention was paid to the current and future economic 
costs of welfare programmes.62 Prochaska asserts that the traditional historiography and 
political discourse of the welfare state in Britain has tended to overemphasise the role of the 
centralised state as a “replacement” for nineteenth-century charity. There was always a 
complex interplay between private philanthropy and the state, with many charities being 
founded and thriving after 1945 and many of the traditional charities continuing to provide 
services to those considered in need.63 It also tends to ignore the state-run and private welfare 
schemes in the first decades of the twentieth century. It simplifies the events of the mid-
twentieth century as the death of private insurance and the birth of a public insurance purse; 
or the decline of community based insurance in favour of big business and big government.64 
There was also an increase in new, private organisations involved in welfare provision. Carers 
for disabled people, for example, are very often provided by commercial or not-for-profit 
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organisations which are licensed by a local authority.65 Thus, there was not a “clean break” 
from the past after the War in which the State took complete control of the welfare of its 
citizens from what was an entirely private enterprise; an assortment of public and private 
vehicles for welfare persisted both before and after the 1940s. 
This ‘pluralism’ of welfare providers has accelerated since the decline of what has been 
called the ‘classic welfare state’ from the 1970s onwards. After the Callaghan government was 
forced to introduce expenditure restrictions in return for an International Monetary Fund loan, 
the rate of expansion of the welfare budget slowed. With the emergence of the ‘New Right’ 
after the 1979 election, private welfare providers were encouraged in order to make state 
bureaucracy more efficient and to free citizens of government interference.66 Such trends 
continued even with the election of New Labour in 1997.67 These developments have leant 
weight to the arguments of Marxist scholars such as Gough. Britain moved from a more 
‘corporatist’ tradition in which voluntary organisations and trades unions had input into 
government policy to a ‘liberal’ tradition in which private enterprise was dominant.68 Thus, 
welfare states were never designed to replace capitalism;69 rather businesses realised the need 
for trade union support in the post-war reconstruction effort, and the promise of a better 
future for citizens amid rising expectations. The economic boom until the late 1960s paid for 
these efforts, but by the 1970s the needs of capital shifted ‘to re-establish conditions for 
profitable accumulation’.70 Similarly, critiques from feminists and disabled writers have 
emphasised that working men were disproportionately involved in these corporatist 
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negotiations. The insurance principle in social security benefits, for example, disadvantaged 
those who could not work by providing more generous benefits.71 Services not predominantly 
consumed by non-disabled men (such as childcare or the personal social services) were 
neglected. Further, the assumption of the nuclear family, with a man as the bread-winner and 
the woman as the care-giver excluded women from the labour market and often left the care 
of disabled people to unmarried daughters or under-paid wives.72 
Since the 1980s, right-wing economists and historians have provided fresh criticisms. Neo-
liberal thinkers have condemned the inefficiency of the welfare state, believing that full 
provision of services impairs personal responsibility, encourages welfare dependency and by 
association stunts economic growth and enterprise. Private service providers and the profit 
motive are preferred as they help drive down costs and competition increases quality.73 
Emphases on the individual have led to policies which focus on “rights” and “customers” in 
welfare rather than broader concepts of “society” and the protection of key groups. Recent 
histories have focused on the “marketisation” of health care, private companies’ involvement 
in social security74 and, according to Bagguley, the decline in importance of voluntary 
organisations fighting for the political rights of various groups.75 Beck has described how late 
industrial societies therefore shifted the risks of unemployment and social dislocation away 
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from societal groups and communities to the individual.76 This attitude can lead to the 
reaffirmation of the “deserving poor” argument, since the individual is removed from his or 
her “society” and made solely responsible for his or her behaviour. Charles Murray famously 
described the creation of an “underclass” which survived on social security and had no 
aspirations to work, maintain a stable family or contribute positively to society.77 These 
attitudes have been criticised heavily since the 1980s in response to the policies of successive 
neo-liberal governments in Britain and the United States. For instance, Warren asks whether 
the “deserving poor” are those who are willing or able to modify their bodies to become ready 
for the labour market.78 Further, despite the rhetoric, Pierson has shown that the Thatcher 
government was not able to retrench the welfare state completely.79 We therefore have a 
body of literature which emphasises welfare pluralism in the post-1948 welfare state, and 
invites the historian to be critical of narratives of progress. Similarly, the British state has 
continued to change over time, and these developments will be central to understanding the 
context in which disability policy was made.  
Disability and social security 
The major disability campaigns in the late-sixties revolved around social security, and 
“benefits” continued to be a contentious topic throughout the period. Few historical analyses 
of disability and social security exist,80 but there has been much social and political science 
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literature on the subject.81 This has grown since the 1980s when the costs of welfare were 
rising, while governments became increasingly concerned about how to limit expenditure. 
First, it must be made clear that there is ‘no universally accepted definition’ of social security.82 
Much like “the welfare state”, it can encompass a wide range of services (including 
employment, state schemes, social policies) and informal care networks (such as support from 
families, friends and neighbours). This thesis uses a much more narrow definition as identified 
by McKay and Rowlingson; direct financial support from the state paid to the individual. This in 
itself is problematic, though, as schemes like tax credits and funds which are administered by 
third parties (but financed partly or wholly by the state) are usually not considered part of the 
social security system as classically defined.83 Therefore we must understand which schemes 
can be called “disability benefits” before reaching a definitive conclusion on which will be 
included in the analysis. 
Categorisation has been seen as a more practical form of administration than individual 
subjective judgements on a case-by-case basis.84  As Dixon and Hyde argue: 
The welfare state thrives upon categorising the individuals 
who require help from it. A series of distinctions are made 
to sift and eventually select those who are considered 
worthy of receiving the highest benefits from those who 
must make do with less.
85
 
Broad, measurable criteria were therefore created and access was managed through a 
range of administrative and legal procedures. Bolderson and Mabbett measured welfare 
categories by four criteria: how easily they can be identified; how viable exclusionary decisions 
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are; the legitimacy of the claims to help by the members of the category; and how relevant 
that category is to the imagined “real world” of the nation. Disability scores well on the 
‘legitimacy’ criterion, they contend, but ‘the question of who is included and who is excluded 
and whether membership of the category signifies need remains problematic’.86 Again, Stone’s 
‘distributive dilemma’ is raised. To attempt to combat this problem the British state has had to 
use the medical profession as “gatekeepers” to disability welfare. This is by no means an 
isolated conclusion. By the mid 1990s, 163 countries had developed disabled social security 
programmes,87 with ‘medical certification of disability [...] one of the major paths to public aid 
in the modern welfare state’.88 These schemes themselves can, as Stone argues, be 
manipulated to control access and rationing of state resources. Since it is logical that there 
must be a finite amount of money available to the state, entry conditions must be imposed 
upon all government welfare schemes.89 
Within “disability benefits”, four main types are usually identified. 
 Compensation benefits: payable to claimants based on injury or diseased 
contracted as a result of their work. The two main examples are Industrial Injuries 
Benefits and War Pensions. 
 Earnings replacement benefits: payable to claimants on the basis that they are 
unemployed due to disability or have reduced earnings capacity. Examples include 
sickness benefits, Invalidity Benefit and Incapacity Benefit. 
 Extra costs benefits: paid to cover the additional financial expenses associated 
with disability. Attendance Allowance, Mobility Allowance and Disability Living 
Allowance were paid on this basis. 
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 Means-tested benefits: available to disabled claimants only if their income and 
assets fall below a proscribed minimum. Disability-related additions were available 
under National Assistance, Supplementary Benefits and Income Support.90 
These distinctions are not always absolute. For instance, Non-contributory Invalidity 
Benefit was means-tested but designed to replace lost earnings. Similarly, Invalid Care 
Allowance can be seen as both a benefit to a disabled person to cover the extra costs of a carer 
and as replacing the earnings of that carer. The categories should therefore be used as a guide 
only. By the same token, these areas were financed in different ways. Means-tested benefits 
often came from direct taxation, unlike the contributory-principle National Insurance benefits. 
This became politically sensitive as the number of people claiming disability-related benefits 
increased dramatically through the 1980s and 1990s, despite repeated attempts by 
governments to cut the social security budget.91 
Scholars note how difficult disability benefits have been to administer. Bolderson and 
Mabbett identify four measures of success for any benefit – ‘the ease with which categories or 
cases are identified, the viability of the exclusions which are made in the process, legitimacy 
(whether members of the category are seen to deserve their membership), and the perceived 
“fit” between need and membership – that is, the relevance of the category’. Disabled people 
are often considered a legitimate group for receipt of benefit, but the other three criteria are 
very problematic.92 Most benefit payments on the basis of disability would be considered 
‘categorical’ benefits, i.e. benefits paid to a group because it is presumed that most people 
within that group will be in need of support. This can often lead to a difference between 
‘deemed’ needs and ‘actual’ needs.93 The British system therefore ‘paid on the basis of 
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assumed need rather than in relation to the individual’s earning loss’ as was common in 
continental Europe.94 Hickel has studied the benefit system in the United States for World War 
I veterans and shown that there was fundamental tension between medical, bureaucratic and 
social conceptions of disability.95 The definitional problem is present throughout these 
chapters: just because a person qualified as disabled did not necessarily mean she was 
considered a worthy recipient. 
Voluntary Organisations96 
The work of politicians, civil servants and government ministers is articulated throughout the 
thesis. However, the crucial interactions are those with voluntary organisations. As I show, 
disability groups were central in defining disability and pressing government for legislative 
change during the period. 
Pre-war histories have tended to focus on the traditional charities which emerged during 
the modern period. These were philanthropic and paternalistic organisations caring for the 
“deserving poor”.97 Owen has described how from the late-eighteenth century ‘the blind 
always had a special appeal’ and similar organisations were founded to cater for other sensory 
impairments, such as the deaf and the dumb.98 Later, these charities were criticised for failing 
to ‘reform’ the impaired and failing to encourage self-sufficiency.99 Many provided direct relief 
to disabled people, either through alms or through running large institutions such as care 
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homes and sheltered employment.100 Later histories have described how these charities 
segregated disabled people. Until recently, few allowed or encouraged disabled people to 
participate in decision-making processes. Charities were run by “well-meaning” non-disabled 
people who believed they knew what was best for disabled people.101 These groups were 
comparatively large in terms of financial resources and individual membership, and were 
institutions well-respected by the general public and government. 
Histories of the late twentieth century have described how the voluntary sector developed 
in the new welfare state. Groups emerged which focused more on the demands of those they 
were seeking to help and their families. Organisations such as the Spastics Society, the 
National Association for Mental Health (MIND) and National Association of Parents of 
Backward Children (MENCAP)102 were still run by non-disabled people, but had a greater focus 
on the wider position of disabled people in society.103 More radical groups were founded from 
the 1960s onwards, including the Disablement Income Group (DIG), and the Disability Alliance 
(DA). These organisations often had disabled people in positions of power, but were reliant 
upon non-disabled experts in the field of political lobbying. They did not have the resources of 
the larger charities, but quickly became visible to the general public. Furthermore, these 
organisations, unlike the traditional charities, were pan-impairment – that is to say they did 
not focus on one group or medical conditions such as “the blind”, “the deaf”, “the mentally ill” 
or “spastics”, nor did they (for the most part) provide segregating welfare services. Following 
from the “rediscovery of poverty” in the 1960s, these groups followed a Fabian tradition of 
negotiation with central government on behalf of social groups who were considered 
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disadvantaged (referred to by Bagguley as a ‘corporatist’ approach).104 Unlike the older 
organisations which had lobbied government, these new groups were more aggressive in their 
demands, more willing to criticise the government openly, and able to make better use of the 
media for their political campaigns.105 This had a knock-on effect, encouraging older voluntary 
organisations to take up these tactics.106 It led to the creation of what is often referred to as 
the “poverty lobby”, a collection of similarly-minded organisations campaigning for people 
affected by issues such as child poverty (e.g. Child Poverty Action Group), homelessness 
(Shelter), old age (Help the Aged), and so forth.107 
Since the 1970s, sharp distinctions have been drawn by social modelists between groups 
for and groups of disabled people. Organisations which were not led by disabled people were 
considered part of the former and a threat to disabled people’s autonomy. The 1980s saw a 
growth in the number of groups of the disabled – often referred to as Disabled People’s 
Organisations (DPOs). Examples include the Union of the Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS) and the British Council of Organisations of Disabled People (BCODP).108 
They campaigned for such causes as independent living and direct payments so that disabled 
people could take control of their own finances.109 The 1970s and 1980s, then, were focused 
on services for disabled people, whereas by the 1990s the cause had focused more on “rights” 
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as a key battleground.110 Throughout, there has been antipathy and open hostility from the of 
groups towards the for groups.111 Often referred to as ‘charities’ (although the poverty lobby 
organisations are sometimes included in this category), they were seen as undemocratic, 
diverting resources away from truly-representative groups, and helping to maintain a culture 
which saw disabled people as dependent upon the benevolence of non-disabled people. 
Further, they were a key part of the medical model which individualised disability rather than 
focusing on reforming society.112 
DPOs have been referred to as ‘New Social Movements’ (NSMs) or as Lewis has described 
them in relation to social policy ‘new political constituencies... convened around the formation 
of identities and solidarities in relation to social differences of gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality 
and disability’.113 These were said to have developed from the 1960s as more radical 
organisations of identity groups outside of the traditional party politics structure which was 
seen as no longer able to fulfil their needs.114 They were far more willing to challenge the 
status-quo,115 although in turn this meant that they found it more difficult to become accepted 
by the government. However, Shakespeare has taken issue with this interpretation, arguing 
that traditional NSM theory does not explain the particular developments in ‘the disability 
movement’. Partly this is because disability is not as ‘unitary’ as, say, race or gender because of 
the myriad impairments which impact upon individuals’ life experiences in different ways. 
Partly, however, it is because the “newness” of NSMs has been overplayed and the 
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continuities with older forms of self-organisation have been ignored.116 The National League of 
the Blind and Disabled, for instance, had been established in 1899 and was run by disabled 
people.117 Moreover, the blurred distinction between a group such as DIG (focused on incomes 
and considered a for group) and UPIAS (focused on rights and considered an of group) mean 
that the dichotomy is problematic for historians of the period. Later work on Embodied Health 
Movements (EHMs) addresses some of these concerns. Brown et al have defined EHMs as 
building on ‘the embodied experience of people who have [a] disease’, and their challenge to 
‘existing medical/scientific knowledge and practice’. However, this still does not fully describe 
DPOs, since EHMs also ‘involve collaborating with scientists and health professionals in 
pursuing treatment’.118 Further, DPOs focus more on social oppression upon those with 
impairments rather than the medical aspects of disease. It is important, therefore, to 
understand that any overarching categorisation of disability voluntary organisations is 
problematic, and such terms should be used as guides rather than perfect descriptions of the 
state of the sector. 
As organisations became more politically active from the 1960s, so their role in policy 
making became more central. As discussed earlier, many commentators see the British welfare 
state as a pluralist structure, with a number of providers and policy makers from areas outside 
the traditional civil service or Houses of Parliament. Along with the creation and maintenance 
of voluntary and commercial groups in welfare provision there has also been a growing place 
for them in the policy sector. Sometimes referred to as “interest” or “pressure” groups, these 
organisation seek to influence the direction of existing policies, change attitudes or bring new 
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issues to the political agenda.119 They believe that organised bodies have more power to make 
their views heard.120 Grant indentifies three main characteristics. First, they are ‘organised’ 
entities, with some form of structure, membership and so on. Second, ‘their range of concern 
is narrower than that of political parties’ and they will therefore tend to be “single issue” 
groups, or purport to represent a specific constituency. Third, ‘they seek to exert influence of 
government rather than taking control of, or share in, government themselves’.121  
These attributes help us to understand if not the reality of the power structure in Britain 
then certainly voluntary organisations’ beliefs about it. These coloured their tactics. Over the 
1980s and 1990s, a number of political scientists studied how they operated. Their tendency to 
attempt to influence the government through Parliament and Whitehall showed that they had 
some faith in the bureaucratic power of the political establishment.122 Government as a whole 
(including the Civil Service) or “Whitehall” was often seen as a key battle ground, as 
governments were believed to have direct control over policy at the micro and macro levels. 
Parliament had much less power since most MPs were constrained in what they could say and 
do by their parties’ leadership,123 but could still be a useful institution to target because MPs 
and Lords may have one day become part of the government and could raise issues in the 
chamber that would be debated and reported upon.124 Later analyses have shown how this 
faith in “the establishment” has wavered,125 but was still an important part of pressure group 
strategy in the period under discussion. Besides, groups had already begun to use “unofficial” 
channels to influence policy. The growing exploitation of the mass media also shows that the 
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organisations had faith in the idea of “public opinion”.126 Pressure groups often tried to 
influence opinion in order to build more support and create awareness for their cause; if not 
overall public opinion (in the case of potentially divisive issues such as abortion) then certainly 
of informed opinion which was seen as having an impact on the minds of individuals within 
government.127 In more recent years, groups have been more active in providing detailed 
evidence for government select committees and inquiries to inform decision makers.128 In 
other situations, groups tried to compensate for their lack of ability to directly influence policy 
by challenging government in the courts. Test cases which question the legitimacy of 
government action could force reform.129  
These activities were not new – the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her 
Child, among others, had been actively lobbying the governments of the late-nineteenth 
century with information130 – however, the increased professionalisation and proliferation of 
voluntary organisations from the 1960s onwards led to both increased volume of submissions 
and an increase in government consultations in which groups were invited to participate. By 
the mid-1980s there was a growing ‘recognition of the importance of the state as a regulator 
of the pressure group system’.131 Indeed, there were benefits for both sides. The increase in 
the number and visibility of organisations was significant;132 for Coxall this could be taken as a 
sign that ‘social needs were not being met by the public authorities and the two major parties’, 
as the growth of minor parties in the House of Commons and the declining voter turnout 
appeared to indicate.133 The government began to make greater use of pressure groups for 
advice and information, acquiescence to policy changes and assistance in the administration of 
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the resulting policies.134 MPs and Lords also found the information provided by pressure 
groups invaluable for understanding political issues which had become so complex that no one 
member could possibly be well-informed about every issue they were expected to debate.135 
Similarly, the government could get forewarning of any potential dissent as well as gaining 
concessions from the major organisations in a particular field. This helped to legitimise their 
actions.136 Essentially, in return for access to the policy making process groups followed certain 
conditions as set out by the authorities. Those that were respectable and showed ‘restraint 
and moderation’ would be allowed “in”, whereas those who behaved in unacceptable ways 
tended to be ignored.137 These findings led to an “insider/outsider model” in which the 
government or establishment acts as a gatekeeper to admit certain organisations into the 
policy making process or keeps them “out of the loop”. This is a useful descriptive device as it 
allows our understanding of groups to change as they become more or less accepted by 
institutions over an historical period.138 However, such a model relies on an idealised form of 
consultation in developing legislation and fails to take into account less formal methods of 
influencing or directing policy.139 It is, therefore, more useful as a description of intent and 
tactics rather than as a status granted by government departments. 
Pressure groups have targeted all of these institutions – the media, Government and 
Parliament – in order to try and affect policy. However, specific groups chose to prioritise one 
section over another. This is the difference between an “open” strategy or a “focused” 
strategy.140 How successful these attempts were is attributable to a number of factors. Some 
causes may have been seen at a particular point in time as more worthy than others. Influence 
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could also be affected by the constituency of the group. Heffernan identifies four factors: 
‘visibility’ (how well the group becomes known to people in key positions or in the public 
consciousness); ‘resources’ (how well the group can raise funds and manpower to achieve its 
goals); ‘size of membership’ (in terms of gross numbers but also the relative number of people 
affected by the issue who join the group); and ‘legitimacy’ (how well the group is accepted by 
people in key positions).141 These issues are important to understanding some of the 
differences and tensions between voluntary organisations and pressure groups in the disability 
sector. 
Timeframe and key concepts 
Having shown the existing literature on the major themes this thesis tackles, I will now explain 
the approaches I have taken and why these were important areas to study. 
First, I have chosen the period 1965 to 1995 as it was a period of significant change for 
disability politics (see Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). On a practical level, thirty years was a 
manageable time frame in terms of source collection and analysis within the three years of a 
PhD study. In terms of landmark events, 1965 saw the formation of the DIG, the first pan-
impairment lobby group in the United Kingdom founded and run by disabled people. 1995 
witnessed the collapse of Rights Now, an umbrella organisation campaigning for anti-
discrimination legislation. This was also the year in which Incapacity Benefit was introduced 
and the Disability Discrimination Act passed. Importantly, very little historical work has been 
done on the primary material beyond 1980, allowing fresh insights into the more-recent past. 
Although this is a project on the British welfare state, it is also a project centred around 
Whitehall and Westminster. The period of study occurs before Scottish and Welsh devolution, 
but inevitably there is an English bias. A full investigation of all the areas of policy would have 
to include the particulars of Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as the role of local 
government in the administration of central government policies. References are made 
                                                          
141
 Heffernan, "Pressure Group Politics," p. 178. 
  38   
 
throughout when regional difficulties became a major topic of conversation. Overall, however, 
I concentrated on the overarching arguments rather than specific localised details. The subject 
of the study is the underlying concepts behind policy decisions rather than their 
implementation; although clearly, policy outcomes affect future policy decisions and will have 
to be referenced. 
Acknowledging the problems in precisely defining “disability”, and the “welfare state”, this 
thesis analyses the policies that the latter devised for the former. Political scientists and, in 
more recent years, historians have developed tools for analysing the policy-making process 
and its impact. According to Walt and Gilson, policy formulation can be thought of in terms of 
a triangle with the three corners representing ‘context’, ‘content’ and ‘process’. In the centre, 
‘actors’, or groups and individuals, have to work within and upon those parameters (see Figure 
1.3). As a basic framework it argues that those involved in the policy process are constrained 
by, influenced by and, in turn, influence the political and cultural context, the content of any 
policy document or legislation and the processes by which such policy is developed and 
practised.142 The actors in this triangle can be said to form a ‘policy network’, in which experts 
in the field exchange information on potential policy solutions and the relative merits and 
demerits of each.143 This and subsequent chapters will therefore provide the historical context 
in which decisions were made; outline the content of current and past legislation; provide 
insight into the discussions and bureaucratic and political processes which created this 
legislation; and examine the major politicians, political departments and lobbying 
organisations which took part in this entire process. 
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Table 1.1: Selected legislation affecting disabled people (1965-1995) 
Chronically Sick and Disabled 
Persons Act 1970 
Originally a Private Member’s Bill by Alf Morris, set out for 
the first time statutory obligations on local authorities to 
provide services for disabled people. 
National Insurance (Old 
Persons’ and Widows’ 
Pensions and Attendance 
Allowance) Act 1970  
Conservative Act borrowing from a failed Labour Bill, which 
provided the first “extra costs” benefit for the “civilian 
disabled”. 
Education (Handicapped 
Children) Act 1970 
Transferred responsibility for educating special needs pupils 
from the Department of Health and Social Security to the 
Department of Education and Science. 
National Insurance Act 1971 Created Invalidity Benefit, a new national insurance benefit 
for those claiming sickness benefit long-term. 
Social Security Benefits Act 
1975 
Created a set of new benefits for disabled people, including 
new allowances for carers, for the extra costs associated 
with mobility and a non-contributory pension for 
“housewives”. 
Social Security Act 1980 Reforms to benefit which restructured means-tested benefit 
and affected payment rates. 
Disabled Persons Act 1981 Originally a Private Member’s Bill by Dafydd Wigley, 
designed to improve access for disabled. 
Social Security Act 1986 Reforms to benefit which had a major impact on disabled 
people. Necessitated  the creation of new benefits to cover 
those who lost entitlement to benefit. 
Disabled Persons (Services, 
Consultation and 
Representation) Act 1986 
Originally a Private Member’s Bill by Tom Clarke, designed to 
allow disabled people to nominate a representative and 
increase participation of disabled people in decision-making 
processes. 
National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990 
Created framework for providing mental health and other 
care services in the community rather than in institutions. 
Disability Living Allowance and 
Disability Working Allowance 
Act 1991 
Created new benefits for disabled people, including a means-
tested earnings addition for disabled people in employment 
but disadvantaged in the labour market. 
Social Security (Incapacity for 
Work) Act 1993 
Replaced Invalidity Benefit with Incapacity Benefit, a new 
benefit with a form of medical test based on functional 
impairment rather than a physician’s diagnosis. 
Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 
Re-defined disability in law and provided protection for 
disabled people against unjustifiable discrimination. 
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Table 1.2: Selected events in disability policy, 1965-1995 
1965 Formation of the 
Disablement Income 
Group 
The first pan-impairment voluntary organisation 
lobbying for social security reform. 
1968 Seebohm Report Review of personal social services which included 
blueprints for reform of care and education. 
1971 Publication of 
Handicapped and 
Impaired in Great Britain 
The “Harris Survey”, the first time the government 
commissioned a report into how many disabled 
people lived in Britain. 
1972 Thalidomide scandal Led  to the creation of a new fund for “congenitally 
disabled” children and focused public attention on 
disability-related issues. 
1974 Formation of the Disability 
Alliance 
An umbrella lobby group formed in response to 
perceived failures in DIG’s approach.  
1974 Minister for Disabled 
People 
Alf Morris appointed “Minister for the Disabled” by 
Harold Wilson, the first such post in the world. Led 
to many reforms and publications from the Labour 
government. 
1975 Publication of 
Fundamental Principles 
Report of a meeting between DA and the Union of 
the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) 
which first outlined an embryonic social model 
approach to disability. 
1977 Formation of the Royal 
Association for Disability 
and Rehabilitation 
Government-sponsored voluntary organisation to 
represent all classes of disabled people and lobby on 
a wider remit than incomes policy. 
1978 EEC directive on equal 
treatment (gender) 
European regulation that men and women must be 
treated equally in social security. Led to legal 
challenges and benefit reform in the 1980s. 
1979 Committee on Restrictions 
Against Disabled People 
established 
Committee created by government to investigate 
access and anti-discrimination legislation for 
disabled people. It published its report in 1982. 
1981 International Year of 
Disabled People 
United Nations year which led to Disabled Persons 
Act 1981 and other voluntary action initiatives. 
1981 Formation of the British 
Council of Organisations 
of Disabled People 
National umbrella body of disabled people’s 
organisations which gained influence as the century 
went on. 
1988 Completion of various 
reviews of disability 
benefit 
Government survey of disabled people and services 
provided to them, resulting in many publications 
and green papers. 
1994 Civil Rights (Disabled 
Persons) Bill controversy 
Bill presented to outlaw unjustifiable discrimination 
against disabled people which was defeated by 
underhand tactics by the government. Controversy 
caused political difficulties for the government and 
led to the 1995 Act (see table 1.1). 
 
  41   
 
 
This is useful in identifying the areas that need to be investigated. The “why” of policy 
formation is more complex. Kingdon has provided a ‘multiple streams’ theory to explain why 
decisions are made in a particular way at a particular time. He argues that there are three 
‘streams’ of policy. These are constantly shifting. Only when all three converge do we get a 
‘policy window’; or in other words, the issue is on the political “agenda”. During this window 
policy can (but does not necessarily have to) change. The first is the ‘problem stream’. Until 
something can be seen as a problem it cannot be dealt with. The second is the ‘politics 
stream’. Until enough people believe the problem to be worth solving or until the benefits of 
solving the problem outweigh the costs it will not be prioritised. The third is the ‘solution 
stream’. Until the technological, bureaucratic and political tools exist to solve the problem it 
cannot be solved.144 Other explanations for change involve the idea of conflicting forces, 
internally and externally. Pearson and Prinz have argued that ‘only when policy begins to 
collapse under the weight of its own contradictions do governments summon up the courage 
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to introduce change’.145 Billis goes further to suggest that contradictions are not the only 
requirement. There needs to be a ‘less absurd’ alternative as well as a ‘crisis in the real world 
of problems’.146 These would be the ‘solution’ and ‘problem’ streams respectively in Kingdon’s 
analysis. If problems are not articulated successfully, there may be a ‘policy silence’, and hence 
no opportunity for change.147 This may be due to the failure of interested parties to 
successfully convince policy makers, or it may be because existing power structures make it 
impossible for people to see that there is a problem or that there might be alternatives.148 
Another approach in explaining the options open to policy makers is the theory of ‘path 
dependence’. It argues that an initial policy decision sets the establishment down a particular 
path that is difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to deviate from. Pierson explains this 
using the economic concept of ‘increasing returns’ where when an organisation “invests” in 
one course of action it gains more from continuing in that direction than by removing its 
investment and starting down a different path.149 This investment does not necessarily have to 
be financial, and can include moral, political or bureaucratic commitments, creating 
‘momentum’ and ‘policy feedback’. Change does and can occur at ‘branching points’ or ‘critical 
junctures’ during ‘trigger events’, and historians should pay attention to these to help explain 
how, why and when policies made significant shifts.150 This tendency to be constrained by the 
past has often been noted with regard to social policy and the welfare state. As Alcock has 
argued, ‘social policies are the product of history, not of logic.’151 Fawcett has used this theory 
to show how the British pensions system has been trapped in a ‘Beveridge Strait-jacket’. 
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Because the social security authorities were wedded to ideas about the role of national 
insurance contributions and social assistance, the Labour governments of the 1960s could not 
radically reform the system before they lost power in the 1970 election.152 Pierson has also 
argued that the Thatcher governments were constrained in how much of the welfare state 
they could roll back because of the electorate’s expectations which had been built since 
1948.153 These elements are clearly present in the period of my study; yet this was also a 
period of significant reform. Political commitments to disabled people and the way in which 
disability policy had been practiced limited policy makers; but opportunities for reform arose 
at various points and were taken by the governments of the day. 
By taking a bureaucratic definition of disability, I am specifically interested in the 
‘distributive dilemma’. This means I do not employ “disability” to describe a group identity or 
lived experience. Rather, I investigate the bureaucratic category of disability as expressed 
through government policy and the ways in which this definition was managed. This thesis is 
not about defining disability “as it essentially was”, but to understand what the government 
thought it was.154 It is a state-centred approach, as has been utilised by Blackie in the context 
of post-revolutionary disability benefits for veterans in the United States (though unlike Blackie 
I do not go on to explore the experiences of claimants).155 Like Berger and Luckman, I argue 
that societies ‘possess objective facticity’ and are ‘built up by activity that expresses subjective 
meaning’.156 Disability is a concept constructed from a number of subjective experiences. The 
“reality” of “disability” for the government is therefore self generating; but it is a different 
reality to the “disability” experienced by other constituencies, such as disabled people or the 
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lay public. So, the object of study is not discrimination by the state against those declared 
medically deviant per se. Rather, my subject is the codification of beliefs surrounding a 
phenomenon referred to by the government or by others as “disability”.  
This thesis cannot avoid the problem that by identifying disability policy as an object of 
study, it will inevitably be making judgements within this established framework. That is to say, 
I contend that on many levels “government”, “disability” and “policy”, in some form, “existed” 
during this period. It is clear that the actors and the British “state” (in the loosest form of the 
word) believed in these concepts and acted within these frameworks. Moreover, it is highly 
unlikely that policy actors understood their own actions in social modelist terms, and such a 
totalising view obscures the nuances in different approaches to the perceived problem of 
disability.157 
My interest in this Stonean definition has inevitably led to a bias towards social security. 
This is the most visible and high-profile example of how lines are drawn between eligibility and 
non-eligibility for distributive systems based on need. Other areas of disability policy provide 
the context for the decisions that were made, but they receive less discussion. A notable 
exception is the campaign for anti-discrimination legislation which cannot be separated from 
the political developments within the disability lobby and wider attitudes towards welfare 
during this period. For some, the study of one country’s social security system is considered 
passé: partly because transnational studies can provide new theoretical perspectives and 
partly because social security is just one form of redistributing income and managing 
poverty.158 My reasons for choosing this area for study are threefold. First, social security is a 
site for investigating my wider research question, “how did the government construct 
disability in the late-twentieth century?” The actions and inactions of government in this policy 
area will be instructive. Second, disability groups themselves chose social security as a major 
                                                          
157
 As shown above, Anderson, Borsay, Hampton and Mantin have come to similar conclusions about the 
use of the social model as an explanatory model for historical processes. 
158
 McKay and Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain, p. 22-26. 
  45   
 
area of policy. The initial campaigns for disabled people participating fully in society were 
focused on DIG’s National Disability Income. DIG and DA which championed this approach 
were two of the most high-profile campaigners during this time, and both have a wealth of 
archival material. This set the framework for post-sixties’ disability policy, as the following 
chapters demonstrate.  Third, the response of both Labour and Conservative governments to 
social issues before 1979 shows us that the provision of cash payments were considered a 
more effective and just form of welfare provision than services in kind.159 After 1979, 
perceived attacks on the welfare state alongside increased expenditure made social security a 
high-profile area for politicians and campaigners. Taken together, social security policy allows 
us to see changes in government and voluntary organisation attitudes towards disability policy 
over the thirty-year period, and draw conclusions about how the government’s construction of 
disability was understood at different times. 
In choosing this area of focus,  it must be noted that there were benefits which disabled 
people may have claimed, but not as a direct result of being disabled.160 For instance, people 
who may have considered themselves or have been considered by others to be disabled might 
have claimed unemployment benefit if they had no job.161 This could be because they did not 
qualify under the existing criteria for disability-related benefits, they chose not to claim or 
were unaware that they could claim for disability. Others such as housing benefit or council tax 
benefit were paid to disabled people not because they had a health condition but because 
their incomes fell below a set minimum. One could argue that their financial circumstances 
were a result of disability;162 but this was not the direct reason that these benefits were paid. It 
is therefore difficult to draw definitive distinctions between “disability benefits” and other 
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types of social security, as categories of claimants were fluid. The benefits discussed in this 
study (see table 1.4), therefore, are broadly those which would have been paid to disabled 
people because they were disabled and paid by the National Insurance system, directly by the 
government as non-contributory benefits, or as social assistance (National Assistance, 
Supplementary Benefit and Income Support). There are also references to funds which were 
created specifically for disabled people, or had major implications for disability policy and in 
turn tell us more about the government’s conception of disability. 
Having chosen this path, the reader may note a bias towards physical disability. People 
with cognitive disabilities and mental health issues were always eligible for disability benefits, 
but initial concerns clearly focused around physical access to work and services. Historically, 
the treatment of physical and mental disabilities has been different, and those affected by 
these issues have had different life experiences.163 The separation of the two is theoretically 
complex, and politically sensitive. I discuss all forms of disability in this study, although only as 
they were framed by the discourse of the day. Thus, while sensory impairments and mental 
health issues are discussed (and their representative voluntary organisations appear at various 
points in the text), it is clear that physical impairments and policy actors with physical 
impairments play a disproportionate role in the story. I contend that this is because these 
people had disproportionate access to policy communities.  
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Table 1.4: Key disability benefits, year of introduction and intended purpose. 
Benefit Started Target Group Type Replaced 
by 
Sickness Benefit 
(SB) 
Pre-1948 People with National Insurance 
(NI) contribution records who 
could not work due to illness. A 
longer-term rate was payable 
after 6 months. 
Earnings 
replacement 
Incapacity 
Benefit 
(1995) 
Industrial 
Injuries 
Benefits (IIB) 
Pre-1948 People injured in the workplace. Compensation n/a 
War Pensions 
(WP) 
Pre-1948 People injured while serving in 
the armed forces. 
Compensation n/a 
National 
Assistance / 
Supplementary 
Benefit 
1948 / 
1966 
All families earning below a 
subsistence wage. Certain classes 
of disabled people were entitled 
to more money than the general 
population (e.g., blind). 
Means tested Income 
Support 
(1988) 
Attendance 
Allowance (AA) 
1971 People requiring additional care 
in their own homes. 
Extra costs Disability 
Living 
Allowance 
(1993)** 
Invalidity 
Benefit (IVB) 
1971 General unemployed disabled 
people with NI contribution 
record. 
Earnings 
replacement 
Incapacity 
Benefit 
(1995) 
Non-
contributory 
invalidity 
pension (NCIP) 
1975 Disabled people without the 
necessary NI contributions for 
Invalidity Benefit. 
Means tested, 
earnings 
replacement 
Severe 
Disablement 
Allowance 
(1984) 
Mobility 
Allowance (MA) 
1975 People requiring help with 
transportation and mobility. 
Extra costs Disability 
Living 
Allowance 
(1993) 
Housewives’ 
non-
contributory 
invalidity 
pension 
(HNCIP) 
1977 Housewives who were unable to 
perform their ‘household duties’. 
Means tested, 
extra costs 
Severe 
Disablement 
Allowance 
(1984) 
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Invalid Care 
Allowance (ICA) 
1977 People who could not work due 
to caring for a relative. 
Extra costs, 
earnings 
replacement 
n/a 
Severe 
Disablement 
Allowance 
(SDA) 
1984 [Rationalised NCIP and removed 
the distinction between NCIP and 
HNCIP.] 
Means tested, 
earnings 
replacement 
n/a 
Income Support 1988 Families earning below a 
subsistence wage. Replaced many 
of the discretionary aspects of 
Supplementary Benefit and 
included a disability premium for 
disabled claimants. 
Means tested n/a 
Independent 
Living Fund 
(ILF) 
1988*** Severely disabled people 
requiring extra financial support 
to live independently in the 
community. 
Means tested, 
extra costs 
n/a 
Disability Living 
Allowance 
(DLA) 
1993 [Rationalised attendance 
allowance and mobility allowance 
into a single benefit.] 
Extra costs n/a 
Disability 
Working 
Allowance 
(DWA) 
1993 Disabled people with low 
earnings, designed to encourage 
them to find work and to help 
with the additional costs of 
disability.  
Means tested, 
earnings 
replacement 
n/a 
Incapacity 
Benefit (ICB) 
1995 General unemployed disabled 
and sick people. Replaced 
invalidity benefit and sickness 
benefit with a new “fit for work” 
test. 
Earnings 
replacement 
n/a 
* - dates after 1995 shown as “n/a”. 
** - after 1993, payments continued for those over the age of 65. Younger claimants were moved 
onto Disability Living Allowance. 
*** - a new fund was created in 1991. 
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In turn, this has influenced the linguistic choices I have made. The politics of whether to 
use the term “disabled people” or “people with disabilities” is an old and familiar topic.164 I 
come at this project from the British tradition and am writing about British political groups. I 
am therefore predisposed to use the “disabled people” construction, which politicises 
disability and shows that it is something imposed upon people. This tended to be the 
construction used at the time by the voluntary organisations I have studied, and later adopted 
by government departments. Similarly, there will be times where medical model and 
derogatory language (such as “handicap”, “spastics”, “mentally subnormal”) will be used. This 
is not to condone or reify these concepts, rather to emphasise the linguistic constructions of 
disability in the past. In other settings, I believe that outmoded concepts – such as “the 
disabled” or “the sick” – are actually useful tools in understanding the motivations of policy 
actors. I do not subscribe to the idea that “the disabled” are or should be seen as one 
homogenous group; but the continued use of the term throughout this period serves to 
remind us of the concepts underpinning government action and inaction. In short, I do not see 
myself as “doing” disability studies. My aim is not to emancipate disabled people. As a not-yet-
disabled person, I do not believe this is my role.165 Rather, my focus is on the political and 
social construction of disability as a bureaucratic category. The language used is a reflection on 
this category; not the lived experience of disabled people. 
I argue that three different approaches to disability have manifested themselves in 
government policy. These are my own constructions based on political and social historians’ 
uses of the terms. 
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The social-democratic approach. Expressed by the Labour Party in the 1960s and 1970s, 
this approach to disability drew on social-democratic ideas about equality of opportunity and 
redistribution of wealth.166 This has parallels with Esping-Andersen’s use of the term, but does 
not mean that the British welfare state regime under Labour can be categorised as such. 
Rather, I use the term to describe the nineteenth-century origins of a political strategy that 
used parliamentary democracy to move towards socialism rather than full-blown Marxist 
revolution.167 Lowe has in turn referred to this approach as ‘democratic socialism’.168 In this 
scheme, disability was recognised along with other aspects of the “rediscovery of poverty” as 
an area that had been neglected by the Beveridge settlement. Therefore, further resources 
were provided to disabled people, primarily in the form of cash payments which could be 
spent on services that disabled people felt they needed. This was provided to British citizens as 
a right. However, reform was slow and piecemeal as the government had to juggle economic 
considerations with the competing, and sometimes more-established demands of other well-
represented interest groups. 
The liberal approach. For the Conservative Party, society had a moral duty to provide aid 
to the “deserving poor”. Lowe has used the term ‘reluctant collectivism’,169 and I take the 
“liberal approach” to invoke similar attitudes to the liberal welfare state regime described by 
Esping-Andersen. During the 1960s, Conservatives also agreed that disabled people had been 
neglected, though they argued this was a result of too much money being spent on people 
who did not need it. As part of a campaign of targeting benefits at the “most in need”, disabled 
people were seen as worthy recipients. Again, the pace of change was slow and the resources 
made available were minimal. But this was seen as part of older concerns of “less eligibility” 
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and social security as poverty relief rather than enabling equal participation in society. 
Disability benefits were therefore something society would provide, but only if it was believed 
the state could afford it. 
The neo-liberal approach. After the election defeats of 1974, Conservative thinking 
became more overtly monetarist, and attempts to reduce social security expenditure were 
prioritised.170 This borrowed from earlier liberal approaches to moral hazard, the work ethic 
and benefit dependency. Disabled people were therefore considered to be disadvantaged, but 
capable of providing for themselves with the right work incentives. Expenditure had to be 
curbed, while disabled people were encouraged to become self-sufficient. This led the 
government to accelerate the deinstitutionalisation that had begun in the 1960s, but also 
involved restrictions to which  benefits could be claimed. In the later period, the rising costs of 
disability benefits jarred with attempts to reduce overall government expenditure, resulting in 
new definitions of disability to separate those considered capable of some form of work and 
those deserving of full state support.171 
After my research was completed, Jameel Hampton submitted his thesis at the University 
of Bristol on the welfare state and the ‘general classes’ of disabled people between 1948 and 
1975.172 This has meant that there is some overlap in the material and events discussed, and 
some similar conclusions were reached independently. However, it is clear that we have taken 
very different approaches. Hampton has evaluated the impact of policy on the lived experience 
of disabled people. Further, he has concentrated more on the Personal Social Services and the 
role of the media. He has therefore spent more time evaluating the relative “success” of 
government policy, while ending in 1975 means his thesis has had to engage less with the 
social model and political friction within the disability movement from the late-seventies 
onwards. My approach is centred far more on the government rather than wider concepts of 
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the state, and seeks to understand how different definitions of disability which began to 
circulate from the 1960s were absorbed or rejected. The reader will notice that while some of 
the events will be familiar, our use of the material is significantly different. 
Data collection and analytical techniques 
This was a three-year study conducted for a PhD at the Centre for History in Public Health at 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. It is an historical analysis of government 
policy in Britain between 1965 and 1995. Primarily it relies on documentary evidence from 
archival sources and publications from governmental and non-governmental organisations 
from the period. Some oral history interviews were conducted as part of the research process, 
but these were not central to the analysis. 
I focused on the ways in which the government interpreted and constructed the typology 
of disability, the aim being to investigate the ‘distinctions used by people in a setting to break 
up the complexity of reality into distinguishable parts’.173 By focusing on the language and 
definitions created by the government, I aimed to provide insight into the meaning of 
“disability” as a distinguishable category. New research questions were formed as new 
information was discovered so that the lines of enquiry could remain open and follow the data 
available as well as the most conceptually interesting leads. Ultimately, this approach gave me 
the flexibility to be able to juggle with these concepts and provide them in this final form. 
The sheer weight of material on this subject has necessitated selection. Even a full analysis 
of the few areas Robert Drake describes as ‘vital to participation in society’ – growth 
(education), movement (transport) and location (accessible housing and public buildings)174 – 
would have been impossible in a PhD thesis. Therefore, I have taken what I believe to be 
events and areas in policy which help illuminate the processes which are of central concern; 
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namely, the ways in which the category of disability was defined and redefined within the 
British government over the period. As I have discussed, I have also focused on the poverty 
lobby175 and the topic of social security to keep a coherent narrative. Groups such as DIG, DA 
and RADAR were leading figures in this arena, and were pan-impairment. This has meant wider 
concerns about disability as a whole have been brought out from the specific cases of social 
security reform. 
I set out to make use of oral history evidence to delve deeper into areas untouched by 
extant written material. One of the advantages of my chosen time frame was that many of the 
actors were still alive and retired, and therefore free to speak to me more candidly. In 
particular, I was interested in the emotions from policy actors which may never have been 
documented on paper, or evidence that may still be restricted in depositories such as the 
National Archives.176 Through the research process I found my initial interviews more useful 
for directing me towards other materials rather than the sole source of information in their 
own right. In some cases, I have quoted from my interviewees to add more depth or 
supporting evidence to a particular claim; in general, however, the interviews have become 
research references. As a result I conducted fewer interviews than originally intended, and 
using them as central to the argument would add undue weight to the words of a few, 
selectively chosen actors. This has given me different sources of evidence, but not fewer or 
less varied. Many of the principal actors have themselves written about their experiences in 
the media and in other publications.177 It is also clear that there is far more extant and 
accessible written material than I had initially supposed. The thesis, I believe, has enough 
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evidence to support its key conclusions, and may in the future be strengthened by further and 
more in-depth oral history data. 
Source materials 
The project made use of archival material from four main sources: the National Archives 
(quoted in footnotes as TNA) in Kew, London; the Peter Townsend Collection (PTC) at the 
University of Essex, Colchester; the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University of 
Warwick, Coventry; and the files of Disability Rights UK (RADAR).178 The University of Leeds 
(LEEDS) has also digitised a number of texts produced by disability organisations, particularly 
BCODP.179 Additionally, many governmental and parliamentary publications have provided the 
“public voice” of the government and the opposition through Hansard, Command Papers, Bills, 
Acts and House of Commons Papers.180 Other published materials have also become primary 
sources in their own right because of when they were published and by whom. The Times 
Digital Archive has been a source of media coverage of the events of the period. 
Disability concerned many government departments, and TNA provided files from a wide 
range including the Home Office, Department of Health and Social Security, the Treasury, the 
Cabinet Office, the Department of Employment, the Department of Education and Science and 
the Prime Minister’s Office (and their predecessors and successors). This included research 
papers, civil service memoranda, policy decisions taken by ministers, correspondence with 
internal and external bodies, advisory committee minutes, press releases, press cuttings and 
so forth. PTC contained the correspondence and minutes of DA from their foundation up to 
1998, deposited by Professor Peter Townsend, DA’s founder and long-time Chair. The 
collection also includes publications both from DA and external voluntary organisations such as 
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DIG, BCODP and many local groups. MRC holds files from DIG from 1965 to 1975 deposited by 
both Dr Fred Reid (a lecturer at the University of Warwick and DIG member) and the Coventry 
Branch of DIG on its dissolution in 1975. As well as publications and correspondence, this 
collection has a wide range of local branch newsletters from across the country. Additionally, 
files from the British Association of Social Workers contain correspondence with government 
and other voluntary organisations on the subject of disability. Finally, I am grateful for the 
opportunity to visit Disability Rights UK and its office in London to study RADAR’s newsletters 
and annual reports. I was also allowed access to their older files, including minutes of the 
Central Council of the Disabled which were stored offsite. I thank Mary Convill and Marije 
Davidson in particular for providing me with a workspace and access to the material. 
Despite the oral histories being of secondary importance in the analysis, all the interviews 
were conducted in such a way as to comply with “best practice” and university ethics 
guidelines. Although a rough interview schedule was developed, I did not stick rigidly to it, 
preferring to let the conversation develop naturally.  This often teases out information which 
may not be forthcoming from direct questioning,181 though the questions were designed to 
steer the interviewee to touch on the subjects I had identified as important. The purpose of 
the interviews was to explore the ‘policy community’,182 therefore the questioning had to be 
focused on common themes to provide relevant and comparable information. Inevitably, this 
meant I was following leads from one interviewee with the next, or from other primary 
material that was collected, though I felt this increased my understanding of the subject and 
made further research easier. Still, as all the interviewees were “elites” in their fields, 
interviews can often provide “official” narratives rather than their “real” experiences. These 
can sometimes be amplified by the power relationships between interviewee and 
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interviewer183 and a perceived need for confidentiality.184 All interviews were conducted in a 
location suitable to the interviewee. Where possible this was in a domestic setting as offices 
and public places have been found to produce more “official” sounding interviews which 
reflect more upon events than on personal experiences.185 This was not always possible, 
especially with those interviewees who were not yet retired. However, all historical evidence 
has flaws and is affected by its purpose and its author. “Inconsistencies” or “misremembering” 
may, therefore, be useful evidence.186 Following this process made me more confident that the 
information I was receiving could be treated as reliable and checked against other forms of 
historical record. 
Not all the interviewees have been directly quoted, but all helped me immeasurably by 
sparking new research questions, directing me to other people and helping track down other 
historical sources. I wish to take this opportunity to thank (in alphabetical order) Dr Roger 
Berry, Tom Clarke MP, Agnes Fletcher, Sir Graham Hart, Baroness Masham of Ilton, Sir Bert 
Massie, the late Lord Tony Newton, Victoria Scott, Susan Scott-Parker, and Lord Dafydd Wigley 
for their time, help and patience. 
Thesis structure 
This thesis shows how policy towards disabled people changed in Britain from the 1965 to 
1995. By focusing on what services were provided to disabled people, and how eligibility 
criteria were drafted, it shows how disability was constructed by government. I argue that 
definitions supplied by voluntary organisations were never fully embraced. However, disabled 
people were able to claim successfully that the government had a moral, political and legal 
duty to provide certain services. Different political parties had different ideas about what 
support should be provided – and, crucially, why. 
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I have structured the following chapters chronologically according to broad times of 
change. Each begins with an introduction, within which I include “policy context” sections on 
wider government policy and the state of the economy. This is followed by analysis of the state 
of the “lobby” during the period. I then explore how policy was formulated and what 
“government action” was taken. The three approaches outlined above frame these discussions 
and explain why governments of different parties reached the conclusions that they did.  
Chapter 2 examines the period between 1965 and 1972. It asks what tactics the nascent 
DIG used in its National Disability Income campaign and whether it was able to impact upon 
government thought. As both Labour and Conservative governments directed resources to 
planning and implementing new benefits, why were two opposing approaches to disability 
able to reach a consensus of action? Using the literature on policy formation and Kingdon’s 
work on agenda setting,187 I explain how disability came to be an important policy issue during 
this period and how the Department of Health and Social Security responded. 
Chapter 3 covers a dynamic period between 1972 and 1979. The disability lobby began to 
fragment at this time, and new social definitions of disability were coming to the fore. How did 
the lobby’s tactics change, and how did the government respond? How did the government 
utilise voluntary organisations, and what does this say about its underlying approach to 
disability? I also ask how the decisions taken in the earlier period informed or constrained 
further developments. Finally, I investigate Stone’s contention that disability schemes tend to 
broaden as pressure comes to bear on government to relax eligibility criteria through lobbying 
groups, the courts and political priorities.188 
Chapter 4 analyses the majority of Margaret Thatcher’s time in office, running from 1979 
to 1988. Taking Pierson’s thesis that the Conservatives were unable to reform the welfare 
state or sickness-related benefits significantly,189 I examine whether the case of disability 
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benefits bears this out. While there were no new benefits created for disabled people during 
this time, none were removed either. What can we learn about the government’s concept of 
disability and attitude towards disability policy from this? If the “Fabian” poverty lobby found 
it more difficult to influence the government in this period,190 how did its tactics evolve? Did 
this pave the way for DPOs to become more influential? And again, did the reforms of the 
1970s restrict what policy-makers could accomplish in the 1980s? 
To end the thesis, Chapter 5 examines the era of neo-liberal disability policies from 1988 to 
1995. How did the significant rise in expenditure on disability-related social security affect 
government attitudes? Why was reform made towards the end of Conservative rule rather 
than the beginning? With DPOs and other disability organisations rallying around the cause of 
Civil Rights Bills in Parliament, what developments can we see in both voluntary groups’ tactics 
and government responses to them? And given their historical antipathy, how strong were 
these alliances between groups of and for disabled people? 
This thesis goes beyond the highly politicised disability histories of this period to look more 
closely at the voluntary organisations and government actions which shaped disability policy in 
the late-twentieth century. Building on histories of pressure groups and welfare policy,191 the 
specific case of disability shows that there are parallels as well as contradictions to be drawn. 
By utilising under-used materials from DA and DIG, as well as official papers, this analysis of 
British disability policy presents an original insight into the way in which disability was seen by 
government. I show that there have been many “disabilities” depending on the organisations 
defining the issue. By choosing the approach outlined in this introductory chapter, I argue that 
totalising narratives of disability history and the oppressive nature of the state fail to show the 
subtleties in understanding amongst individuals and collectives. 
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Chapter 2 – Establishing disability – 1965 – 1972 
Introduction 
This chapter shows how disability and the distributive dilemma were reconceived in the 
political climate of the 1960s. As the rediscovery of poverty uncovered disabled people as at 
significant risk of poverty, traditional definitions of sickness and disability were shown to be 
inadequate. This led to a critical juncture in welfare policy which set the framework for 
disability benefits throughout the twentieth century.  
The Disablement Income Group (DIG) was successful in convincing both the Labour and 
Conservative governments that the cause of “the civilian disabled” was worthy of attention. As 
a result of its campaigns for a National Disability Income, two new social security benefits were 
provided – Attendance Allowance (AA) and Invalidity Benefit (IVB). Additionally, the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) made efforts to better understand the scale 
of disability in the country through an official survey, and back-bench pressure led to the 
passing of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. I argue that these policy 
solutions were acceptable to the three main actors – the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, 
and DIG. However, the underlying concepts of disability which made these solutions 
acceptable were rather different. DIG’s Fabian approach to disability was not fully endorsed by 
either Labour (which favoured a social-democratic approach) or the Conservatives (with a 
liberal approach). This meant that policy reform was not as radical as DIG had hoped. 
In this section, I explain how social security for disabled people was partial. Certain groups 
were entitled to more support from the state than others as a result of the Beveridge 
settlement in the forties. I then outline two different approaches to solving the issues arising 
from this inequality from the Labour and Conservative parties. In the second section I show 
how DIG quickly and effectively showed the iniquities in the existing system, and drew wider 
conclusions about the position of disabled people and the services with which they ought to be 
provided. It adopted an approach to campaigning associated with Fabian “poverty lobby” 
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groups which also emerged in the mid-sixties.1 The Group’s “insider” tactics allowed it to build 
contacts with influential individuals, and its cause was seized upon by politicians and ministers 
from both major parties. This diverted the ‘problem’ stream by highlighting disability as a 
political issue, the ‘politics’ stream by convincing people of its importance, and went some way 
to influencing the ‘solution’ stream by redefining disability and offering alternative support 
schemes.2 However, its wider argument that a National Disability Income be provided to all 
disabled people was rejected as too costly and impractical. 
The idea of a true political “consensus” has been challenged by historians.3 As I will show, 
however, there is a remarkable continuity in the actions taken by both parties. The third and 
fourth sections explain why this was so. I begin by detailing Labour’s responses to the newly-
discovered “civilian disabled”. New surveys and investigations were started in the 1960s, but 
few reached legislative conclusions before the 1970 General Election. This was because Labour 
– and in particular the Secretary of State for Social Services between 1968 and 1970, Richard 
Crossman – had other priorities and had already committed itself to other areas of social and 
economic reform. In the following section, I show how the Conservative government re-
introduced failed legislation in a modified form creating AA and IVB. This was because the new 
Secretary of State (Sir Keith Joseph) and the Conservative Party had committed themselves to 
providing new cash benefits to groups they saw as vulnerable and deserving. Labour’s planning 
provided acceptable tools for achieving this. 
Policy context – Social security for disabled people before 1965 
By the 1960s, voluntary organisations and the major parties had come to realise that there 
were flaws in the social security system devised in the 1940s. Disabled people were not 
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recognised as a specific category.4 Coverage was therefore provided to specific impairment 
groups, or individuals received support on their qualification for some other form of 
assistance. Discontent lead to a reappraisal of welfare services, and coloured both major 
parties’ attitudes towards social security. 
As described in the previous chapter, Tania Burchardt has identified four types of disability 
benefit in British history: 
 compensation benefits; 
 earnings-replacement benefits; 
 extra-costs benefits; 
 and means-tested benefits.5 
The relative weighting of these in Britain before 1965 explains why DIG began campaigning 
for disability benefit reform and the choices it made in putting forward its policy solution. 
Compensation benefits 
Earlier in the century, the state had committed itself to providing compensation pensions for 
those injured in the armed services (War Pensions) and those injured or diseased as a direct 
result of their work (Industrial Injuries Benefit). These were justified on the basis that soldiers 
and industrial workers were putting their health at risk for the good of the nation.6 Trade-
union lobbying had led to workman’s compensation legislation, while the moral case for 
treating war veterans had been enhanced by the devastation of the First World War.7 DIG’s 
campaign literature therefore distinguished between “the civilian disabled” who were not 
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entitled to these benefits and those who were. In this thesis, I refer to these compensation 
benefits as “duty pensions” for similar reasons. 
A pension was payable on a ‘percentage of disablement’ basis. A medical examination 
determined the ‘loss of faculty’ and pensions were paid as a percentage of the full amount. 
100% disablement did not necessarily constitute complete incapacity. Further, payment of the 
pension was not dependent on unemployment or unemployability, meaning one could work 
and still receive it. These duty pensions paid a significantly higher rate than any other benefit 
available to disabled people, and included more generous additions. Of particular note in the 
context of the period covered in this chapter is the constant attendance allowance which was 
payable to cover the costs of those who required care during the day or night.8 
Earnings-replacement benefits 
Under National Insurance (NI), disabled people were entitled to the general-purpose Sickness 
Benefit, which paid at a higher rate after twelve months. This required proof of incapacity for 
work, usually through a doctor’s certificate and an examination by a government-appointed 
doctor if there was a dispute.9 However, this was only available to individuals who had built up 
insurance contributions, and so was not available to those disabled from childhood or most 
married women. For this latter group, the additional argument was made that since married 
women did not work, no earnings were lost if the wife was disabled. Wives were legally 
considered dependent upon their husbands for their income.10 For those unable to prove their 
inability to work on health grounds, standard Unemployment Benefit (UB) was provided at the 
same weekly rate, but this required the claimant to make themselves available for work. If the 
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household did not contain someone covered under NI, they had to rely on means-tested 
benefits. 
Extra-costs benefits 
Outside the additional constant attendance allowance in the duty pensions, there were no 
extra-costs benefits available to disabled people as benefits in their own right. Additions were 
made in all benefit types based on assumed needs of dependent family members. Wives, 
children and other dependent adults were considered. The lack of provision for the extra costs 
associated with disability became a key part of the debate in the late 1960s.11 
Means-tested benefits 
For those without NI contributions, the National Assistance Board (NAB) provided payments. 
These were designed to be paid at a subsistence level, as per the Beveridge settlement, and 
only available to those on very low incomes. Other payments were available to those with 
dependents; for those reliant upon National Assistance long-term; for certain impairments 
(such as blindness or tuberculosis); and for exceptional needs, such as necessary one-off 
purchases for the household.12 The rates of payment were deliberately low to maintain the 
insurance principle, and would decrease depending on other benefits and assets so that the 
claimant’s total income remained around the subsistence line. Payment was based on the 
discretion of the NAB, and because of its association with the Poor Law guardians of the pre-
Beveridge system there was stigma attached to seeking its help.13 
At this time, payments to disabled people were made on the basis of their unemployment 
or their relative poverty. As per the Stonean ‘distributive dilemma’14 and liberal welfare 
regime,15 resources were concentrated on those who were either covered by NI or could 
                                                          
11
 MRC: MSS 108/3/6, Towards a National Disability Income, DIG Paper #9, December 1968. 
12
 See National Assistance Board, Report of the National Assistance Board for the year ended 31st 
December 1963 (Cmnd. 2386, 1964), esp. pp. 20, 25. 
13
 Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, p. 61. 
14
 Stone, The Disabled State. 
15
 Esping-Andersen, The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Jordan shows that the ‘liberal tradition’ of 
welfare requires poverty to be a condition for wealth redistribution. This means that only the “most in 
  64   
 
demonstrate financial hardship as a result of a medical condition. There was no grand category 
of “disabled people”, save for references to the number of ‘sick and disabled’ people claiming 
National Assistance.16 Rather, there was a collection of benefits payable to those covered by 
forms of insurance, compensation legislation or social assistance. It is in this context that 
Labour, the Conservatives and voluntary organisations became more concerned for the lack of 
proper provision for disabled people as a whole. 
Policy context – Labour’s “social-democratic” approach 
I will explain why the Labour and Conservative governments acted as they did towards DIG and 
the subject of disability by sketching out their broad attitudes to social security policy. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, I have identified the “social-democratic” approach towards 
disability as one that sees disabled people as a group unable to participate fully in society. 
Policies to help such groups were therefore designed to enable individuals to participate, a 
duty of government towards its disadvantaged citizens.17 As far as possible, any benefits 
provided would be “universal” (in the sense that they were not means tested), but some form 
of selectivity was needed to ensure that costs were kept manageable. The politics and policies 
of the Labour governments between 1964 and 1970 show how disability could be recognised 
as a new category; but they also show why concrete policy responses were slow to materialise. 
One element of the social-democratic approach is that a balance must be sought between 
the needs of labour and capital.18 Thus, while it is important for industry to have access to have 
a healthy, well-fed and well-educated workforce, it is also necessary to control taxation and 
expenditure. Very often, therefore, this leads to “prioritisation” of policies, since social 
democracy (unlike radical Marxism) seeks gradual reform rather than worker revolution.19 The 
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sterling crises between 1964 and 1967 also limited what the government could do. Michael J. 
Oliver has argued that while this would have troubled any administration, the way Labour 
responded – by reducing confidence in the currency still further – ‘turned challenge into 
crisis’.20 Recent analyses have stressed that while the myriad external factors that made 
effective economic management very difficult, Wilson’s record is not strong in this regard.21 
Subjects of reform were therefore prioritised within what was seen as affordable. In the social 
security realm, Labour’s political commitments revolved around pensions, embodied in 
Richard Crossman’s 1957 document National Superannuation: Labour’s Policy for Security in 
Old Age. The plans did not specifically mention disabled people as a group, though they were 
designed to provide earnings-related benefits for retirement, unemployment and sickness.22 
Crossman continued to make this his priority throughout the sixties, but the government was 
soon inundated with new demands from a variety of disadvantaged groups. National 
Superannuation had been the result of extensive study alongside a group of academics from 
the London School of Economics, including Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter 
Townsend. They had been at the forefront of the “rediscovery of poverty”. The publication of 
Abel-Smith and Townsend’s The Poor and the Poorest23 had led to the creation of the Child 
Poverty Action Group (CPAG), a lobbying organisation that campaigned for higher household 
incomes.24 DIG also grew from this tradition. 
Another priority was bureaucratic reform. This was seen as necessary to improve the 
machinery of government so that more fundamental social policies could be efficiently 
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administered. After the “thirteen wasted years” under Conservative rule, Labour proposed to 
take a more active role in planning the economy.25 Cronin argues that this captured the mood 
of the electorate, and was a major factor in Wilson’s victory.26 Wilson had been a civil servant 
during the war, and believed that the institutions were fundamentally sound, but used too 
many “Oxbridge classics students” rather than experts in specific fields.27 The Plowden Report 
published in 1968 recommended a more managerial style of administration. Yet many 
attempts to do so are seen as failures, built on a ‘naive’ assumption that the economy would 
continue to grow evenly, and that Westminster was capable of directing it.28 Notably, the 
Department of Economic Affairs, which was supposed to rival the Treasury in dictating 
economic policy, was closed in 1969 after a combination of rising unemployment and 
arguments with the cabinet.29 The Ministry of Social Security (MSS) and Ministry of Health 
were merged into the single DHSS in 1968, often seen as the result of Crossman’s political 
ambitions rather than administrative ease.30 Even the commitment to using more experts was 
half-hearted, with permanent specialist advisors often appointed but never fully integrated 
into government as the French cabinet system had done. Neither traditional nor radical, these 
changes ensured that the machinery of government became clogged.31  
Despite these problems, Labour did manage some reforms to social security. The NAB was 
replaced by the Supplementary Benefits Commission (SBC) in an attempt to make means-
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tested benefits more efficient. This, it was hoped, would remove the stigma of National 
Assistance for those who remembered the Poor Law and introduce a more structured and 
consistent decision-making process for claimants.32 Labour also showed that it could respond 
to politically sensitive causes as they arose. CPAG, for example, was successful in arguing for 
reform to family allowances between 1967 to 1969, despite the government not going as far as 
CPAG had hoped.33 However, Thornton has claimed that on its boldest promises Wilson’s 
government was a failure. Although there were significant rises in the rates of NI benefits and 
new supplements for widows, the sick and the unemployed, plans for a more redistributive 
pension system and a minimum as-of-right ‘income guarantee’ did not materialise. Crossman’s 
Superannuation plans were not updated to be relevant to the sixties, and the government only 
began seriously addressing them in 1967, three years after the first election victory.34 
It is important to note, therefore, that Labour’s social-democratic approach involved the 
recognition of groups requiring support as citizens – but responses to the demands of these 
groups were constrained by economic realities and existing policy priorities. This is in contrast 
to the Conservative “liberal” approach which saw disabled people in the sick role, and as part 
of the tradition of the deserving poor. However, there are also similarities in terms of policy 
prioritisation and economic constraints. 
Policy context – The Conservatives’ “liberal” approach 
For the Conservatives, disabled people were permitted to be inactive in the labour market 
because it was seen as unreasonable for them to be expected to work. As part of the 
“deserving poor”, benefits would be targeted through means testing and other forms of 
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selectivity to ensure that limited resources reached those “most in need” of support.35 By 
extension, aid would be provided only as far as resources allowed, and any increase in benefits 
would be limited by a commitment to (relatively) low taxation and other economic priorities.36 
Heath is often accused of being elected with a commitment to neo-liberal, right-wing 
policies, but performed multiple U-turns when the results of those policies were unpopular.37 
With an electorate that still saw unemployment as a marker of poor government,38 Heath was 
particularly embarrassed when unemployment passed the one-million mark. However, had he 
used the measures of joblessness from the 1980s (which were designed to hide 
unemployment), the figure would have been closer to 800,000.39 Still, the Heath years have 
been re-assessed since the early-nineties. Many of the attacks on Heath’s U-turns have come 
from Thatcherites, who used Heath’s “failure” to justify their own political choices during the 
1980s.40 As for being committed to right-wing policies in 1970, this downplays Heath’s “One 
Nation Conservatism” which emphasised the duty of the government towards the most 
vulnerable, and the dangers of creating a nation with great disparity between the wealthy and 
the poor.41 Indeed, the Conservatives had campaigned on the promise to ‘give priority to those 
most in need’42 and between 1970 and 1974, expenditure on welfare services grew 
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considerably.43 Heath declared himself proud of this record in his autobiography.44 For the left, 
however, targeting and means testing meant that the government was ‘hard-hearted and 
uncaring’.45 
The Conservatives also tried to improve economic planning so that the state would be 
more efficient and growth more regular.46 For them, however, this was not so that growth 
could be more equally distributed amongst the population. Rather they believed that as the 
economy grew, more jobs would be created and more resources would be available to those in 
dire need.47 Heath also wanted to utilise “experts”,48 and created the Central Policy Review 
Staff to scrutinise policy above the vested interests of individual departments. This, he hoped, 
would allow Whitehall to plan its activities with greater foresight.49 An old Macmillan tool, the 
Programme Expenditure Survey Committee, was replaced with Programme Analysis Review 
(PAR) as an attempt to get departments to show explicitly to the Treasury what resources 
would be required for a number of years into the future. However, the Treasury hated it, 
preferring to have direct control of expenditure for itself. In the end, Hennessey writes, ‘PAR 
became slow, top heavy and the victim of the relentless interdepartmental grind’.50 Another 
study of PAR lamented that ‘the mechanisms for translating results of analysis into action were 
sadly lacking’.51 Combined with the oil crisis and industrial disputes in 1973 and 1974, the 
government was severely restricted in terms of the resources it could dedicate towards social 
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security. As with the Labour governments, this lead to prioritisation of policy and new benefits 
were restricted to keep costs to a minimum. 
Despite these major economic problems in the sixties and seventies, followers of both the 
liberal and social-democratic approaches were able to see disability as an area of concern. As I 
will demonstrate, both parties responded to the growth of DIG and disability issues, and both 
directed their administrations to seek out information on disability issues and provide concrete 
legislative proposals. Disabled people – who thanks to DIG’s campaigning had been recognised 
by 1970 as both disadvantaged and “worthy” recipients of “targeted” support – were in a good 
position to grab the parties’ attentions. Labour and Conservative politicians believed that the 
country needed to strengthen the economy and redistribute some of those gains towards 
disadvantaged people. This guided government constructions of disability. In the social-
democratic tradition, disabled people were a group requiring support to help them achieve a 
more equal standing; in the liberal tradition, disabled people were worthy of receiving support 
due to their legitimate exclusion from traditional employment.  
The Lobby – DIG establishes “the civilian disabled” 
DIG’s origins 
While the two parties’ attitudes towards social welfare and the economy allowed them to see 
disability as a problem, voluntary organisations were crucial in bringing the ‘problem stream’52  
to the government’s attention. The most prominent and successful of these was DIG, and its 
particular methods of campaigning had a significant impact on how disability was framed and 
understood by the government. Thus, DIG is significant for two reasons. First, it established 
disability as an object of policy. By showing how individuals were treated in different ways 
based on an arbitrary system which prioritised cause of impairment over need, DIG was able to 
show that “the civilian disabled” were neglected by the welfare state and required support. 
Second, by using a Fabian insider approach to press its politics on the government and 
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politicians, it established a framework for the major disability organisations over the late-
twentieth century and their relations with Westminster and Whitehall. 
DIG is credited as the first organisation formed by disabled people to campaign for 
disabled people as a class rather than representing a specific impairment group.53 It was 
formed by two “housewives”, Megan du Boisson and Berit Thornberry.54 This is significant 
because the married or co-habiting woman was at a significant disadvantage within the social 
security system. Both were diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and set up DIG to fight for a 
guaranteed income within the welfare state paid to individuals as their right as a citizen. The 
overwhelming response to her letter in The Guardian in 1965 made Du Boisson realise that 
there was a need for a pressure group to raise awareness of the difficulties disabled people 
faced. Along with Thornberry, she set up DIG in Godalming, Surrey, and set about lobbying 
politicians at the local and national level to secure changes in legislation.55 Early patrons 
included Abel-Smith, Townsend and David Owen,56 emphasising the link with the emergent 
poverty lobby and centre-left politics. Other branches were soon added, and DIG took on a 
national character with new chapters in the Midlands and the North, and the formation of DIG 
Scotland. The branches ensured a core membership of people at local level supporting and 
complementing the lobbying activities of the central command in Westminster. This appears to 
be in large part attributable to the work of Du Boisson whose energy and contacts made a real 
impression. It is significant that Du Boisson – usually referred to affectionately as “Megan” – is 
referenced regularly in Hansard and in the memoirs of those who have written about disability 
politics in the 1960s.57 Thornberry, however, is not, despite evidence that she was campaigning 
                                                          
53
 See for example, Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics. 
54
 Berit Thornberry’s name changed twice over this period. At various time she was called Moore, 
Thornberry and Stuland. Thankfully, Berit is not a common name. For clarity, I refer to her as Thornberry 
unless quoting directly from a source. 
55
 See also Derek Kinrade, Alf Morris : people's parliamentarian : scenes from the life of Lord Morris of 
Manchester (London: National Information Forum, 2007), pp. 139-44; Evans, "Stopping the Poor Getting 
Poorer," p. 148; Whiteley and Winyard, Pressure for the poor, pp. 43-44. 
56
 Owen would be elected as a Labour MP in 1966, and quickly became a junior minister. 
57
 See especially Kinrade, Alf Morris; Jack Ashley, Journey into silence (London: Bodley Head, 1973); 
David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Penguin, 1991). 
  72   
 
for DIG and multiple sclerosis groups.58 Du Boisson comes across in the historical record as a 
charismatic leader and an inspiration to those around her. An interview with The Times in May 
1967 shows a woman dedicated to the cause and in command of a ‘river of statistics [and] case 
histories’.59 This was important in establishing both the administrative framework for DIG and 
selling the message. ‘Charismatic leaders’ can help shape an organisation’s identity and dictate 
its future policy priorities.60 
The National Disability Income campaign 
DIG’s main focus was on a “National Disability Income”. Initially outlined in a September 1965 
memorandum to Douglas Houghton (then “overlord” minister for health and social security),61 
Structure of a National Disability Income62 was updated in 1968,63 197264 and 1974.65 The 
central argument, like that of other poverty lobby groups, was that cash payments would allow 
individuals to tailor the services they required to their particular needs. In the specific case of 
disability, each individual’s impairments and pain affected them differently; therefore, cash 
was a way of helping individuals take control of their own lives rather than living to the 
schedule of institutional care or inflexible statutory services. The problem was that access to 
these types of benefits was not based on need but based on various other factors. 
As I have shown, “disability” did not exist as a category within the social security system. 
Either one was sick, or one was entitled to compensation for injury or disease caused by one’s 
employment. This left a number of disabled people outside the remit of social security. In 
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reference to the war pensions, DIG called this group “the civilian disabled”. Jameel Hampton 
has also referred to a group called ‘the general classes’.66 For these people, DIG identified two 
major costs – loss of earnings power and the extra costs of disablement.67 DIG began its 
campaign by targeting high-profile politicians. This fitted within the tradition of the new 
poverty lobby campaigners in the 1960s, who targeted Westminster and government 
departments to effect changes in policy.68 In this case, DIG aimed to make politicians aware 
that the difficulties faced by “the civilian disabled” constituted a problem which the 
government had to take seriously. In the 1965 memorandum to Houghton, DIG argued that: 
Disability should not be regarded as short term sickness 
indefinitely prolonged, but as a category of being for which 
special provision must be made. DIG’s proposals are 
designed to alleviate the financial strain imposed by 
disablement, not to compensate (as does the Industrial 
Injuries Scheme) for loss of the faculty or enjoyment of 
life.
69
 
Later, in an open letter to Michael Stewart, the new “overlord”, DIG explicitly stated the 
case: 
For the ‘civilian’ disabled DIG asks: 
1) for recognition of the existence of the category 
(“perceiving the need”) 
2) for the formal provision of 
a. cash benefit appropriate to the category 
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b. basic services, not permissive but mandatory.
70
 
Practical suggestions for how this might work were made in the publication Why DIG Exists, 
printed in December 1968. The ultimate goal was a comprehensive disability income,71 but in 
the short-to-medium term it demanded: 
i. The constant attendance and exceptionally severe 
disability allowance [...] available to those injured 
industrially or in the services, should be made available to 
all severely disabled people needing them. 
ii. Recognition of the needs of the disabled housewife. 
iii. Modification of the earnings rule so that the £2.16.0 
(1968) [£2.80] allowed for his wife to a disabled man on 
sickness or unemployment benefit should not be set against 
any earnings she may make in an attempt to help balance 
the household budget, at least when her husband has a 
long-term disability.
72
 
DIG organised rallies to impress its point upon politicians and the wider public. The first 
was in July 1967 where ‘more than 200... improbable crusaders’ assembled in Trafalgar Square 
and marched to Downing Street to give a petition on the National Disability Income to the 
Prime Minister.73 The Times’s choice of language betrayed a paternalistic attitude towards 
disabled people, but it was clear that the cause was gathering momentum. The following year 
‘more than 1,000’ disabled people and their allies attended a rally in Trafalgar Square. Judith 
Hart, the Minister for Social Security, gave a speech in which she described ‘the civilian 
disabled’ as ‘the forgotten poor’.74 Hampton’s study of the media’s reaction to DIG shows that 
the group also made a concerted and successful effort to ensure disability-related stories were 
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covered by the major newspapers and broadcasters.75 It was at this time that Jack Ashley 
(Labour) proposed a Disablement Income Commission Bill, designed to create a statutory body 
to investigate the needs of disabled people and provide advice to government.76 DIG 
continued to lobby Westminster by sending delegations of disabled people to the Houses of 
Parliament. The 1969 rally drew ‘nearly 500’ people according to the Newcastle Branch of DIG, 
‘400’ according to Huddersfield, or ‘more than 300’ according to The Times. Figures quoted 
here and by other DIG branches suggest an actual attendance of between 300 and 400 
people.77 
The Fabian approach 
These origins and behaviour show that DIG had what I have termed a Fabian approach78 to 
disability benefits. I use this phrase to highlight the tactics and origins of these poverty lobby 
groups which emerged in the 1960s. Drawing on the campaigning tradition of, among others, 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, these organisations used data and rational argument to push for 
incremental policy changes and head towards a more egalitarian society.79 However, unlike the 
Labour Party which sought to do this by taking political power,80 these Fabian groups 
influenced governments from outside. The Group sought to appeal to the government through 
reasoned political debate and a sound evidence base. This would make gradual reform of the 
system inevitable once the argument had been won.81 Thus, I employ “Fabian approach” as a 
short-hand for a campaigning tradition and ideological focus rather than a codified entity. It 
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also serves to distinguish these organisations from the “traditional charities” and Disabled 
People’s Organisations (DPOs). 
Leading members of the Fabian Society were also involved in these poverty lobby groups. 
The influence of Peter Townsend is particularly evident. Townsend had helped form CPAG82 
and was a trustee of DIG when it was first created. In a speech to CPAG members at the 1967 
Labour Party Conference he argued that: 
the Government should declare that it intends to introduce 
new pensions for all kinds of disabled persons, including 
children, according to degree of disability, and without 
discrimination according to the place or origin of the 
disability, or as between men and women. It should 
immediately launch a national study to establish the 
numbers of disabled in the population, including the 
mentally handicapped, and appoint an expert committee to 
work out a modern assessment and review of the social 
services for the disabled.
83
 
It was as part of what has also been called a ‘corporatist’84 tradition that DIG saw disability 
as a category of need which should be recognised by welfare services and saw social security 
as a preferable method of providing for its needs. This was based on the idea that disabled 
people were unable to participate fully in society as a result of their increased risk of poverty; 
although it also included arguments based on the unequal treatment of different subsections 
of disabled people within the existing system. Disability was a special case, incurring extra 
costs beyond those of classically-defined sick or unemployed people.85 This Fabian approach 
saw disability benefits as an entitlement which should be paid based on ‘actual’ rather than 
‘deemed’ need.86  
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DIG quickly established itself as a reliable source of information, giving it some influence 
over the ‘solution stream’.87 It became an acceptable, if tenacious, campaign group. Within 
Westminster, the newly created All-Party Disablement Group (APDG) utilised disability 
organisations to inform both Houses about the needs of disabled people. The APDG was 
established by Jack Ashley and John Astor (Conservative) in 1968 in response to the growing 
interest inside and outside Parliament about disability issues. The Central Council for the 
Disabled (CCD) provided the secretarial services, a function its successors continue to perform 
to this day.88 When Du Boisson was killed in a car crash on her way to DIG’s fifth annual 
general meeting in 1969, she was succeeded as Honorary Spokesman by Mary Greaves, the 
head of the CCD’s Legal and Parliamentary Committee. This ensured a continuity of pressure in 
Westminster and Whitehall. Greaves, like her predecessor, was a hard-working, charismatic 
individual who had the ear of those in important positions. Earlier in 1969 she had been 
appointed to the Department of Employment’s National Advisory Council on the Employment 
of Disabled Persons (NACEDP) by Barbara Castle.89 
DIG was also among the organisations which provided assistance to Alf Morris in the 
drafting of his Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Bill 1969. Although Morris knew that he 
wanted to present a Bill to help disabled people, none of the major disability organisations had 
considered a Private Member’s Bill as a solution to the problems they faced. This is intriguing 
given that most of the progressive legislation that had passed through the House at this time 
had been introduced as Private Members’ Bills: including Acts on the legalisation of 
homosexuality,90 the repeal of the death penalty91 and abortion.92 This may in part reflect 
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DIG’s preoccupation with incomes rather than “rights” in a more general sense. Since such 
legal reform would require significant sums of money from the Treasury, such a Bill would 
have been unfeasible as a method of creating a National Disability Income. Regardless, once 
the Bill was proposed, DIG and others became active in supporting Morris.  Mary Greaves and 
Peter Large – also with CCD’s Parliamentary committee, founder of the Association of Disabled 
Professionals (ADP), and later to be Greaves’s successor as leader of DIG93 – are mentioned by 
name in Alf Morris’s biography. So too are James Loring of the Spastics Society and George Lee 
of MENCAP. Other more traditional charities such as Leonard Cheshire and a medical surgeon 
were involved in an ‘ad hoc committee’ to provide Morris with legal and practical advice.94 
Disability organisations were, therefore, in contact with legislators, parliamentarians and 
government ministers throughout this period. They were able to press their ideas on those 
with access to the machinery of government. As the case of Invalidity Benefit and Attendance 
Allowance shows, the core of DIG’s argument was absorbed and concrete changes were made 
to the social security system. 
DIG’s particular form of Fabian approach relied on explicit “insider” tactics.  It is important 
not to take the insider/outsider model as a literal description of the policy-making process, as 
organisations are rarely ever fully accepted or fully ostracised, and their status can fluctuate 
over time.95 I use this phrase to describe the tactic of the Group rather than the end result. DIG 
specifically targeted high-ranking officials and attempted to form strong relationships with 
them and work with them to achieve policy change. This is in contrast to an approach which 
might prioritise highly-critical public campaigns against the government, or which would seek 
to reform social security through non-governmental channels. The insider Fabian approach 
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that DIG operated would not be shared by all voluntary organisations throughout the period of 
this thesis, as I will demonstrate; for now, however, this was the primary strategy of the 
disability lobby. Through doing so, the government recognised disability as a category of need 
in welfare, and began to produce policy proposals based on this understanding. 
Government action – The Labour governments  
DIG successfully promoted the cause of “the civilian disabled”, and both major parties began 
preparing responses to the public support raised by DIG’s campaigns. In Kingdon’s terms, the 
‘problem’ stream had been stimulated,96 and disability was seen as an issue worthy of 
attention. The success of the poverty lobby approach, combined with a political consensus 
around disability welfare policy at the time, meant that government favoured cash payments 
over services in kind. Labour failed to legislate major changes to the benefits system in the way 
DIG had hoped. Partly this was because the government had little data to work on. To remedy 
this, it commissioned an Office for Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) report into the 
needs and numbers of disabled people living in private households in the United Kingdom. It 
also began serious inquiry into the likely cost and impact of introducing new benefits in the 
medium term, with the hope of being able to afford a National Disability Income-type scheme 
in the distant future. 
Richard Crossman  
To explain the Labour government’s choices, it is important to understand its approach to 
disability as well as the motivations of key individuals. There was clear personal support within 
the party for reforming disability-related benefits. Richard Crossman’s predecessor, Judith 
Hart, had supported DIG’s cause, speaking at the 1968 rally, and calling for the recognition of 
“the civilian disabled”.97 However, there were tensions within the party with regard to social 
security policy. Those on the right supported welfare expansion, but felt the only practical way 
forward was through means-testing and some form of selectivity. Those on the left continued 
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to adhere to the principle of universalism.98 With the merger of the Ministry of Health and MSS 
slated for 1968, Crossman was put in charge of social security policy. He was clearly more 
interested in enacting his Superannuation plans rather than dealing with the relatively new 
claims for a National Disability Income. Yet he was, if we take his comments in the House at 
face value, ‘deeply moved by the lives and the words’ of the disability campaigners.99 
Hampton argues that Crossman neglected disability benefits and did not see them as an 
important issue, but I believe Crossman’s approach was more nuanced than this.100 He was 
single-minded over what he saw as priorities, and objected to the time being taken up by Alf 
Morris’s Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Bill.101 The lack of movement on the question of 
poverty over Labour’s six years in power provoked angry reactions from poverty campaigners, 
notably when CPAG attacked Labour for making the poorest worse off.102 Crossman lamented: 
I had a trying time this afternoon with the Child Poverty 
Action Group [...] [Peter Townsend] used to be so young 
and handsome and debonair and now he is a grey, dreary 
man who kept us arguing about unemployment benefit for 
too long. I think it did me a great deal of harm. [...] We are 
in trouble here because the attack is on our most sensitive 
point, our humanity.
103
 
However, he did modify his Bill to accommodate disability. It is significant that the constant 
attendance allowance and invalidity pension ideas brought into the Bill in 1969 were 
consistent with his Superannuation plans. The reforms to which he had been committed since 
1957 could easily accommodate these new benefits. Indeed, we do not know what would have 
become of these plans if Labour had won the 1970 election, or had delayed the election until 
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1971. Labour’s manifesto indicated that disability benefits would be introduced,104 and, as we 
will see, the government could make use of the published findings of the OPCS survey. 
Disability had only been a major policy issue for three or four years before his Bill was 
introduced. I argue, therefore, that while Crossman may well have seen disability as a lower 
priority, it was important enough for him to amend his plans (albeit slightly) and attempt to 
create new benefits.  
In this we see Labour’s social-democratic approach. Any new benefits had to be affordable, 
but the varying claims of different groups were “prioritised” according to what was seen as 
practical at the time and previous commitments already made. Disability had rapidly risen up 
Labour’s hypothetical to-do list; but it had not been an issue long enough for Labour to have 
access to the necessary data and planning time to complete legislation before the 1970 
election. The significance of the Labour years is therefore the data they were able to provide 
the incoming Conservative government. I will discuss two such programmes in some depth: 
the OPCS Survey, which allowed the government to estimate the likely costs of policy 
proposals; and the planning stages of a “constant attendance allowance” for those requiring 
care in their own homes. 
OPCS Survey 
The production of reliable statistics on disability was important for campaigners and 
government alike. Though the measure used in official surveys is always problematic,105 
recognition that disabled people could be counted and studied was a crucial part of creating 
disability as an object of policy. DIG saw that disability needed its own welfare category, 
refashioned from earlier concepts of poverty, compensatory “duty” benefits and specific 
impairment groups. If disability were accepted as a bureaucratic category, then it could 
logically extend beyond social security and into other services. Indeed, a memorandum to 
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Michael Stewart mentions what would now be called the social services and nursing 
provision.106 Its campaigns were therefore focused as much on defining and creating disability 
as they were on improving access to and the rates of benefits. To achieve any of this, the 
government needed some idea of how many disabled people were in the country and what 
their basic needs were. No such attempt had been made to calculate this in the past, and by 
the late sixties it was clear that the DHSS and other relevant departments needed more 
information. Registers of disabled people existed in the Department of Employment, but these 
only reflected the number of disabled people looking for work rather than all disabled people, 
regardless of employment status. In response to a question from Labour MP William Hamling 
on 20 December 1965 about the ‘estimated cost to the Central Government and to local 
authorities of maintaining the chronic sick and disabled under the present scheme of social 
provision’, Houghton replied that: 
There is no standard definition of the terms “chronic sick” 
and “disabled”, nor do the records and accounts of all the 
various social services fully distinguish between the many 
categories which they help.
107
 
Townsend called for a systematic survey at the 1967 Labour Party Conference.108 DIG also 
felt such work was ‘urgently necessary’.109 The Seebohm Report had nominally investigated 
the needs of elderly, disabled and chronically sick people and the social services provided for 
them. In reality, however, disability had not become enough of an issue for the committee, 
and the focus was predominantly on the needs of elderly people. Moreover, the incomes 
question was not explicitly addressed.110 On 23 October 1967, the government announced ‘a 
study of adults living at home who are substantially and permanently handicapped by 
                                                          
106
 MRC: MSS 108/4/1, Memorandum to Michael Stewart. 
107
 HC Deb 20 December 1965 vol. 722 cc. 370-1W. 
108
 Townsend, Sociology and Social Policy, p. 303. 
109
 DIG estimated the number of disabled people at 1.5 million and quoted this in various publications. 
See especially MRC: MSS 108/4/1, About DIG, August 1968, p. 1. 
110
 Frederick Lord Seebohm, Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social 
Services (Cmnd. 3703, 1967); Hampton, Disabled People and the Classic Welfare State, pp. 109-14. 
  83   
 
limitations in their movements’ in England and Wales.111 DIG and Mary Greaves were 
consulted and mentioned explicitly for their contributions in the introduction to the published 
findings.112 The survey had originated as a small study conducted by Bedford College which 
was ‘developing an array of devices for measuring disability’. Two government departments 
were interested in expanding the scope of the study, according to Moss. The Ministry of Health 
was concerned with the social and economic problems created by disability, finding out how 
many people might be considered disabled or in need of support from local authorities, and 
determining what extra resources may be needed to cover any gap. The MSS needed to know 
how many disabled people were in need of support for its proposed Attendance Allowance. 
Later the Ministry of Housing would also declare an interest.113 It used a medical definition of 
disability, using the concepts of impairment, disability and handicap, which was subsequently 
built upon by the WHO.114 
The survey took, as far as many campaigners were concerned, too long to set up and too 
long to publish. Indeed, DIG branch newsletters suggested that this very delay showed 
institutional discrimination against disabled people.115 Townsend pushed this criticism further 
by suggesting that those in the professional classes were more interested in their own pay and 
conditions than the people they were supposed to be helping.116 Du Boisson advised against 
waiting ‘until 1970’ for the report to be published and to press ahead immediately with the 
proposed constant attendance allowance; an action that she claimed had precedent, since no 
survey was conducted on the needs of industrially disabled people.117 One disabled person 
wrote to The Times: 
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my probably selfish concern is that this information should 
be made as soon as possible; and that thereafter, if we are 
to be helped financially, this help should be forthcoming 
without waiting for the construction of giant computers. 
There can’t be all that many of us.
118
  
Restlessness amongst campaigners within Parliament manifested in the Chronically Sick 
and Disabled Persons Act in the final months of the Labour government. This attempted to 
push through changes before the survey’s publication by placing an obligation on Local 
Authorities (LAs) to provide services for disabled people. As a Private Member’s Bill, it never 
received full government support or the legal apparatus to force LAs to comply. While 
authorities were given the power to act, there was little compulsion, and the actual quality of 
services provided around the country varied considerably.119 But the Act’s significance lay in 
the government’s support for its passage through Parliament, expressing a moral commitment 
to services for disabled people. Moreover, its existence gave campaigners within and without 
Parliament the opportunity to reference the law and use this to compel or shame local and 
national authorities into action. Private Members Bills are very often used as campaign tools in 
this way. Many analyses of the Act have concentrated on whether it was “really” effective,120 
but I argue that this misses the point to a large extent. Its existence is more relevant and 
important than questions of whether or not it was properly enacted. It was highly improbable 
that such a Bill would even become an Act, let alone get full government backing in the form of 
financial and legal commitments. It must be seen, along with the survey, as an attempt to 
articulate an embryonic framework for providing welfare for disabled people. Specifically, it 
                                                          
118
 Ralph Arnold of Oxfordshire, The Times, 3 February 1969, p. 9. 
119
 Borsay, Disability and Social Policy, pp. 191-95. 
120
 Hampton, Disabled People and the Classic Welfare State, pp. 214-21; Eda Topliss and Bryan Gould, A 
charter for the disabled (Oxford: B. Blackwell & M. Robertson, 1981); Borsay, Disability and Social Policy, 
pp. 191-95. 
  85   
 
was a campaign tool, which its supporters hoped would be strengthened over time.121 It did 
not speed up the publication of the report. 
Hampton has argued that the OPCS survey was used as a way of deflecting calls for a rapid 
introduction of the National Disability Income. He has shown that the government deliberately 
called for the Harris conclusions to be phrased as speculative rather than definitive, and for the 
results to be presented in the past tense so that it could claim that the new Attendance 
Allowance and Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act had made a difference.122 However, 
there appears to be little direct assertion from campaigners that the survey was deliberately 
used as a delaying tactic by either the Labour or Conservative governments, even if they were 
left frustrated by the long wait. Partly this may be seen as a symptom of DIG’s “insider” 
approach, with the Group reluctant to start a fight with those politicians it aimed to court. Yet 
it seems that both governments could easily have done nothing at all over this period, waiting 
for the report before acting. Regardless of whether or not surveys have been used historically 
to delay financial commitments, governments do require data to effectively direct 
resources.123 As we will see, the Thatcher government was much more willing to use its OPCS 
survey in 1986 to delay making commitments to disabled people than either Wilson or Heath 
were at the beginning of the 1970s. The constant attendance allowance and some form of 
invalidity pension were planned and then presented to Parliament well before the results of 
the survey were known or made public. Despite the clear weaknesses of the Chronically Sick 
and Disabled Persons Bill, this was pushed through both Houses with Labour government 
support before the dissolution of Parliament. This is incredibly significant, and shows how 
important disability issues had become. Given the potential cost of the National Disability 
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Income proposals, I find it difficult to believe that waiting an extra 24 months for the survey 
results would have made full implementation any more likely or would have softened the 
demands of DIG and its allies. 
The OPCS report shows that disability was taken seriously as a policy area by the 
government. It had been framed as an issue of need amongst people living with impairments 
in private households. Yet the time delay both in beginning and publishing its results shows us 
that disability was not a high priority for the social-democratic Labour government, even if it 
was a legitimate concern. Still, with data to analyse – a crucial part of the Fabian argument – 
and a working definition of disability, the government could begin to plan solutions to the 
problem as presented by DIG. To return to the Kingdon model, the ‘politics’ and ‘problem’ 
steams had now converged. The debate would now surround which ‘solution’ to choose. 
Discussions in Whitehall 
This debate at the turn of the decade marks the point when voluntary organisation 
arguments were used as part of a reconfiguration of disability within government policy. 
However, the bureaucratic machinery, influenced by policy precedents and wider political 
concerns and priorities, did not embrace all of DIG’s ideas or solutions. 
Even if one believes that the survey was used to delay legislative action, it was not used to 
delay investigation. The government looked at the possibility of introducing a targeted, low-
cost benefit for those with the most severe impairments. The discussions over a civilian 
attendance allowance from 1967 onwards show that while DIG had clearly convinced the 
government of the need for action, not all their arguments had been fully accepted. There was 
‘no doubt’ in the MSS that ‘the cause of the “civilian” disabled [was] one that [attracted] a 
great deal of public sympathy’, and that failure to provide more for this group would be 
politically indefensible. But they immediately rejected proposals for a scheme for civilians on 
the same basis as the duty pensions. The costs were presumed too high, although as DIG 
themselves had claimed, it was difficult to know the true implications of their ideas at this time 
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because there was little extant data upon which to work.124 Instead, the government 
considered providing a form of payment based on the constant attendance allowance. This 
was considered financially and bureaucratically manageable and in line with the demands of 
groups such as DIG.125 It was also not a new idea; it had been proposed during the committee 
stage of the Finance (No. 2) Bill by Paul Dean in 1965.126 Townsend had argued in his speech at 
the 1967 Labour Party Conference that, as an interim measure, the government should extend 
‘constant attendance and hardship allowances from war pensioners and industrial injury 
pensions to other disabled persons’.127 
In the duty pensions, constant attendance allowance was paid at a “higher” rate to those 
who needed constant attention through the day and night; and a “lower” rate for those who 
only needed attention during the day or night. Two higher rates also existed for those in 
extreme need. This was identified as an area that supporters of DIG had been pressuring 
parliament, and was a benefit which might be introduced much sooner than a comprehensive 
income.128 M. C. L. Simms, a civil servant with responsibility for social security policy, believed 
that it would be very difficult to introduce a similar scheme for the general population. He was 
especially concerned about pensioners.129 The problem was ‘sheer weight of numbers’, as 
another civil servant, G. D. Caldwell, put it.130 This was exacerbated by Simms’s and others’ 
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concerns over the contributory principle.131 Breaching it, as this allowance sought to do, was a 
big step that neither of the major parties had fully embraced in the late sixties.132 Labour had 
consistently blocked Conservative backbench Private Members’ Bills which sought to impose a 
non-contributory benefit for pensioners over the age of 80.133 In Simms’s memo, the problems 
associated with this sort of benefit would be not only of the number of potentially worthy 
claimants, but also difficulties in restricting entry criteria, financing the scheme and in ensuring 
the gatekeepers had enough control. Perhaps more instructively, the policy divisions in the 
Ministry were discussing a ‘helplessness allowance’134 – belying not only the concept of 
disability in this context, but also driving their logic in determining which classes of disabled 
individuals should qualify. While Labour politicians may have opposed the means test, the 
strict medical criteria certainly made this potential benefit highly selective. 
The draft internal memo requested by the Minister on the practicalities of the scheme 
recommended that any allowance should  be limited to very severely disabled people, at least 
initially. It estimated that around 50,000 people would qualify for this, as opposed to 250,000 
if the new ‘helplessness allowance’ allowed claims to both the “higher” and “lower” rates of 
constant attendance allowance.  
One must remember that the extension of an allowance to 
the substantially disabled [...] would still not bring in a good 
many of the severely disabled people who attract public 
sympathy, e.g. people in wheelchairs who nevertheless 
manage to do a great deal to attend to their personal 
needs. If there were not to be clear political advantages 
from starting with the wider group, consideration of 
practicability would swing the argument in favour of 
starting with the narrower group. 
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With only the higher rate considered, the cost of the benefit would be £8 million, as 
opposed to £40 million for both.135 An import aspect of this, however, is the idea that voters 
had to see the benefit working. Was the higher rate really that cost efficient? Even if the 
expenses of administration and benefit payments were ignored: 
in terms of social priorities the case for providing large 
numbers of pensions for relatively slight disablement (the 
great bulk of industrial and war disablement pensions are 
for assessments of 30 per cent or less), and which, 
incidentally, would also be paid to people who work, 
whatever their earnings, seem [sic] very weak indeed.
136
 
Crossman introduced the lower rate of constant attendance allowance for “civilians” in his 
National Superannuation and Social Insurance Bill 1969. The planning stage for the benefit 
brings up three main points. First, any new benefits would have to have limited costs. Second, 
individual claimants would be eligible based on their medical criteria, and ultimately these 
people would be seen as ‘helpless’ recipients of aid. Third, it was important that the classes of 
disabled people which ‘attract[ed] public sympathy’ were seen to be helped; perhaps as much 
as actually providing aid on the basis of need. In this we have a complex mix of the three 
approaches I have outlined. A class of intended beneficiaries had been shown through solid 
political argument and evidence to be in need of support. Yet the idea of support for people 
who attracted ‘sympathy’ based on the most severe medical criteria is much more in keeping 
with older liberal approaches to disability and “the deserving sick”. Furthermore, the rejection 
of equalisation of benefits by extending Industrial Injuries Benefits to the general population 
showed that DIG had not successfully convinced the government that such discrimination was 
completely unacceptable. 
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Government action – Conservative Legislation 
The Conservative government took the constant attendance allowance and created through 
legislation the Attendance Allowance (AA). In addition, it revived Labour’s plans for an 
‘invalidity pension’ – effectively a higher-rate and earnings-related Sickness Benefit for long 
term NI claimants – with a new Invalidity Benefit (IVB). This was done not because of 
commitment to a specific group through universal benefits, but because disabled people were 
considered worthy and deserving recipients of aid neglected by the 1948 welfare state. To 
understand why the Conservatives were so quick to legislate, two major factors need to be 
considered. First, the party had committed to providing pensions for disabled people, people 
over the age of 80 who had never had the chance to build up insurance contributions post-
1948, and widows whose husbands had not built enough contributions to provide them with a 
NI pension. All three of these groups could claim Supplementary Benefit, but Conservatives 
argued they should be provided with a small, as-of-right, non-contributory allowance to 
remove the stigma of claiming social assistance. Second, the new Secretary of State for Social 
Services, Sir Keith Joseph, had a personal political commitment to disabled people and to 
providing targeted benefits for groups considered worthy of state support. Further, the 
Conservatives were able and willing to build upon the planning instigated by the previous 
government, making use of the OPCS survey and the plans for the constant attendance 
allowance. 
Sir Keith Joseph 
Joseph’s personal attitudes towards disability and welfare impacted on policy priorities and 
choices. He was an enigmatic personality. On the one hand, he was one of the architects of 
Thatcherism. Yet until 1974 he was considered ‘a very rare Tory who had entered politics 
specifically to try to relieve poverty’.137 The Conservative Party as a whole had made 
commitments to disadvantaged groups, though not through the universalist scheme presented 
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by Labour and Crossman. It promised to ‘improve the benefits payable to those who are 
seriously ill or disabled, and introduce a constant attendance allowance for the most seriously 
disabled’.138 Selectivity and targeting were key. This was part of a general trend in the Anglo-
Saxon countries.139 AA certainly fits this model by focusing resources through a ‘helplessness 
allowance’ to the “most in need”. Yet Joseph has come under attack from both the left and the 
right of the political spectrum. For the right, his department spent far too much 
indiscriminately; for the left, the Conservative government was attempting to dismantle the 
welfare state. Neither interpretation quite works, especially in the case of disability. Social 
security moved more towards means testing and selectivity, though Joseph did not attack the 
budgets of the social services anywhere near as hard as the Conservatives of the 1980s would. 
For Campbell, the main failure of the Heath government in this regard was its failure to take 
into account the rapid demographic and economic changes that placed greater stress on the 
welfare state throughout the 1970s.140 Hence, total expenditure rose while expenditure on 
individuals became more targeted. 
Heath was apparently worried by Joseph’s right-wing politics, overlooking him for the 
Chancellorship on the death of Iain Macleod. Denham and Garnett show that some of his 
speeches indicated that he may have been a little resentful at being overlooked, but it 
generally seems that he had no real ambition to run the Treasury.141 Still, his future hard neo-
liberalism appears to have been dormant in the early seventies. His biographers paint the 
picture of a man who had a distaste for high government expenditure, but who believed that 
economic growth would ‘enable the state to protect the “worthy” poor’.142 Joseph had been a 
regular attendee at CPAG meetings. Bovis, the company which had made his family’s fortune, 
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also provided sponsorship to CPAG events.143 As we will see in the next chapter, he put 
pressure on the Treasury to release funds for the expansion of disability benefits. The Times 
wrote that ‘the appointment of Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary of State is a recognition that 
[social security] is an area where compassion alone is not enough, and it is more important 
that the policy thinking should be thorough than it should be rushed for the sake of political 
appearances’.144 As part of the One Nation Group he wrote a section in Responsible Society on 
social policy in which he argued that targeting of benefits was the most efficient and moral 
way of directing public resources. National Assistance and family allowances could continue to 
be funded by the tax payer, but, as the economy grew, services such as healthcare and 
pensions should be provided through insurance.145 Whilst housing minister in the 1960s under 
Macmillan he had criticised previous Conservative policies for reducing the availability of 
housing, contributing towards dependence on the state.146 This famously led Jim Callaghan to 
exclaim that Joseph was ‘not a socialist yet, but he is coming along’.147 At the same time, his 
later pronouncements on the ‘cycle of deprivation’ caused by ‘problem families’ showed that 
he also believed in the “undeserving” poor, ultimately killing any chance he may have had in 
becoming a future leader of the party.148 
Joseph and the Conservative Party continued Labour policies of prioritising cash over 
services in kind. The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act was, as Hampton has argued, 
something of an anomaly in that it called for increases in the availability and provision of 
services.149 There are two main reasons for this. First, the Act was brought by a backbench MP, 
and so did not necessarily reflect the views of the government. Second, Private Members Bills 
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are almost universally barred from putting financial demands on the exchequer. Any Bill 
requiring government funds requires a money resolution to be approved by Parliament. As it 
was, the small level of expenditure the Bill needed was forced through before Parliament 
dissolved for the 1970 General Election.150 But this nominal sum did not place great demand 
on the Treasury, and was part of a public commitment to disabled people rather than a deep-
seated ideological one. Services in general were becoming less important to the welfare state 
as it focused more on providing cash and choice rather than inflexible and expensive statutory 
provision. 
The most explicit example of this was the deinstitutionalisation of various groups, notably 
disabled children in schools, and “mentally ill” and “mentally handicapped” people from 
psychiatric hospitals and the old asylums. This process had begun in previous decades, but 
accelerated during this period.151 As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, Enoch Powell’s “water tower” 
speech had led to a change in policy that saw a reduction in the numbers of patients in 
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Figure 2.1: Average occupied beds across the year in psychiatric 
hospitals in England by patients classed as "mentally ill" and 
"mentally handicapped", 1959 - 1986. 
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Source: DHSS, Health and Personal Social Services Statistics for England 1985, p. 111; Department of 
Health, Health and Personal Social Services Statistics, p. 122. See Appendix note on statistical data. 
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residential ‘subnormality’ and psychiatric hospitals.152 The case of education, however, is 
worth covering in a little more detail as it shows another area of legislation which was lost to 
the 1970 General Election, but revived by the incoming Conservative government. 
Responsibility for the education of ‘the educationally subnormal’ in hospital was transferred 
from the health side of the DHSS to the Department for Education and Science (DES). The 
‘educationally subnormal’ were already the responsibility of DES if they lived at home; but 
those cared for in institutions were educated by local authorities under the command of the 
Minister for Health.153 The Ministry estimated that this equated to around 30,000 children in 
1966.154 In March of that year a joint circular from the Ministry of Health and DES was sent to 
local authorities advising them on, and asking them to provide details of, the co-ordination 
between health, welfare and education services.155 The Seebohm Report had further 
recommended that the functions be transferred.156 By 1968, despite repeated questions in the 
House of Commons, it was no clearer whether the government intended to actually transfer 
responsibilities or not. They continued to ‘consult’ on the matter. In November 1968 it was 
claimed MENCAP had funds lying idle as they were unsure which Minister was responsible for 
education.157 At the end of that month, the Prime Minister finally announced the intention to 
transfer functions from the now DHSS to DES.158 Eventually this became law in the Education 
(Handicapped Children) Act 1970. The main difficulty in producing acceptable legislation 
quickly was that of staff training. DHSS employees who had been working with severely 
disabled children would no longer be considered qualified under DES definitions of 
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“teachers”.159  
The Act additionally made it illegal to deem a child ‘ineducable’, meaning that all children 
had a right to some form of education. Introducing the Bill, William van Straubenzee  noted: 
The Government's reintroduction of the provisions of 
Clause 1 [of Labour’s Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
[H.L] Bill 1970] at the earliest possible moment will, I know, 
reassure many people who have the interests of mentally 
handicapped children at heart, and not least their parents 
and those who have the important duty of teaching them in 
junior training centres and in hospitals for the mentally 
handicapped.  
[...] We are all agreed that it is right that responsibility for 
the education of these children should now be taken over 
by the authorities responsible for general education 
services [...]. It is good that Parliament should give special 
attention to the needs of those who are unable to fend 
effectively for themselves.’
160
 
There was a broad level of consensus, therefore, that disabled people needed to be given 
greater opportunity for “integration” with general society. Both the liberal and social-
democratic approaches agreed on this principle, and were willing to pursue the same policy 
solutions to their particular understanding of the problem. DIG’s role in helping to foster this 
consensus through increasing the visibility of disability as an issue cannot be dismissed. 
Disability was made a “worthy” cause for Labour and Conservatives alike. We may not class 
Joseph as a neo-liberal in this period, but he certainly expressed the liberal approach to 
disability and welfare. He was committed to a paternalistic attitude of providing help for 
worthy people. Outside the labour market through no fault of their own, resources could be 
targeted at “the most disabled” without damaging the work ethic or the overall contributory 
principle reserved for the general population. This liberal approach had a “benign” element to 
it because Joseph was also committed to expanding welfare provision in appropriate areas. 
DIG’s cause found a receptive audience, but Joseph’s interpretation of the issue meant that a 
National Disability Income was a long way off what the Conservative Party was willing to 
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provide in the 1970-74 term. Instead, they created AA and IVB. The way in which they were 
introduced and the regulations surrounding them show how the government conceived of 
disability and how it hoped to provide limited help in the short term. 
Attendance Allowance 
AA was part of the first Bill to receive a second reading in the Heath administration, with 
Joseph acknowledging: 
we would not have been able to come so quickly to the 
House with legislation had it not been that two-thirds of 
this Bill is adopted from the legislation which was lost at 
Dissolution but laid before the House by [Crossman]. [...] 
This was common ground between the parties, though the 
credit has to be given to the Labour Party for starting upon 
legislation.
161
 
AA was initially paid at one rate, available to a claimant if: 
(a) he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that he 
requires from another person, in connection with his bodily 
functions, frequent attention throughout the day and 
prolonged or repeated attention during the night; or 
(b) he is so severely disabled physically or mentally that he 
requires continual supervision from another person in order 
to avoid substantial danger to himself or others.
162
 
The National Insurance (Old Persons’ and Widows’ Pensions and Attendance Allowance) 
Act 1970 also created an Attendance Allowance Board (AAB) which was designed to hear 
appeals and advise on the benefit’s administration.163 It included mainly medical professionals, 
but also involved lay experts, including Mary Greaves. This board had nowhere near the broad 
scope of that suggested by Jack Ashley’s Disablement Income Commission Bill 1968, but it did 
include the voice of a well-respected disability campaigner. If nothing else, this shows the 
standing which DIG (or prominent members within DIG) had gained over the previous six 
years. 
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AA was designed as a benefit payable to disabled people to cover the additional costs of 
disability. Originally planned for April 1972 (the new financial year), it was brought forward to 
late 1971 as the new government sought to emphasise its commitment to disabled people.164 
Although even by Joseph’s own admission it was not enough to purchase full-time care, it did 
at least acknowledge the extra-costs principle outlined by DIG.165 This was a critical juncture 
for social security policy. As the Group later wrote, it was ‘a very important breach with 
tradition’ because it was awarded ‘on medical grounds, not linked with contributions as 
insurance benefits are, nor dependent on a means test as supplementary benefit is. Now that 
this has happened, there seems at least a reasonable hope that it will be extended.’166  
The government was criticised, however, for not introducing both the higher and lower 
rates of AA at the same time.167 In its early stages the DHSS had ‘already made awards to just 
over 50,000 people and still [had] something like 40,000 claims to deal with’, but, as Joseph 
argued, ‘we have always made it clear that at the outset the scope of the allowance must be 
limited to the most severely disabled people. We hope to go beyond it [...] but I cannot go 
further now.’168 Discrepancies also continued along origin of impairment lines. Jack Ashley 
argued in the Commons that the AA for “civilians” was £4 in February 1972 compared to the 
£12 constant attendance allowance available to “non-civilians”.169 
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Invalidity Benefit 
IVB built upon Crossman’s plans to reform Sickness Benefit for the chronically sick. Crossman 
had included an invalidity pension in his Bill, but in a very different form to both the demands 
of DIG and the IVB introduced by the Conservative government. Sickness Benefit would 
remain, but a long-term, earnings-related addition would be created, or ‘in effect an invalidity 
pension, which will continue until pension age and will then be replaced by retirement 
pension’.170 This was, then, an extension of the existing system rather than the transferral of 
Industrial Injury Benefit (IIB) into the civilian domain. It also did not address the issue of the 
discrepancy between NI and Supplementary Benefit claimants. This was again critical in the 
‘increasing returns’ of policy formation. By deliberately eschewing the Industrial Injury 
structure and creating smaller benefits in a piecemeal fashion, future reforms would have to 
build gradually upon this base. IIB was not seriously considered as the template for civilian 
benefits after this point. 
Joseph’s IVB was split into two parts: an Invalidity Pension which was initially paid at the 
same rate as regular Sickness Benefit; and an Invalidity Allowance for those more than five 
years away from pensionable age.171 Invalidity Allowance was paid at three rates depending on 
the date of the onset of impairment. The higher rates were paid to people who first claimed at 
a younger age. The logic was that younger people had less opportunity to build up private 
insurance, property, investments or savings, and so required more money to maintain a decent 
standard of living.172 Under Labour’s earnings-related plan, older workers would gain an 
advantage as they were likely to have more capital and higher wages at the time they 
“retired”. There were also higher rates of additions for dependent children and ‘a much 
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relaxed earnings rule governing the payment of an increase of benefit for working wives’.173 As 
with Labour, the transferral of IIB to the civilian population had been rejected, but the relative 
simplicity of the new arrangement allowed Joseph to begin payments in April 1972. 
Criticism was levelled at the government for not creating a full earnings-related pension for 
disabled people,174 but IVB was, at least, recognition that Sickness Benefit was inadequate for 
chronic sickness.  The Invalidity Allowance also showed that the government understood DIG’s 
arguments about the inequality between those disabled earlier in the life cycle and those 
nearer to retirement age. Yet even if the principle was sound, disabled people were in many 
cases no better off. Payment of IVB offset income from Supplementary Benefit. This meant 
that the poorest claimants were often receiving little or no more money than they had before 
IVB’s introduction.175 As an extension of Sickness Benefit, it was also effectively an 
unemployment pension and not, as DIG would have it, unconditional compensation for a 
reduction in earnings power. ‘I will not allow Mr. Crossman, if I can possibly help it, to use the 
phrase “invalidity pension”’ claimed Du Boisson in an interview about Labour’s Bill. ‘It is in no 
sense an invalidity pension – it is a premature retirement pension.’176 Joseph’s plans were only 
slightly different. Although they avoided some of the bias of an earnings-related scheme, the 
problem remained that this was a benefit only available through NI. Alf Morris invoked the 
name of DIG when he noted that a large proportion of disabled people who needed IVB were 
without a contributions record.177 Moreover, IIB’s 100% disablement pension was still much 
more generous than the civilian equivalent (IVB), coming in at £12.80 per week for 1973/74 
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versus £9.35 for Invalidity Pension and the highest rate of Invalidity Allowance.178 However, 
Ashley did concede that while the National Insurance Act 1971 did not go as far as he would 
like, it was ‘nevertheless welcome because it shows that the Government now see the 
chronically sick as a category requiring action’.179 In acknowledging this, pressure built for 
expansion of system throughout the 1970s, whilst simultaneously making it difficult for future 
governments to scale back eligibility. 
Conclusions 
This period is key to understanding the direction of disability policy over the rest of the 
century. The problem of “the civilian disabled” was established, and the political will was 
stimulated. As we have already seen, the solutions chosen were broadly the same. By defining 
disability in this way and creating piecemeal benefits, the government began its bureaucratic 
investment in a particular form of disability. The increasing returns that stemmed from this 
critical juncture180 put economic, political and bureaucratic pressures on the government to 
expand or contract provision within the DIG framework of “the civilian disabled”  
 DIG was central to identifying and publicising this cause. The issue, however, was that the 
political wills of the two main parties came from ideologically different places. Labour asked 
“how can we provide coverage to a disadvantaged group within the existing machinery of the 
social security system?”; the Conservatives asked “how can we protect the most vulnerable by 
targeting resources?” AA and IVB certainly targeted the “deserving poor”, those who through 
no fault of their own could not work or had additional costs which caused them financial 
hardship. This selective approach was consistent with Conservative values, and with Heath’s 
analysis that Joseph felt that expenditure ‘properly targeted’ was a ‘good thing’. But it was also 
consistent with the Titmussite approach to poverty and the idea that the state should help all 
of its citizens to participate in society. With the relatively small cost and the fact that existing 
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benefits could be quickly adapted to provide additional resources, AA and IVB (in some form) 
were also acceptable to the Labour government. 
For DIG, the problem was that the overall argument – that all disabled people be provided 
with services based on their actual rather than deemed needs – was not accepted. The sheer 
cost of a National Disability Income was untenable for both parties. Their Fabian approach 
rejected policy prioritisation, but voluntary organisations have the luxury of not being 
constrained by promises to other groups or the need to balance a budget. DIG’s goal focused 
solely on the isolated case of disabled people. Knock-on effects (such as the destruction of the 
insurance principle or the need to restructure all social security schemes) were of concern only 
insofar as the Group needed to temper its demands to ensure its proposals remained rational 
and in some way appealing to government. In spite of all this, the contributory principle was 
weakened through the introduction of AA and new benefits for widows and the over eighties. 
The fundamentals of DIG’s argument – that there was a group called “the civilian disabled” and 
that they were somehow unfairly disadvantaged – were accepted. Furthermore, the 
government and both major parties had committed themselves to providing more help along 
these lines in the future. As we will see in the next chapter, AA was extended, and over the 
early seventies the DHSS created plans for new payments to meet the needs of carers, 
congenitally disabled children, housewives, uninsured disabled people and the extra costs 
associated with mobility. The ultimate argument was yet to be won, but DIG succeeded in 
setting in motion the machinery for expanding welfare provision to all disabled people. 
The OPCS survey, planning for new benefits and other policy decisions over the late sixties 
show that disability as a welfare category largely concerned impaired people living in poverty 
in private households. It remained a loose category comprised of different forms of 
impairment and their social consequences. Industrial injuries and war pensions remained 
separate from new attempts to cater for “the civilian disabled”. They therefore remained 
separate from other groups. Mental health and cognitive impairment also remained sidelined, 
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implicitly included in plans for non-institutionalised disabled people but rarely having their 
specific needs articulated in the incomes debates. Further, by concentrating on incomes and 
framing the debate in the same terms as the poverty lobby, attention was focused primarily on 
unemployed disabled people. The National Disability Income campaign had mentioned 
payments to cover partial incapacity, but the medically-selective benefits created over 1970 
and 1971 in effect targeted unemployed and severely impaired individuals. For the 
government and campaigners, it is clear that disability encompassed all these different 
aspects, but in reality the poverty of physically disabled people gained the most attention. 
In short, the politics stream had been stimulated, and a mutually agreeable solution was 
found. The problem stream, however, was understood in different ways by DIG, Labour and 
the Conservatives. The solution created a new patchwork of benefits which, as the next 
chapter shows, were built upon by successive governments. The definitions and approaches to 
disability in the 1960s were the foundation for the benefits system for disabled people 
throughout the period covered in this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 – Liberal/Social-Democratic consensus – 1972 – 1979 
Introduction 
Despite the financial crisis in the British welfare state over the 1970s, bureaucratic momentum 
was clearly pushing expansion of disability benefits to new groups. After the Disablement 
Income Group (DIG) had succeeded in securing legislative change, both parties committed 
themselves to further reforms. In particular, they focused on benefits for housewives and non-
contributory benefits. For the Conservative government, these were acceptable as part of a 
targeted approach to a needy group. In 1972, Attendance Allowance (AA) was made available 
at both a lower and higher rate in response to agitation from DIG and a desire on the part of 
Heath and Joseph to extend coverage. When Labour took office in 1974, they could build on 
the planning work initiated by Joseph at the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS). 
More importantly, disability was one of the policy priorities of Barbara Castle in a way it had 
not been for Crossman. This ensured that four new benefits were created in the Social Security 
Benefits Act 1975: Non-contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP); Housewives’ Non-contributory 
Invalidity Pension (HNCIP); Invalid Care Allowance (ICA); and Mobility Allowance (MA). The 
legal processes for this were not smooth, however. The liberal approach of the Conservatives 
was shown through their response to the thalidomide scandal in which preferential benefits 
were made available to affected children through a mix of voluntary, private and state finance. 
Similarly, the social-democratic approach from Labour did not produce a National Disability 
Income, but added to a patch-work of benefits with varying degrees of coverage. Disability 
remained a policy priority for both parties before the “classic welfare state”1 came to an end 
with the financial crisis and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan from 1976 onwards.2 
Crucially during this time, DIG’s insider Fabian approach to disability came under attack. 
New voluntary organisations, frustrated at the slow progress of reform, challenged DIG’s 
status as the pre-eminent disability lobby group. In particular, Disabled People’s Organisations 
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(DPOs) advocated a new approach to disability which focused on oppression rather than 
incomes. The most famous example of this during the seventies was the Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS). While they made little direct impact on 
central government in the 1970s, their document Fundamental Principles lay the foundations 
for the social model of disability. As concerns spread beyond the incomes question, the Labour 
government also encouraged the formation of the Royal Association for Disability and 
Rehabilitation (RADAR) to represent disabled people on a range of issues. These developments 
in the lobby had a profound effect on the way that governments interacted with voluntary 
organisations and policy decisions that were taken. At the same time, DIG and the Fabian 
approach as a whole achieved its biggest “successes” during this period, successfully 
manipulating the 1975 Act to include extra provisions than those initially presented to 
Parliament. This would set the tone for the policy developments of the 1980s. 
This chapter deals with the developments in the lobby alongside developments in policy. 
The first section outlines how and why disabled people and campaigners became disillusioned 
with DIG. Partly this must be explained in relation to thalidomide. Frustration at the slow pace 
of reform led to the creation of the Disability Alliance (DA), a more radical Fabian group 
headed by Peter Townsend. At the same time, Paul Hunt and other disabled people became 
increasingly alienated with what was seen as an “undemocratic” DIG hierarchy. Fearing that 
poverty was seen as the only issue of relevance in disability politics, UPIAS advocated a 
disabled-led approach which regarded poverty as a symptom of wider oppression against 
disabled people. DIG remained an influential “brand”, led by experts such as Peter Large; but 
its days of claiming to be the only group representing the needs of disabled people were over. 
This gives new insights into the disability lobby, and leads to questions about whether 
conventional categories such as ‘New Social Movements’ or ‘Embodied Health Movements’ 
provide useful analytical tools in this context. 
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The second section looks at the first Minister for Disabled People, Alf Morris. The post was 
significant because it gave disability a formal place within the bureaucracy at the DHSS. During 
his tenure, Morris initiated a number of inter-departmental committees to investigate the 
needs and desires of disabled people, seeking practical solutions which might be made into 
policy. It is also important with relation to the disability lobby. Morris had deep links with 
leading campaigners, giving a direct connection between figures such as Large and the 
government. Further, at his suggestion and with DHSS funding the Central Council for the 
Disabled (CCD) and British Council for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (REHAB) were merged 
to form RADAR, creating a large and powerful group with a wider remit than DIG or DA. This 
shows how disability had become a serious concern for the government, but the bureaucratic 
reforms reflected its conception of disability and the role it envisaged for voluntary 
organisations in disability policy. Further, it showed ‘increasing returns’, as the creation of the 
minister was prompted by and in turn fuelled reforms to policy.  
In the third section I examine the details of the new benefits. I start with the planning 
stages initiated by Joseph, and then explain how Castle was able to build upon them. Of 
particular importance are the payments to women and MA. The former showed that while 
married disabled women were recognised and some of the gender inequalities of the 
Beveridge system were being addressed, the creation of the ‘household duties test’ was highly 
controversial and problematic. The latter provides an example of how the government sought 
to move away from the direct service provision to cash payments which could be spent at the 
claimant’s discretion. 
The terms of the IMF loan forced the government to reduce public expenditure over the 
final years of the decade. As the full implication for these new benefits became apparent, 
attempts were made to restrict access by narrowing eligibility criteria. The final section 
explores these issues, with particular reference to Stone’s thesis that, once created, disability 
schemes open themselves up to inevitable expansion. 
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Policy context – The fiscal crisis of the welfare state 
Both parties were severely constrained by economic problems over the 1970s. For Heath, the 
1973 oil crisis coupled with mass strike action forced the government to perform a number of 
U-turns. When Heath called a General Election in February 1974 to determine ‘who governs 
Britain?’, he was narrowly defeated, leading to a minority Labour government.3 This became a 
slim majority in the second 1974 election in October. Labour was then hit by further financial 
crises, leading to a $4 billion loan from the IMF in 1976. One of the conditions was that the 
United Kingdom dramatically reduce public expenditure, meaning that, in effect, no expansion 
of social security would be possible (or desirable) during Callaghan’s time as Prime Minister. 
This is seen by many historians to mark the end of the “classic” welfare state.4 With no new 
money and a need to prioritise relations with trade unions, the Labour government was unable 
and unwilling to move towards a National Disability Income after passing the Social Security 
Benefits Act 1975. 
The traditional historiography has painted the later 1970s as a period of stagnation. There 
was far less optimism surrounding Labour’s re-election in 1974 than ten years prior. According 
to Pimlott, ‘in 1964 the manifesto had been the product of thirteen years’ re-assessment. In 
1974 it was, at best, a shopping list, at worst a collection of slogans. The Labour Party in 
Opposition had been too pre-occupied with its factional quarrel to develop a new set of ideas 
that carried conviction.’ The left has criticised the governments for the amount of cuts they 
made and for being ‘unsocialist’, but these have been seen by others as necessary to control 
inflation and maintain living standards.5 On the social security front, Toynbee and Walker 
argue that ‘it is hard to discern a Castle legacy’,6 though she was removed from her post once 
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Callaghan entered Number 10. The case of disability benefit reform, in addition to the State 
Earnings-Related Pension Scheme, would appear to show some sort of legacy,7 even if these 
were versions of benefits which had been in the planning stages before Labour returned to 
office. Castle’s autobiography suggests that her priorities were first pensions and then 
disability-related benefits.8  
A lack of a ‘legacy’ may have been due to a lack of co-ordination. The Policy Unit was more 
concerned with poverty within families. Charges on school meals and the declining value of 
child benefits meant that families were becoming worse off than when Labour was elected. 
Unlike Castle, Number 10 and the Trades Union Congress prioritised gross pay levels rather 
than targeting resources at households most in need.9 Even so, the Finer Committee’s 
recommendations on support for one-parent families were rejected as too expensive, despite 
heavy campaigning from other sections of the poverty lobby, notably the National Council for 
the Unmarried Mother and her Child.10  Still, Castle was able to gain support for her priorities 
because the Treasury was, before the IMF loan at least, much weaker than in 1964-1970.11 
Similarly, Ziegler argues that the Treasury was pushing for cuts during Wilson’s second term, 
which the Prime Minister resisted.12 Castle had the manoeuvrability to push her own agenda 
under Wilson, and she was considered to be a strong-willed left winger within the cabinet. 
David Ennals replaced her when Callaghan took office, a Callaghan loyalist but not as powerful 
                                                          
7
 Castle certainly thought so in her autobiography. Barbara Castle, Fighting All the Way (London: Pan 
Books, 1994), pp. 468-69. 
8
 Ibid., p. 468. 
9
 Bernard Donoughue, Prime Minister : the conduct of policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan 
(London: Cape, 1987), pp. 115-16. Donoughue was convinced that Castle’s priorities ‘lay elsewhere’. For 
the debate on whether to improve wages or payments to families, see Jackie Goode et al., Purse or 
wallet? : gender inequalities and income distribution within families on benefits (London: Policy Studies 
Institute, 1998). 
10
 Thane and Evans, Sinners? Scroungers? Saints?, pp. 162-64. Morris Finer, Report of the Committee on 
One-parent Families. Volume 1 (Cmnd. 5629, 1974). 
11
 Diary entry for 23 January 1975. Barbara Castle, The Castle diaries, 1974-76 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1980), p. 292. 
12
 In an interview about his biography of Wilson in Anthony Seldon, "Anatomising Wilson : Philip 
Ziegler," Contemporary Record 7, no. 2 (1993). 
  108   
 
or influential. The reasons given for this switch were Castle’s age, a need to shake up the 
cabinet and the antipathy between her and Callaghan.13  
Economically the period was difficult for Labour. One Marxist commentator in the 
aftermath of their election defeat argued that they had performed ‘a minor miracle’ by getting 
trades unions to agree to wage restraint and to tolerate a high level of unemployment. Cuts 
were sold to the public as necessary in the short term to avoid more swingeing cuts in the 
future.14 The Social Contract attempted this through restraining wage increases and therefore 
controlling inflation.15 Yet by 1979 the infamous “Winter of Discontent” effectively brought 
down the government.16 A series of labour disputes culminated in a vote of no confidence in 
March 1979.17 Hay has questioned the economic reality behind the political contemporary and 
historical interpretations of the winter of 1978/79 but acknowledges that the government 
made the crisis worse by openly speculating about the need to declare a state of emergency. 
This put off international investors and stunted growth. He also questions why Callaghan did 
not call an election in summer 1978 when most commentators expected and when his record 
on the economy up to that point had been relatively good.18  
These economic constraints cannot be ignored. They explain how and why a piecemeal 
system of disability benefits endured even though both the liberal and social democratic 
approaches had pushed for social security responses to the newly discovered problems of 
disabled people. And yet it is a testament to how high a political priority disability had become 
that the system continued to expand, at least up until the Social Security Benefits Act 1975. 
This chapter deals with the developments up to and including the implementation of that Act, 
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before showing how the Labour government sought to restrict access to existing benefits after 
1977. 
Policy context – The rising cost of disability benefits 
The 1970s saw a rise in claims to and in the cost of disability-related benefits (Figures 3.1 and 
3.2). Partly this was a result of creating new schemes. Benefits such as AA and Invalidity 
Benefit (IVB) which had started at the beginning of the decade were far more widely claimed 
by the end. The claimant rate of Sickness Benefit and IVB grew at a slower and less even rate 
than AA and MA. This was due to long-term claimants moving from Sickness Benefit to IVB. 
Expenditure on Industrial Injuries Benefit (IIB) remained relatively static, while war pensions 
declined. However, while disabled people became less reliant on means-tested benefit, 
expenditure for the population as a whole rose during the Heath administration after declining 
in the early period, and then increased more markedly in the 1974-79 Labour governments. 
This reflects an increased use of means testing, as well as the rising level of unemployment 
during successive financial crises. For social security as a whole, rising costs, even when 
inflation-adjusted, can be to some extent attributed to the more generous weekly rates of 
benefit caused by new uprating rules in the 1970s (see Figure 4.5). This is important to stress 
because the government continued to look for new areas of expansion in disability benefits 
despite both the rising relative cost and the economic difficulties of the period. 
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The Lobby – Disillusionment with DIG 
Having successfully achieved its basic goals – recognition for the civilian disabled and the 
creation of new benefits – DIG began to waver. The branch structure which had provided a 
solid base for campaigning and finance for the Westminster political lobbyists was starting to 
demand more from the organisation. From one angle, campaigners were concerned that DIG 
had become too obliging to the government, and that “insider” tactics were not securing 
reform quickly enough. From another, members questioned whether DIG was democratic 
enough to represent the wishes of disabled people on the national stage. These forces would 
eventually rip DIG apart by 1976. Peter Large and other experts continued to lobby under the 
DIG “brand” which had built such a glowing reputation in official circles; but they were often 
members of other organisations with more members and financial clout.19 This had 
implications for the direction of the Fabian approach to disability and the ways in which the 
lobby interacted with the government, especially post-1979. 
DIG’s position in the early 1970s 
The real strength of DIG in the 1960s was that it was able to claim credibly that it was the 
lobby group representing disabled people,20 though it would be wrong to say that it was the 
only lobbying organisation. The Spastics Society, for instance, had a history of contact with 
central government,21 and it was common for other charities to provide advice and put 
pressure on Westminster and local authorities.22 This tended to be so that they could ensure 
services were available for their target groups rather than for general concepts of the position 
of disabled people in society. Thane and Evans’s study on the National Council for the 
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Unmarried Mother and her Child suggests that the traditional charities increased their political 
activity as a result of the successes of newer lobbying organisations such as DIG.23 The only 
other significant pan-impairment group with a tradition of campaigning was CCD, which was 
the original secretariat to the All Party Disablement Group.24 However, key members of that 
organisation included Mary Greaves and Peter Large. Effectively, the two most prominent DIG 
representatives in Westminster were also two of the most prominent CCD representatives. 
DIG is mentioned in Hansard far more often than CCD. To all intents and purposes, I argue, DIG 
was the pan-impairment lobby; in branding and in personnel. This position was bolstered by its 
ability to speak directly to and influence decisions in other organisations. 
Large had taken over as Honorary Spokesman of DIG in the New Year of 1973 after 
Greaves’s retirement. He was a qualified civil engineer in the oil industry but had contracted 
polio on a business trip to Indonesia. He founded the Association of Disabled Professionals 
(ADP) in 1971 with administrative and financial support from REHAB,25  and became chair of 
the government’s Silver Jubilee Committee on Improving Access for Disabled People (SJC) and 
Committee on Restrictions Against Disabled People (CORAD).26 Both of these committees (but 
particularly the latter) stressed the need for anti-discrimination legislation and provided a 
wealth of evidence on the physical and cultural barriers facing disabled people. His 
appointment marked a change in the Group’s structure. Rather than leading as a charismatic 
champion in the way Du Boisson and Greaves had done, the major roles within DIG were split. 
Betty Veal became Chairman, speaking publicly about various campaigns and corresponding 
with branch members. Large focused on his role as Parliamentary Secretary, lobbying from 
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inside Whitehall and Westminster, writing informed letters to the major broadsheet 
newspapers, and leaving the wider campaign to others. 
This approach was not universally welcomed. The thalidomide scandal rocked the political 
establishment and disability lobby and appeared to undermine the National Disability Income. 
This created internal disagreements within DIG, eventually leading to two “splinters”. The first 
was led by Peter Townsend, advocating a more radical campaign approach, whilst continuing 
the Fabian focus on cash benefits and academic research. The second, often credited to Paul 
Hunt, led to disabled people forming their own democratic organisations which focused on 
structural inequalities in society rather than purely economic considerations. The result was 
the creation of DA and UPIAS, both of which I discuss in more detail at the end of this section. 
Thalidomide 
For DIG’s opponents, the Group’s handling of the thalidomide scandal showed some of the 
limits of the Fabian approach, or at least a Fabian approach coupled with such dedication to 
“insider” tactics. The scandal showed that DIG had not successfully argued that payments to 
disabled people should be based on need rather than insurance, compensation or sympathy. It 
is an example of how Heath and Joseph’s liberal approach to disability allowed them to find 
millions of pounds for ‘congenitally handicapped’ children, yet would not extend disability 
coverage to other sections of the “civilian disabled”.  
In the late fifties, around 500 children developed birth defects as a result of their mothers 
taking the drug Distival, a form of thalidomide.27 A campaign by the Sunday Times and MPs 
such as Jack Ashley provoked anger in Britain at the way that Distillers, the drug’s 
manufacturers and distributors, refused to pay substantial damages. The link between 
thalidomide and foetal injury had been established in 1961, but it was not until the mid-1970s 
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that the behaviour of Distillers came under great scrutiny. A long-running court case was being 
waged between the families and the company. The families were forbidden from talking to the 
press, and MPs were forbidden from discussing a case in Parliament that was sub judice. The 
Sunday Times published details about the plight of thalidomide-affected children to bring 
attention to the case as far as it could without being in contempt of court. Ashley negotiated 
with the Speaker the best way to bring up a debate about the topic using parliamentary 
privilege, but without contravening parliamentary rules.28  
The principle that Distillers should compensate these families was widely accepted. 
However, as many pointed out there were people with impairments that affected their lives 
just as badly as the thalidomide “victims” who had nobody to sue. Would the government 
provide equal payments to those who were not thalidomide-affected? During the debate, 
Joseph announced that £3 million would be allocated to a fund to be made available to 
families with ‘very severe congenital disability’. This applied to all children disabled at birth, 
regardless of cause. As help for the parents who ‘need more help in shouldering the various 
burdens which caring for these children entails’, Joseph stressed that ‘it is not intended that 
this money should be by way of compensation for being disabled, but rather that it should 
serve to complement the services already being provided by statutory and voluntary bodies to 
help the families concerned’.29 
More money was later made available to the fund, and Distillers provided cash specifically 
for the thalidomide affected children through the Thalidomide Trust. Betty Veal welcomed 
these  developments, but remained cautious: 
Welcome as they may be for the few who will benefit, the 
measures recently announced for thalidomide children and 
congenitally disabled children highlight the anomalies of the 
current provisions and unfortunately heighten the sense of 
injustice harboured by disabled people with equal or more 
severe disabilities. This feeling of injustice will remain so 
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long as the help offered to disabled people depends not on 
the financial effects of their disabilities imposed on them 
and their families but on whether they were fortunate 
enough to sue for compensation.
30
 
Veal also asked in a letter to The Guardian for ‘a coherent policy that is both fair and 
generous... introduced with the speed which is clearly possible’.31 In a more strident tone: ‘of 
course we want the Thalidomide children to be helped, but I am infuriated at the way the rest 
of the disabled are fobbed off. We are always told it is a matter of priorities, yet the 
Government can find sums of money for other groups just like that.’32 Townsend believed the 
government had deliberately ignored the chance to create a more comprehensive ‘equitable 
statutory system of allowances, grants and services for another 300,000 or 400,000 children 
handicapped as a result of chronic disease or accidents at home or on the roads’.33 Even Ashley 
felt uneasy about the reaction to his campaign by critics. 
Throughout the whole thalidomide controversy I’ve been at 
pains to emphasise that I’m concerned with all sections of 
disabled people. But, of course, the media was only 
concerned with the drama. The non dramatic problems 
have been neglected [handwritten: by the media] and so 
have my comments about them. [...] It galls me to have the 
usual letters from people saying why are you only 
interested in thalidomide!
34
 
Not everyone was as dismissive as Townsend and DIG. Some accepted the premise that the 
new benefits of the early 1970s, including the Fund, were the beginning of a longer process. 
James Loring, The Director of the Spastics Society, was uncomfortable with hard-line criticism. 
‘I have spoken to [Joseph]’, he wrote to Townsend, ‘and it is quite plain to me that he doesn’t 
regard the £3m. as a sop, but rather as an attempt to reach those [...] who do not benefit in an 
important way from existing legislation’.35 The momentum behind expansion appeared to be 
growing. Heath wrote in response to Townsend criticisms that ‘the Government is very far 
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from satisfied. A great deal remains to be done, and the public awareness of the needs of the 
handicapped is developing constantly.’36 CCD was also impressed that the fund would pay on 
the basis of the effect of disability rather than on medical cause.37 As DIG wrote in a critique of 
a speech given by Joseph to their AGM, ‘the Minister’s speech is rather one of “jam to-
morrow, but never jam to-day”’, but ‘it is perhaps only fair to add that there was still less jam 
yesterday’.38 
The use of a “fund” rather than a statutory state benefit paid directly to affected families 
was an interesting development. Not solely Victorian charity, yet not Beveridge-style welfare, 
this concept would become relevant again in the 1980s with the Independent Living Fund. A 
fund has limited resources, and so must decide who will receive aid by a combination of 
discretion, prioritisation and a first-come-first-served policy. For the thalidomide-affected 
children, this was not overly complicated. Later, direct compensation from Distillers would be 
provided. For the general population, however, eligibility criteria were not under the auspices 
of law and statutory regulation, but the discretion of trustees working within guidelines. This 
form of aid owed much to the pre-1948 Poor Law Guardians,39 although for a more specific, 
and presumably “benevolent” purpose for “deserving” individuals. Even so, the question 
remains as to whether this can be considered part of a hybrid welfare system working towards 
a National Disability Income; or whether it remained very separate from the Fabian campaign 
being waged by DIG and the piecemeal growth of state benefits that would be added to by 
Labour.  
Hampton has argued that DIG’s inability to use thalidomide to secure greater social 
security expansion was an opportunity lost. His research had led him to conclude that DIG did 
not want to “rock the boat” and risk its privileged position within Whitehall and the then-ruling 
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Conservative party.40 There is some merit to this explanation. The documents he cites clearly 
show that Heath was worried that DIG would use the scandal to press for more wide-reaching 
reform, but when the government met with DIG in late 1972, they only mentioned it in passing 
towards the end of the meeting.41 However, I argue that there was a deeper philosophical 
problem for DIG regarding thalidomide. Greater funding for congenitally disabled children42 
was fundamentally incompatible with a campaign built on the premise that all disabled people 
should be supported based on their needs, not the cause of their impairment. That it was 
possible for the government to respond to the very public crisis of thalidomide but not “the 
civilian disabled” as a whole gives further evidence to the claim that disabled people were part 
of the liberal concept of the “deserving poor”. Some were considered as more deserving than 
others. This liberal approach was in some ways beneficial as it could unlock resources from the 
government; however, it also meant that the arguments for a comprehensive disability income 
for all disabled people as a right of citizenship were not fully accepted. Whether because of the 
“public sympathy” argument that we saw in the debates over AA in the 1960s, or because of 
adherence to the principle of tort law and compensation, the thalidomide children were 
provided with more generous benefits than other sections of the disabled population. Even if 
this is seen as yet another piecemeal benefit on the road to a National Disability Income, it was 
(in DIG’s conception of disability) the “right” movement for the “wrong” reasons. 
DIG in decline 
Whether DIG’s handling of the crisis was a “success” or a “failure”, members were becoming 
uneasy. By failing to criticise the government seriously during the height of the scandal or 
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pressing more stridently for the National Disability Income at a time when the public’s 
attention was on disability issues, questions were raised about the Group’s tactics. Even before 
this, there were concerns about DIG’s future. In 1970 some felt that a new constitution was 
necessary for an organisation that had outgrown its status as a ‘small South-East pressure 
group’. The sentiment was that the branches needed voting rights which ‘in some way... 
reflected their numerical strength’.43 At the 1971 AGM members queried ‘how far DIG should 
move away from its original “mainstream” policy’ and whether it should tackle ‘welfare, 
employment, etc’.44 One resolution passed at the 1973 AGM proclaimed: 
That this AGM, disappointed by the frequent failure of DIG 
spokesmen during recent months to comment positively on 
issues of concern to DIG when they have been the subject 
of discussion in the press or other media, urges that on each 
and every occasion when comment from DIG might further 
the aims of DIG, such comment shall be made irrespective 
of whether it might be critical of the Government of the day 
or one or other of the parliamentary parties. This 
Conference is of the opinion that DIG must engage in more 
spectacular activities in order to gain more widespread 
public support, and calls upon the Executive and 
Management Committees to take steps to arrange such 
activities.
45
 
Mari Lynn was perhaps the most vocal critic. Originally from the Newcastle Branch, she 
was Branches Secretary in DIG’s National Executive Committee (NEC).46 In 1975 she resigned 
over concerns that DIG at the centre was failing. Having seemingly achieved, on a basic level, 
the core aims of the group, where would DIG go next? Did the NEC even know? 
D.I.G. has come to the crossroads. After nine years of active 
campaigning the principle of the non-contributory invalidity 
pension, which will include disabled housewives, has been 
accepted as well as some of the expenses of disabled living 
e.g. the attendance allowance (in operation), the invalid 
carers allowance and the mobility allowance (yet to 
commence). Details including dates are not yet satisfactory. 
Future struggles will be to win in greater degree the rights 
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which are now widely acknowledged by MPs and to point 
out the anomalies that exist and will continue to exist in 
spite of the new benefits.
47
 
She argued for greater cooperation with other disability groups so that the wider needs of 
disabled people could be met. This could be done through the branch structure. The main 
issue, however, was: 
that, apart from the excellent negotiations carried out by 
Peter Large and Stewart Lyon
48
 with the Ministries and 
Parliament, DIG at the centre has been drifting, while other 
bodies have come into existence to try to broaden the base 
of activity for improvement in the plight of disabled people. 
One of these is the Disability Alliance which appears to be 
intent on saying in a more aggressive and noisy way what 
DIG has been pressing for quietly and effectively for the last 
9 years. They are not set up to further the state of 
knowledge of disability problems and rely heavily on DIG’s 
past work.
49
 
This final sentence was not entirely fair on the Alliance, as I will discuss shortly. Yet the 
general feeling was that big personalities were pushing DIG’s aims strongly and effectively in 
Westminster while the organisation as a whole was not looking after its members. The split 
between an increasingly out of touch NEC and the branches was given as a reason for the 
formation of UPIAS.50 Lynn was not responsible for the formation of either group, but she 
clearly expressed a sentiment that was held by many of DIG’s branch members.51 
The future for the Fabian approach 
It should be noted, however, that the mid-1970s saw the Fabian approach’s biggest successes. 
The campaigns which culminated in the 1975 Social Security Benefits Act brought a number of 
reforms that DIG had been created to promote. For those committed to the Fabian approach, 
therefore, the answer was not to jettison rational campaigning but to create a more strident 
and unified lobby. This would draw on the expertise, funding and visibility of all organisations 
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involved in disability issues rather than just DIG.52 To this end, DA was formed by Peter 
Townsend and fellow academic Alan Walker in an attempt to put forward the case for 
comprehensive disability benefits more forcefully. This Alliance would continue the tradition of 
using evidence and political argument to try and effect government policy changes, but did so 
from a more critical position than DIG. It began as a jointly signed letter to Heath in 1973,53 
before becoming a formal entity in 1974. The central steering group was populated with 
officials from its member organisations. In time it employed a full-time co-ordinator and, later, 
researchers.54 The development of research was, however, a slow process as the group grew in 
membership and financial power, hence Lynn’s impression in 1975 that DA was not created to 
‘further the state of knowledge of disability problems’. 
Initially, the links between the two organisations suggested DA might be a “spin off” rather 
than a rival. Members of the steering committee included Fred Reid, Betty Veal, and Berit 
Thornberry. The Spastics Society provided office space, strengthening the link between the 
older, service-based organisations and the newer, Fabian groups.55 Townsend claimed that he 
hoped a new umbrella organisation of all groups, including DIG, would give the National 
Disability Income campaign unity and ‘fresh authority’.56 While clearly building on DIG’s past 
work, Townsend was himself the pre-eminent expert on poverty.57  
DIG and DA broadly agreed on the need for a full income for disabled people. However, 
there were subtle differences in emphasis. DIG’s 1974 policy document recommended the 
extension of the industrial injuries scheme to cover “civilians” and better accommodate the 
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needs of people with mental and degenerative conditions.58 DA’s preferred system involved an 
allowance (paid on the basis of percentage of disablement), a pension (to cover lost earnings) 
and additional payments for specific extra costs as they arose, such as payments to carers.59 At 
a DIG meeting at which these ideas were aired, the DHSS observers noted that while DIG’s 
suggestions were a logical extension of existing schemes, Townsend’s was ‘so eclectic as to be 
almost absurd’. On the other hand, they did acknowledge that by separating everyday life from 
employment as the basis of payment, Townsend’s scheme was ‘significant’ and worth 
investigating.60 The important common idea to both was “percentage of disablement”. Rather 
than providing benefits only to “the most disabled”, the poverty lobby argued that the medical 
tests in the duty pensions – which measured a claimant’s disability in percentage terms – could 
be used to provide a fraction of a full disability income. This would allow people who could 
only work part-time to live comfortably, as well as ensuring payments were based on need 
rather than broad and inflexible categories of eligibility.61 This system would not be seriously 
considered by the governments of the 1970s, but with Severe Disablement Allowance (Chapter 
4) the use of a “percentage” would become controversial. 
However, DIG’s membership of the Alliance was a thorny subject from the start, and soon 
the relationship broke down. At a DA meeting, Veal stated: 
We hope the Alliance will complement our work, not 
duplicate it. We must at all costs avoid giving politicians the 
opportunity of playing for time, of telling the Alliance to 
wait while it considers DIG’s proposals and vice-versa. 
I am, as you will understand, jealous for DIG and what it had 
achieved, so you will not mind me pointing out that one of 
the reasons why the Alliance has got off the ground 
comparatively quickly is because of the hard work we have 
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put in over the last nine years, and also we have educated 
public opinion and Members of Parliament.
62
 
DA sent a letter to Wilson in 1974. DIG signed but with a caveat: 
The Disablement Income Group heartily endorses the 
sentiments expressed in the above letter but wishes to 
point out that the proposals do not accord in all details with 
D.I.G.’s policy statement as expressed in “Realising a 
National Disability Income”.
63
 
After much debate with DA and within the DIG NEC, Veal eventually had to declare that 
DIG was withdrawing from the Alliance in March 1976.64 
DA’s style was certainly more combative that DIG’s, drawing more on a tight group of 
academic research guided by an informed steering committee of its members. This difference 
was noted by Whiteley and Winyard also. DIG had developed a reputation among civil servants 
as ‘an extremely eminent and sensible organisation’.65 DA was not considered as “accepted” by 
the establishment according to the authors’ group typology.66 Deliberately eschewing a branch 
structure,67 it allowed its constituent organisations to concentrate on the needs of their 
members. Many DA members were therefore single-impairment organisations coming 
together for incomes campaigns.68 These groups, and the prominent figures within them, 
ensured that disabled people were involved in the running of DA, although they shared that 
platform with non-disabled experts and charities. Instead, the Alliance was a publishing arm 
and a “think tank”, guided by the sort of campaigning for which Townsend had become 
famous. As DIG declined in importance, DA became the pre-eminent group on the issue of 
disability incomes. The Fabian approach on this topic, therefore, became less “insider”, though 
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still committed to rational argument, collection of evidence, and attempts to communicate 
with government to secure policy change. 
The coming of the oppression approach 
From branch members, many of whom were disabled people, a more democratic answer was 
needed to solve DIG’s perceived failings. Campbell and Oliver have offered the distinction 
between the ‘incomes and oppression approaches to disability’ to distinguish DPOs from DA 
and DIG.69 This reflects the wider concerns of these groups, as well as the focus on 
‘democratic’ structures which were seen as the only way to represent the voices and 
aspirations of disabled people.70 In this thesis, the term refers to those groups founded and 
run by disabled people who campaigned on a wider platform than simply incomes. Unlike the 
Fabian groups, they did not attempt ‘insider’ tactics, though they did gather information to 
support their arguments for more radical reforms to politics and society. These traits are 
evident in the organisations inspired by Paul Hunt. 
Hunt had been involved with DIG, though he was critical of both the Group’s and 
Townsend’s approach to incomes, believing their methods of assessment put a ‘premium on 
dependence’ rather than actively encouraging independence.71 Frustrated, he wrote to The 
Guardian and other newspapers asking whether other disabled people felt the same 
discrimination he experienced.72 From the respondents, he formed UPIAS. The Union argued 
that DIG’s branches had simply been used to prop up the campaigning of an out-of-touch 
central command.73 It drew on left-wing campaigning traditions, particularly the emancipation 
movements for women and black people in America. Along with Vic Finkelstein, a disabled 
activist who had been jailed in South Africa for anti-Apartheid protests, and others, UPIAS 
                                                          
69
 Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics, p. 55. 
70
 See discussions on “representation” and “accountability” in Baggott, Pressure Groups Today, pp. 65-
71; Hilton et al., A historical guide to NGOs in Britain, pp. 354-55. 
71
 TNA: BN 89/139, CBD 23, The DIG Debate, 15 October 1973, p. 3. 
72
 LEEDS: Paul Hunt letter to The Guardian, 20 September 1972; Paul Hunt, Letter, Magic Carpet (Winter 
1973) Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 36. 
73
 Ken and Maggie Davis described the membership as ‘little more than fundraising fodder for this elite 
group of well-versed parliamentary lobbyists’. Quoted in Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics, p. 63. 
  125   
 
attacked DIG for concentrating on poverty at the expense of the real injustice – discrimination 
against disabled people.74 
UPIAS made little direct impact in policy circles. It is not mentioned in Hansard, nor does it 
appear in government correspondence. However, it represents a marked change in the 
composition of disability organisations. To many, it represented the beginning of the disabled 
people’s movement, a critical shift away from the traditional charities and the “expert” groups 
of the poverty lobby.75 The blueprint proliferated, leading to the creation of the British Council 
of Organisations of Disabled People (BCODP) in 1981. This, like DA, was an umbrella body 
representing the wishes of its constituent members. UPIAS were founder members, and 
remained active until 1990.76 Contact with government was through the BCODP, of which key 
UPIAS members and social model academics such as Vic Finkelstein and Mike Oliver were also 
senior figures. It would concentrate on issues such as information dissemination and 
independent living, as well as general rights-based discourse and later anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
This new approach challenges some of the histories of voluntarism and political 
campaigning. It is important to stress that DPOs came into being at least in part from DIG and 
because of DIG and its perceived failures. Oliver has argued that DPOs constitute a New Social 
Movement (NSM),77 but this is problematic as an overarching explanation for DPO activity. 
Shakespeare contends that the literature on NSMs does not adequately explain the difference 
between ‘indigenous or representative’ disability groups. DIG, for example, was not a DPO; yet 
social movement theory might see them both as such, given that it was founded and largely 
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run by disabled people.78 Embodied Health Movement is also a problematic category as 
defined by Brown et al, as the focus on medical care and the idea of members as “patients” 
does not sit well with the social model base of DPOs such as UPIAS and BCODP.79 There was a 
cultural change which began in the 1970s and is explored in the following chapter with 
reference to campaigning in the 1980s. The emergence of DPOs suggests that disability politics 
is an area where analytical categories used in other sectors are difficult to apply. Disability 
organisations have historically been run by or for disabled people; have focused on social 
security, health care, service provision, rehabilitation and/or civil rights; and have ranged from 
small associations to multi-million pound institutions. All of these traits have a tendency to 
overlap, causing difficulties for those attempting to apply a single label. I can offer no scheme 
to solve this issue, other than to reiterate that my own descriptions of ‘Fabian’ and 
‘oppression’ approaches to disability should also be taken as broad indicators of activity rather 
than hard ideologies. 
An example of the tension – Fundamental Principles 
The difference these groups made was the insistence on self-determination for disabled 
people. Out of this grew the social model of disability. The idea that the expectations of 
disabled people were relative to the expectations of wider society was not new. DIG argued in 
1968 that: 
“Integration” of the disabled into the community, the 
disabled population’s growing self confidence and the 
development of egalitarian ideals means that this minority 
will increasingly look to the cultural norms of the wider 
society for its frame of reference, and this will rightly 
demand a higher standard of living.
80
 
The idea that not only was disability relative to society but caused by society was, however, 
novel. The Fabian tradition had defined poverty as relative to the standards of the average 
household, and showed how structural inequalities in society contributed to this. The social 
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model took this further by arguing all social inequality justified by impairment was created by 
society. It drew its inspiration from arguments over the relationship between “sex” and 
“gender” in feminist literature.81 This radical approach caused tension with the more-
established groups. Partly this was ideological, and partly because of the members of these 
organisations. Disabled people were often driven to DPOs because of their dissatisfaction with 
the way they had been treated by supposed “experts”. The dispute over Fundamental 
Principles shows this tension very clearly. 
UPIAS stated that: 
Disability is a situation, caused by social conditions, which 
requires for its elimination, (a) that no one aspect such as 
incomes, mobility or institutions is treated in isolation, (b) 
that disabled people should, with the advice and help of 
others, assume control over their own lives, and (c) that 
professionals, experts and others who seek to help must be 
committed to promoting such control by disabled people.
82
 
This was the result of a meeting between DA and UPIAS to discuss the future of the 
disability movement, and can be seen as an attack on DIG and the way the poverty lobby had 
hitherto campaign on disabled people’s behalf. The correspondence between the Alliance and 
the Union suggests that Townsend was broadly supportive of the efforts of disabled people to 
run their own organisations.83 It was also widely accepted that disability was a social rather 
than medical issue. The problem was that, as the letters indicate, Townsend did not fully 
appreciate what UPIAS was or why the group found its method of attack so important. By the 
same token, it seems that UPIAS was making little effort to fully engage with DA and its work. 
It presented a clearly formulated policy proposal to DA without making it explicit that this was 
their intention. This took DA by surprise and meant that Townsend was responding to UPIAS’s 
critique of him and his work on the hoof.84 UPIAS refused to allow DA to retract or amend any 
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of their statements.85 Further, both groups had agreed to publicise and make available the 
proceedings of the meeting in print and on audio cassette, which the Union took as an 
agreement by DA to prioritise the meeting in terms of manpower and financial resources. By 
the end of the process, DA was clearly exasperated, with Irene Loach (DA’s organiser) sending 
a firm rebuke to Hunt: 
If our correspondence has [...] not been up to the standard 
of your meticulously drafted letters, I do apologise. 
However, I am very busy in struggling for the rights of other 
equally disabled people who are less articulate than 
yourselves, and who might therefore justify greater support 
and a greater proportion of my time when they ask for help 
and guidance.
86
 
Fred Reid of the National Federation of the Blind agreed that Hunt’s criticisms meant DA 
had to look at its own democratic structures. Still, he took the pragmatic view that: 
I think what underlines Paul’s thinking is a strong element 
of disabled sectarianism. I profoundly agree that the 
disabled need an organisation, such as the Union, which 
they control. This is the only authentic voice they can have. 
[...] But I think it quite unrealistic to imagine that such 
organisations can operate entirely in isolation from bodies 
such as the charities and hybrids such as DIG in situations 
where they control funds and have special relations with 
government and Parliament. The same point applies to 
experts.
87
 
By using the DA archives to illuminate this debate, I suggest that we must question some of 
the motives behind UPIAS’s decision to meet with DA. The traditional narrative, mainly told by 
people involved in DPOs during the late twentieth century, has been that the document was 
the result of disabled people struggling to be heard and taking control of the narrative of 
disability away from non-disabled people.88 This is certainly a major factor, and the document 
has undoubted historical importance; but the meeting that spawned it appears to have been 
manufactured to catch DA out and promote the Principles at the expense of the “traditional” 
expert groups. UPIAS made little attempt to fully engage DA with the purpose of the meeting, 
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and when DA was inevitably unprepared it made great capital out of the impression that the 
expert groups clearly did not understand or represent disabled people. This was an important 
campaign tool for UPIAS, and aided the development of the disabled people’s movement in 
the UK. It is also understandable, born, no doubt, out of years of frustration from being 
excluded from the leadership of the disability lobby, as well as the dangers of being forced to 
‘conform’ to expert views on the nature of the problems faced by disabled people.89 Yet it also 
sparked internal reflections in DA’s senior members. Whatever the political rights or wrongs of 
following an incomes approach using non-disabled experts, DA was not ignorant of the 
philosophical problems of its position. This would be crucial in understanding how and why the 
groups were able to work alongside each other in loose alliances during the 1980s and 1990s 
on specific projects. At their heart, both approaches sought to change societal and political 
attitudes towards disability to allow disabled people to participate more fully in society. It was 
not that DPOs were deliberately isolationist – hence the organisation of the meeting in the first 
place90 – but they remained wary of the power and influence of the expert groups who sought 
to work with government rather than campaigning for a wider restructuring of society. Only 
disabled-led organisations could ever achieve “legitimacy” in the eyes of DPOs. 
To conclude this section, it is important to note that during the mid-1970s, DIG’s insider 
Fabian approach was challenged by more-critical Fabian campaigners and DPOs following an 
oppression approach. The thalidomide scandal showed that the liberal Conservative attitudes 
to disability had not fully embraced DIG’s ideas. DIG’s  unwillingness to attack the government 
fully, coupled with frustration that the NEC was not responsive or democratically responsible 
to its branch members led to its decline. It would go into further decline after the 1974 
General Election, as Hampton has also shown. However, it did not disappear. The reputation 
DIG and its senior members had developed allowed it to remain as a well-respected voice in 
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Westminster and Whitehall even if it could not be said to be representative of the lobby or 
disabled people as a whole.91 
Government action – The Minister 
DIG’s campaigns in earlier years had clearly influenced the ‘politics’ and ‘problem’ streams.92 
From this ‘critical juncture’, momentum led to Wilson appointing Alf Morris as Minister for 
Disabled People on his return to power in 1974. The post is important because it represents 
changes in the bureaucratic management of disability, placed a prominent disability 
campaigner in a position of power, and led to key developments in the voluntary sector and in 
government policy. This was related to social-democratic attempts to cater for specific groups 
and Wilson’s reform of the machinery of Whitehall. His position in the social security side of 
the DHSS suggested that disability had become associated with the income campaign. 
However, when it was first suggested in the early 1970s, a DIG newsletter proclaimed: 
SPECIAL MINISTER? NO, THANKS 
[Mary Greaves] voiced her disapproval for the idea of a 
special Minister for the Disabled. There was a danger, she 
felt, that such a department would become isolated. 
Getting Alfred Morris’s ‘Chronically Sick and Disabled 
Persons Bill’ through the Commons recently had involved 
nine different Ministers without any particular difficulty. In 
any case, the disabled were people and should not be 
pigeon-holed in the same way as sport, productivity, 
transport, defence and so on. 
Disabled people needed the services of just as many 
departments of Government as able-bodied people and 
should be kept in touch with them all.
93
 
This was backed up by a letter to Wilson, then leader of the opposition. The 1971 AGM had 
agreed unanimously that a Minister for the Disabled ‘would prove a disservice to the disabled 
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population’ because ‘the interests of disabled people are not fundamentally different from 
those of the able-bodied population’. DIG feared ‘segregation’, a ‘ghetto’ and lamented that it 
was ‘highly improbable that he or she would be a cabinet minister’. It preferred to maintain 
‘the freedom to approach the minister concerned direct, rather than rely upon an additional 
barrier between ourselves and the responsible minister’.94 Wilson replied that he was ‘in 
general agreement with [DIG’s] approach’ and that the matter was under review.95 
By 1974, however, it appears Wilson had changed his mind, and decided to follow through 
with the plan. Sir George Young (Conservative), echoed many of DIG’s concerns at DA’s 1976 
AGM. He argued that the reality of the Minister was similar to DIG’s prediction. Morris was not 
there for ‘entirely benevolent reasons’ and he was ‘a bit of a sop... his existence had in some 
ways made it more difficult to extract information from other ministers’. Young was reported 
as saying: 
Whilst before his existence questions relating to disability 
could be submitted to a whole variety of Ministers, they are 
now channelled directly to Mr. Morris, and seldom get 
beyond him. He had become the focal point for discontent 
for MPs on matters relating to the disabled, and yet he was 
not given the power to implement action, or to force 
Government departments to fall in line with new or existing 
policies. Furthermore, although he had powers within the 
DHSS, he is less influential in other Government 
departments, and is therefore unable to follow up the 
implementations of legislation in other departments. Sir 
George concluded that what is therefore needed is a “policy 
for disabled people, rather than a Minister for them”.
96
  
A post in the DHSS 
Despite the opposition, Morris’s appointment led to some significant achievements, not only in 
the field of social security but also in interdepartmental communication. During his time in 
office, the DHSS provided four new social security benefits, the Motability Scheme and 
established CORAD. Files from the National Archives show an increased level of 
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communication between departments as a direct result of Morris’s work. His appointment is 
significant because it shows an official commitment to the category of “disability” within 
Whitehall, and in turn led directly to further reform.  
The site of the minister is particularly interesting. Morris was placed in the social security 
“half” of the DHSS. His direct superior was the Secretary of State for Social Services, and he 
shared rank with the under-secretaries of health and social security.97 This gave him some 
power, although as Greaves correctly predicted it did not give him cabinet status. However, he 
was able to run sub-committees in the Cabinet Office on issues to do with general inter-
departmental government policy on disability.98 At his behest, an Interdepartmental Group of 
Officials (Disability) (INDEGOD) was created to  share information across government and to 
address policy issues.99 It also ensured a point of contact for voluntary organisations. Both DIG 
and DA corresponded extensively with Morris over the late 1970s,100 and it was through him 
that Peter Large was appointed chair of the Silver Jubilee Committee and CORAD.101  
Morris’s location confirms that the official response to disability was cash benefits rather 
than services in kind. There was no necessity for him to be stationed in Social Security. One 
long-running government body was the National Advisory Council on the Employment of the 
Disabled (on which Mary Greaves had sat). This was based in the Department of Employment 
(and the Manpower Services Commission).102 Rehabilitation was part of Employment. Long-
stay hospital and psychiatric care was under the auspices of the health side of DHSS; as was 
the artificial limbs service and the renting out of invalid carriages. Further, it was not unheard 
of to create ministers without portfolio, though these were usually reserved for cabinet 
ministers. For Morris to be based in Social Security shows that by 1974 disability was seen as 
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largely an issue about poverty and incomes, or at the very least that this was the first “natural” 
port of call. This is unsurprising given the success of DIG and attempts to reform benefits and 
social services; but we must be aware that this is a relatively new phenomenon. In the forties, 
disability was the domain of the Department of Employment through the Disabled Persons 
(Employment) 1944 Act. Many other services were dispensed through the Ministry of Health. 
Now social security was taking over. This emphasises that cash rather than services in kind 
were seen as the priority in welfare for disabled people. The minister remains in this 
department, through its various incarnations, to this day.103 
Morris was an obvious candidate given his background and campaigning on disability 
issues. His work, largely off his own initiative, with the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons 
Act had cemented his reputation with disabled people. However, he was not alone. Jack Ashley 
was appointed as Barbara Castle’s Parliamentary Private Secretary.104 In this role he pushed for 
and gained a new institute for research into deafness.105 This was a concerted effort by the 
Labour administration to give disability a place within the bureaucracy, both formally through 
the creation of a new post and in terms of the personnel appointed to ministerial rank. Castle’s 
successor, David Ennals, had been wounded in the forces and claimed a War Pension himself. 
He had also been the chair of MENCAP.106 It meant that the voices within government pushing 
the case for how disability policy ought to be formulated came from the DIG campaigning 
tradition. 
Creating RADAR – the Fabian approach evolved 
For the poverty lobby, one of the most significant acts during Morris’s tenure was the creation 
of RADAR. The group, like DIG, pursued an “insider” campaign to effect policy change, also 
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using the Fabian approach of trying to win the political argument with evidence and reason. 
Unlike DIG and DA it did not focus specifically on poverty, broadening out to wider concerns 
such as participation in society and access to services. It was far from an oppression approach 
group, however, drawing on a tradition of working alongside disabled people rather than being 
run by them. Through significant investment via the DHSS, RADAR was actively consulted by 
government on disability issues and given specific grants for research or to provide services, 
most famously the RADAR public toilet key.107 
Morris had become concerned that the DHSS had no central group with which to 
communicate. DIG and DA were well-respected, as were their senior members. However, their 
concentration on poverty meant that other issues could be sidelined. DIG was also in terminal 
decline at the branch level, meaning that its claims to represent disabled people through its 
size of membership were unsustainable. A general organisation, he felt, was needed.108 The 
answer lay in two existing groups. CCD, as mentioned earlier, had a history of lobbying 
government, but despite having existed since the 1910s they had not been as effective as DIG. 
CCD had disabled members – notably Greaves and Large – but it was not a disabled-led 
organisation by any means. Its earlier name of the Campaign for the Care of Crippled Children 
is instructive as to its traditional philanthropic background. The other organisation was REHAB. 
This was constituted of medical professionals and those concerned with rehabilitation for the 
purposes of allowing disabled people to lead a more “normal” life. It was a group rooted in the 
medical model. Both organisations were in financial trouble by the mid-1970s. The DHSS saw 
potential in a merger and offered a grant to help the new organisation establish itself. This 
totalled £175,000, with a further £28,910 made available for specific projects.109 RADAR would 
give the Department a first port of call for disability issues, and give disabled people a “voice” 
which had regular access to ministers and the government. Plans of this kind were discussed 
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following the Sunningdale Seminar which was organised by the DHSS to bring together 
voluntary organisations and the Department. They argued that ‘government should seek to 
encourage rationalisation of voluntary bodies’ activities as suitable occasions arise’ through 
merging some of the smaller groups into larger, easier-to-consult bodies. This should not be 
forced, but should the ‘opportunity’ arise to encourage mergers, the DHSS should seek to do 
so.110 Creating RADAR was as a result of the government’s conception of disability and 
signalled further investment in institutions which could aid the management of this 
bureaucratic category. It is yet another example of momentum guiding policy down the path 
started in the mid-sixties. 
Proof of the government’s commitment to RADAR can be seen through the ‘Royal’ prefix. 
Initially created as the British Association (BADAR), Morris and Michael Foot were able to push 
through the necessary application to use the title ‘Royal’ based on the age and prestige of the 
two organisations.111 Some years earlier, REHAB had attempted to become ‘Royal’ through the 
Home Office and had been unsuccessful on the grounds that it could not ‘be regarded as pre-
eminent or outstanding in comparison with other bodies in the field of voluntary work for the 
disabled’.112 RADAR would go on to work more closely within Whitehall than previous poverty 
lobby groups had done.113 DIG became members of RADAR, emphasising the link with this 
tradition, and the historical links between CCD and DIG members.114 This position from within 
government rather than solely lobbying from outside gave the lobby greater contact with key 
officials. However, as we will see, from the 1979 General Election onwards, the influence of 
the lobby over government policy, including that of RADAR, declined. More critically, BCODP 
would actively campaign against RADAR, claiming that it was undemocratic and took valuable 
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resources away from other groups which genuinely represented disabled people and their 
interests. This was seen as ‘positively dangerous’.115 It is particularly important when 
explaining the campaigns for anti-discrimination legislation in Chapter 5. 
If the social-democratic approach to poverty and inequality is to establish categories of 
need and redirect resources towards those categories, the Labour government clearly made a 
commitment to this. Disability for the “civilian” as well as “non-civilian” disabled was catered 
for both within the government (through a formal ministerial post) and in the non-statutory 
field (though providing the infrastructure to create RADAR). These developments built on 
research exercises such as the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) survey to 
further define disability and cement it as a permanent area of policy within the government. A 
series of initiatives, then, had been built as a result of bureaucratic momentum pushing policy 
in this direction. As we will see in the reform of social security, there were limits to what the 
government felt it could afford; but through these actions a network of voluntary 
organisations, sympathetic ministers and departmental officials created the category of 
disability and a semi-official line of communication between Whitehall and the “constituency” 
of disabled people. 
Government action – The new benefits 
I now turn to specific legislative change during the period by focusing on the Social Security 
Benefits Act 1975. The new benefits it created provided coverage in a number of areas that 
DIG had campaigned for since its inception; housewives, carers, the extra costs of disability 
and loss of earnings for all disabled people. Policy proposals therefore built on the definitions 
of disability within the welfare state that had been established by 1971 – primarily that it was 
an issue requiring cash payments to cover the costs associated with impairment and the loss of 
earnings power. The question was how coverage could be extended to those with other costs 
and with incomplete insurance records. The Fabian incremental approach continued to matter, 
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and DIG and its allies remained influential. The Labour government had a Secretary of State for 
Social Services committed to reform and prioritised disability benefits. It was also able to build 
upon planning work initiated by Joseph. The result was that once again the social-democratic 
and liberal approaches were broadly agreed on action that needed to be taken, even if their 
reasons for doing so differed. The economic situation, however, meant that reform was 
limited, piecemeal and did not bring about the National Disability Income. Thus, while DIG was 
largely successful over a period of ten years in manipulating the ‘problem’ and ‘politics 
streams’ and creating far greater coverage for “the civilian disabled”, it failed to change 
fundamentally the approaches of the two major parties or achieve equal benefits paid to all 
disabled people on the basis of need. 
The new benefits were Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP); Housewives’ Non-
contributory Invalidity Pension (HNCIP); Invalid Care Allowance (ICA); and Mobility Allowance 
(MA). This section of the chapter is broken into three main parts to show the significance of 
these benefits. The first shows how the Conservative government planned for a non-
contributory benefit which would eventually become NCIP. Outside pressure put legal 
obligations on government to produce detailed plans for the future of disability benefits, 
helped along by a generally receptive Secretary of State in Sir Keith Joseph. The second looks 
at benefits for married women, specifically ICA and HNCIP. These were also forced through by 
extra-governmental forces, but were again tolerated because they allowed Barbara Castle to 
seek concessions from the Treasury for benefits she had always wanted to introduce. The third 
part considers MA and Motability, a scheme designed to provide adapted vehicles for disabled 
people. It is an explicit example of how the government sought to use cash payments as a way 
of giving individuals choice over the services they consumed, as well as a way in which the 
government could rid itself of the obligation to provide certain services that were considered 
arcane and impractical. As a collection, they show that both the liberal and social-democratic 
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approaches resulted in legislative change; but coverage was far from total, and discrimination 
based on gender, insurance and cause of impairment remained ingrained in the system. 
Planning a non-contributory pension 
The creation of a contributory benefit for disabled people out of work (IVB) led to the logical 
conclusion that a non-contributory alternative was also required. It was envisaged that this 
would cover not only uninsured men, but married women as well. The resultant NCIP was 
another example of the consensus between the two main parties; the proposals had been 
presented by the DHSS under Joseph and were continued by Castle. Joseph had declared in a 
speech to DIG at their AGM that he was ‘seriously considering the introduction of a disability 
pension’.116 However, to say that the government as a whole was in support of these proposals 
would be inaccurate. Prolonged discussions took place between senior civil servants in the 
Treasury and DHSS over the practicality and political expediency of introducing new cash 
benefits for disabled people. 
In May 1973 Sir Keith wrote to Tony Barber, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, warning that 
pressure for some sort of disability benefit would increase. Joseph was under the impression 
that DIG and the lobby were becoming more agitated. Although DIG had ‘hitherto been 
thoroughly responsible on all this’ Joseph ‘had a very uncomfortable time’ at the AGM and 
expected ‘to be strongly challenged on the whole issue on “Panorama” on 14 May’.117 There 
had been ‘a great deal of acrimony’ in the room, necessitating a policy meeting some weeks 
later.118 The release of DIG’s Strategy for a National Disability Income a year earlier had made 
significant waves within the DHSS and made Joseph realise that some sort of provision would 
have to be provided to avoid political discomfort in the future.119 The pre-cursor to DA had also 
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written to the Prime Minister directly detailing its concerns.120 While recognising the ‘severe 
public expenditure constraints’ which limited the amount of cash available, he nevertheless 
stressed that an official response or Green Paper on the subject was probably necessary. ‘At 
this stage [...] I do not want to do more than sound a warning note’, the Secretary of State 
concluded: ‘but I have no doubt that this problem is one which is becoming very urgent, and 
will need a response from us before too long’.121  
The bureaucratic momentum behind disability benefit expansion and the successful 
campaigning by the Fabian groups meant that planning for new benefits continued despite 
Treasury opposition. The Conservatives, and especially Joseph, were keen to plan for future 
benefits to extend coverage so that “worthy” categories of disabled people could receive as-
of-right benefits.122 They considered a non-contributory benefit (with some coverage for 
housewives included) as well as debating further expansion of AA and a benefit for carers.123 In 
1972, Baroness Sharp was asked to begin a study on the mobility needs of disabled people and 
the future of the invalid vehicle scheme.124 These proposals received greater attention after 
the Social Security Bill 1972 was hijacked. An amendment had been tabled in the House of 
Lords by Baroness Seear, compelling the Secretary of State to publish ‘a report on what 
amendments are needed in the law relating to social security to meet the special needs of 
chronically sick and disabled persons (including categories of such persons not at present 
entitled to benefit hereunder)’ by the end of April 1974.125 This amendment had been 
sponsored by DIG.126 Graham Hart at the DHSS wrote to the Treasury recommending that the 
clause be amended to give the government more time. Outright rejection would lead to 
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political difficulties and accusations of negligence towards disabled people; trying to remove it 
in the Commons was risky, since the government could be left with an embarrassing political 
situation and the need to produce a report in too short a time span.127 The amendment was 
made to give the government until October 1974 to publish.128 Yet the DHSS persisted with its 
plans for a non-contributory allowance. The Treasury was obviously frustrated at the 
Department’s behaviour, believing that Joseph had the perfect opportunity to delay action. 
Instead: 
Neither Sir Keith nor his officials have attempted to 
elaborate the argument that political considerations make 
an interim gesture essential. The argument appears to have 
no foundation, as the statutory commitment to report by 
October 1974 puts Ministers in a strong position to resist 
pressure for premature, ill-thought out concessions. 
There is, moreover, the danger that the concessions which 
Sir Keith now proposes will be criticised as a presentational 
device, lacking substance, as very few of the congenitally 
disabled will be made independent of supplementary 
benefit.
129
 
The problem was not just the immediate cost of implementing the benefit. While clearly 
hoping the report could be a delaying tactic, there were good reasons for waiting until more 
data was available before committing the government to extra expenditure. This was more 
than a small breach of the contributory principle which was generally accepted in the case of 
AA. 
The proposals, if implemented, would involve the implicit 
concession of the principle that cash benefits for the 
disabled should be paid universally regardless of financial 
need. The proposals are, in fact, totally unrelated to any 
coherent attempt to analyse the objectives aimed at, the 
merits of the various arguments for the support of 
particular categories of the disabled, or the nature of the 
measures (in kind as well as cash) appropriate to provide 
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support in those cases which are thought to have special 
merit. In short, the whole approach amounts to the 
negation of PAR [Programme Analysis and Review], and 
must seriously prejudice the possibility of a rationally based 
outcome from the general review.
130
 
This is an important issue, because it relates to Stone’s conclusion that disability 
programmes necessarily grow over time.131 The Treasury resisted NCIP not so much for the 
financial and political obligations it might create in the present, but for the way in which it 
might open the government up to unaffordable commitments in the future. However the 
category of need called “disability” was defined, it had to be tight so that expenditure did not 
get out of control. One way of effectively “means-testing” and “targeting” the benefit was that 
the proposed payment counted against Supplementary Benefit. However, this was only 
indirect targeting, and in time could lead to greater expenditure. ‘The concession of the 
principle that the disabled should all invariably be supported without test of means will lead to 
pressure for the new benefit to be raised until it eventually dispenses with the need for 
[Supplementary Benefit].’ In the long term, this would mean raising the level of benefit well 
above contributory retirement pension. ‘The ultimate financial repercussions are therefore 
potentially catastrophic.’132 Disability, therefore, remained linked to the restrictive definition of  
poverty in the minds of the Treasury out of financial necessity.  In this liberal approach, new 
benefits were not designed to ensure greater participation in society; rather they were to 
ensure only that the basic costs of living could be covered for those most in need. 
Such investment by the Department in planning these benefits and commissioning reports 
into disability meant that the incoming Labour government could take a “path of least 
resistance” by building upon Conservative plans rather than creating its own. This was another 
example of increasing returns in an era of consensus of action between the two main parties. 
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Despite the consequences of the February 1974 General Election  – both the change in Prime 
Minister and the fact that the new Government had no majority in the Commons –  the Labour 
Party continued to pursue a non-contributory pension for ‘congenitally disabled’ adults and for 
‘housewives’.133 This was part of their manifesto commitment, and in line with their social-
democratic approach to promoting the equality of disadvantaged groups.134 It was also 
(amongst other proposals) recommended by the report initiated by the Social Security Act 
1973, which argued for: 
First, better provision for the severely disabled must come 
before further provision for the less severely disabled. 
Second, benefits for those who cannot work should take 
priority over further provision for those who can, as the loss 
of the ability to earn is stark, overwhelming and readily 
identifiable. 
Third, those of working age who would be at work but for 
long-standing incapacity should have the right to a benefit 
without test of means. 
Fourth, those who relieve the social services and sacrifice 
work opportunities to look after people at home who are 
severely disabled people should be provided with a benefit 
as of right. Neither the stated purpose of attendance 
allowance nor the evidence on how it is spent make it right 
to regard it as a maintenance benefit to be paid over to a 
full-time attendant who has no benefit or pension.
135
 
The Treasury remained concerned that the precedents set by a non-contributory benefit 
would lead to unbearable pressure from outside government to increase the value of the 
payments. The stress remained on an evidence-based approach to the matter – or at the very 
least, the Treasury could use a lack of an evidence-based approach to try and block spending 
proposals. When the DHSS asked to be absolved from the obligation of producing a 
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Programme Analysis Review (PAR) report on cash benefits for disabled people,136 the Treasury 
refused. It was worried that, in effect, DIG was directing the course of government policy, 
noting that: 
what you are proposing would represent an inefficient 
expenditure of resources in relation to the resulting social 
gain. But still more important, without a sound analytical 
base for the policy measures adopted, the pressures for 
much bigger concession – groups with analogous claims for 
consideration of special treatment – will be stimulated 
while the defences against them will have been weakened. 
The effect would be in practice to hand over to outside 
pressure groups the determination of the relative social 
priorities at stake. [Emphasis mine]
137
 
The Treasury had been under the impression that other benefits had been of higher 
priority than disability. Replying to this letter, J.A. Atkinson remarked that ‘quite 
inadvertently... we may have misled you about where cash provision for disablement ranks in 
my Secretary of State’s [Barbara Castle] order of priorities’. It would be impossible to produce 
a PAR report in time to send the NCIP proposals to the Social Services Committee at the 
‘beginning of next month’.138 
Thus, both Castle and Joseph pushed in similar directions. The Social Security Act report re-
emphasised the incremental approach, and gave both the liberal and social-democratic 
approaches the licence to introduce piecemeal changes targeted initially at those “most in 
need”. As I will now demonstrate, both parties had proposed non-contributory benefits for 
men and married women and some form of expansion to extra-costs provision. Castle was able 
to legislate for these benefits because she was able to build on the work started by Joseph, 
and was willing and able to force the Treasury to acquiesce. The following sections focus 
specifically on the debates over benefits for married women and the reform to invalid vehicles 
which eventually led to Mobility Allowance and Motability. 
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Benefits for housewives and women 
Building on plans started by the Conservative administration, Castle sought to extend coverage 
to women, traditionally a neglected part of the welfare state139 and one of the key target 
groups from Du Boisson’s earliest campaigns. Although often dismissive of ‘feminism’, Castle 
had built a reputation for raising issues that affected women and may have been ignored by an 
all-male government (for instance, her support for equal pay and sex equality legislation).140 
The needs of carers and housewives fit into this category. ICA was technically available to both 
men and women, but it was envisaged that the main beneficiaries would be daughters who 
remained at home (rather than seeking employment or marriage) in order to care for an 
elderly relative. More radical was HNCIP which provided a benefit to disabled married and co-
habiting women who were unable to perform their ‘household duties’. There were clear 
shortcomings in these benefits, but they did at least acknowledge both the needs and 
entitlements of women to social security. They reflected the fact that the social-democratic 
Labour government had identified both women and disabled people as target groups for 
support, and had prioritised legislative reform. However, it also showed the limits on how 
much the government was willing to spend, and to how wide it was willing to draw the 
eligibility criteria. It still remained conscious of the insurance principle and the need to balance 
the budget. 
ICA was initially dismissed by the Treasury, but Castle was able to push it through in a 
restricted form. The Treasury argued that it would not be enough to encourage relatives to 
stay at home, and since it would also be linked to the AA administrative machinery the cared 
for (rather than the carer) would receive the allowance.141 J.A. Atkinson at the DHSS responded 
that: 
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you are right in assuming we do not regard the case for an 
invalid care allowance as turning on the extent to which it 
provides an incentive to people to give up work to care for 
an elderly relative. Rather, the case rests on the widely held 
belief that the community should recognise the work (and 
sacrifice) involved by some form of non-means-tested 
payment.
142
 
The word ‘sacrifice’ arguably shows a paternalistic attitude towards carers much like 
‘burden’ was employed for the parents of thalidomide affected children, but the principle that 
there were extra costs involved in disability which impacted upon the entire household was 
accepted. The government felt that social security was one way of dealing with this issue. 
However, when the benefit was brought in, take-up was very low. This was partly because 
married and co-habiting women were still unable to claim due to the principle that they should 
be maintained by their husband’s income.143 This would become a major issue in the 1980s 
and is explored in the next chapter. Of more importance at this juncture is HNCIP. 
Married women were finally accepted as deserving of benefit in their own right when 
HNCIP was introduced in 1977. HNCIP was an extension of NCIP. However, because it covered 
the additional costs associated with an inability to perform ‘household duties’ (as the 
regulations phrased it), it was technically an extra-costs rather than an income-replacement 
benefit. Earlier in the decade, the DHSS had noted that a benefit for housewives was morally 
justifiable, but that it could possibly be out of tune with the electorate. Putting a financial 
value on housework was considered problematic, especially for traditionalists.144 The Treasury 
was more hostile to the idea, but Castle continued to push for the funds to be made available. 
This would suggest that HNCIP was a central part of government policy, or at least the policy of 
the social security arm of government and/or the Labour Party. It is a little puzzling, then, to 
find that HNCIP was not a key section of a government bill introduced with a fanfare during a 
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second reading announcement in the House of Commons. The clause to create the benefit was 
introduced at the committee stage of the Bill by a backbench MP working with DIG. Castle, in 
the second reading of the Bill, promised that a housewives’ benefit (along with a mobility 
allowance) would be the subject of legislation that she ‘hope[d]’ would be introduced ‘in this 
Session of Parliament’.145 The amendments forced the government to act sooner. 
DIG’s tactics had moved on from simply trying to inform official opinion to formulating 
policy options in law. The ‘solution stream’ could be manipulated directly if an ally at 
committee stage was willing and able to force a poverty lobby drafted amendment into a 
government Bill. I argue this was mainly because of the influence of Peter Large and the 
restructuring of DIG’s central command following Mary Greaves’s resignation in 1972. His 
more focused legal approach had allowed the organisation to concentrate on focused lobbying 
at the micro level while the other DIG officers took care of the national campaign. It is 
noticeable how the internal bulletins changed from one-woman newsletters under Greaves to 
multi-page reports from the various senior officers.146 This “open” campaign approach is the 
one identified by Whiteley and Winyard in their summary of DIG in the late-eighties.147 Large is 
quoted as saying that his preferred method of achieving change was to talk privately with civil 
servants.148 
Large related DIG’s role in amending the Bill in his report to DIG’s NEC. All MPs were sent a 
copy of Realising a National Disability Income149 before the Second Reading of the Bill on 21 
November 1974. In Standing Committee B, DIG sponsored five amendments, one of which was 
to include housewives in NCIP. ‘This was debated on 17 and 19 December and was carried by 9 
votes to 8 on 19 December.’ At the Commons report stage, two amendments were made to 
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this clause, but the substance of DIG’s provisions remained. In the Lords, DIG and their 
parliamentary allies were worried that the government wanted to delete ‘our New Clause’ but 
in the event they did not.150 The written record appears to back up his claims. The minutes 
from the committee show that Lewis Carter-Jones, a supporter of DIG, tabled amendments to 
include housewives, and that it passed a division by 9 votes to 8. It was opposed by the 
Minister of State, Brian O’Malley, but supported by Carter-Jones (Labour), Lynda Chalker and 
Sir George Young (both Conservative), all of whom had links to DIG and the APDG.151 
Moreover, Large’s claim that DIG were given ‘full credit’ is sustained by Morris’s praise for 
Large, Veal and Lyon in Hansard.152 
Even more emphatically, Kenneth Clarke praised the ‘ingenuity’ of: 
Mr. Peter Large and Mr. Stuart Lyon, of [DIG]. [...] They 
provided the drafting for extremely carefully chosen 
amendments which my hon. Friends, assisted by [Carter-
Jones] and [John Dunlop, Vanguard Progressive Unionist], 
were able to carry against the Government votes in 
Committee.
153
 
Veal congratulated the troops in a letter sent to all DIG branches: 
The credit for this can, I think, be shared by Stewart Lyon 
and Peter Large and by you, the Branches. Judging from the 
press cuttings I am receiving, and the reports that some of 
you send me, branches have made a very effective job of 
their lobbying. You have helped to influence Back Bench 
opinion; and in doing this you have made a real contribution 
to our success.
154
 
It is made plain from the Treasury correspondence that Castle and the DHSS intended to 
introduce a benefit for housewives at some point in the short-to-mid-term. It means that 
Baldwin’s statement, that the DHSS might ‘hand over to outside pressure groups the 
determination of the relative social priorities at stake’, takes on a new significance. Some have 
argued that poverty lobby groups became allies of certain government departments in the 
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battle against the Treasury.155 An interesting question, therefore, is did DIG force the DHSS into 
concrete action, or did the DHSS use DIG’s intervention as an opportunity to force changes 
past the Treasury? If it were the latter, why did O’Malley vote against the amendment? If it 
were the former, why did the government not remove the amendment when it had chance in 
the various stages between Standing Committee and Royal Assent? DIG, clearly, felt that this 
was a real possibility: 
This success [at committee stage] is very heartening but it 
must be stressed that the Bill has several stages to go 
through before it receives the Royal Assent. Nobody must 
assume that the disabled housewives’ allowance is certain. 
We do not know what the Government intends to do about 
its defeat in committee; all we know is that it has several 
opportunities to reverse the DIG amendment and once 
again exclude disabled married women. We can 
congratulate ourselves on our influence and expertise and 
we can very gratefully thank our MP friends on Standing 
Committee B, but none of us can relax.
156
 
Castle’s diaries show that she saw the backbench intervention as an opportunity. Yet she 
also felt that she needed to make sure that any “victory” of this kind did not damage her or her 
department’s future claims to additional resources; or her government’s ability to run the 
country. 
I am delighted with the backbench revolt which has forced 
the Treasury to concede that disabled housewives shall get 
the full rate of the non-contributory invalidity benefit. But I 
again backed Denis [Healey, the Chancellor] strongly in his 
proposal that we should resist George Cunningham’s 
amendment on the rapid phasing out of the earnings rule. 
My motives were double-edged. Partly I thought it would 
count unto me for righteousness and do something for my 
greedy image in Cabinet. But I was also acutely conscious 
that we were in danger of entering the stage we had got 
into in 1968-69, when our authority as a government was 
totally undermined by a succession of backbench revolts. It 
is intolerable that a small number of our own people should 
be able to hold the Government to ransom for their own 
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pet priorities without having to take account of the whole 
public expenditure picture as cabinet has to do.
157
 
She also argued that the revolt did not speed up the introduction of the allowance (‘we 
cannot operationally introduce it before 1977 anyway’) but it did guarantee that the rate of 
payment would be the same in HNCIP as it was for NCIP. She had accepted the lower rate in 
the bill ‘as otherwise I should not have got it included at all, but it is immensely embarrassing 
in International Women’s Year!’158 
To claim HNCIP, five qualification criteria were noted in the DHSS’s information leaflet. 
First, the claimant had to be ‘married’ or ‘living with a man as his wife’. Second, the claimant 
must have been ‘continuously incapably of [her] normal household duties for at least 28 
weeks; and continuously incapable of paid work for at least 28 weeks’. Third, she must be 
between 16 and 60 years of age before she started claiming, and not in full-time education (if 
under the age of 19). Fourth, she must be a UK resident. Fifth, the rate of HNCIP would be 
reduced based on other benefits received by either the wife or the husband.159 Qualification 
was therefore still dependent on factors other than the woman’s needs – it was directly 
related to her husband’s status. It was a benefit for the extra costs associated with being 
unable to do “normal” housework (however defined) rather than a benefit to a disabled 
person based on her needs and circumstances. Further, it was a medical decision based on 
centrally defined criteria, not the individual circumstances of the claimant. Plans for a ‘social’ 
definition of need were rejected during Joseph’s time. A system involving individual 
assessments by social workers was considered costly, an impossible imposition on social 
workers’ time, and would lead to wildly inconsistent decisions from one case to another; or 
‘injustices’ as the DHSS termed it.160 
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HNCIP was created at a time when sex discrimination was an important political topic.161 
Combined with the prominence of disability and a sympathetic female Secretary of State, the 
social-democratic approach provided coverage to this sub-group of disabled people. However, 
the benefit remained restrictive and discriminatory against women because it continued to be 
tied to her husband’s economic status. Neither an extra-costs benefit for the needs of disabled 
women, nor truly an income-replacement benefit for women unable to work, it showed that 
the government’s commitment to a gradually-evolving patchwork of benefits would continue 
to discriminate against certain disadvantaged groups. Further, the terms of the duties’ test 
effectively targeted the benefit on medical grounds to the “most disabled” wives. Being a 
disabled woman was still not considered grounds in itself for extra financial support, and 
poverty remained a key eligibility criteria as a way of saving money.  Economic and political 
priorities meant that Labour did not go as far as the National Disability Income campaign had 
asked for. 
Mobility Allowance and Motability 
The final “new” benefit during this period to be discussed is Mobility Allowance (MA). It came 
from two traditions. The first was as an extra-costs allowance on the same basis as AA. The 
second was the old “invalid tricycles” scheme. This shows how the social-democratic approach 
had identified disabled people as a group with needs that were not met. However, due to a 
lack of resources, the Labour government also targeted the new benefit in such a way as to 
exclude a number of disabled people through restrictive medical criteria, whilst trying to 
create a cost-neutral scheme to provide transport for disabled people. This hybrid of 
traditional benefits and a not-for-profit company exemplified the approach from both liberal 
and social-democratic governments that cash would give individuals choice over the services 
they used. 
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Mobility Allowance (MA) 
The way that MA got onto the statute books is worth investigating as it shows how the Labour 
Governments from 1974 had difficult financial choices to make. Some form of cash benefit for 
those with restricted mobility was proposed as a replacement for the Invalid Vehicle Scheme 
and as a way of extending the principle of AA to other areas of need.162 This reflected both the 
bureaucratic momentum and increasing returns of earlier years and the more immediate 
‘crisis’163 of needing to save money on invalid trikes. The resultant benefits became “targeted” 
just as the liberal Conservative approach had focused on groups of desert and need. For 
Labour, selectivity was achieved through stricter medical criteria. We have seen how this 
worked with HNCIP, and MA was little different. This self-referential statement by Jack Ashley 
in the debate over MA begins to show these choices. 
It so happens that when the present Government came into 
office they were faced with a clear choice, given the very 
difficult economic circumstances, of either helping all 
disabled people or, alternatively, helping those who were 
faced with the problem of mobility. What the Government 
did, in my view, was to help the immobilised people much 
more than they helped the other groups of disabled people. 
The various other categories of disabled people—the blind, 
the deaf, spastics, vaccine-damaged children and so on—did 
not get a great deal from the present Government, or 
indeed from any Government, in terms of direct 
assistance.
164
 
Again, we see an attempt to focus on those “most in need”; although the reasoning is not 
quite framed in the same way. For Ashley, at this point Castle’s Private Parliamentary 
Secretary, it seems that ‘the immobilised people’ were a sub-category of disabled people, and 
their immobility put them in a different category of deemed need. Morally, and practically, this 
was desirable for the DHSS. Castle wrote to Townsend: 
I do not think that the necessity of “picking and choosing”, 
that is of establishing criteria for eligibility and applying 
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those criteria, can be avoided. [...] I think that it is not 
unreasonable to single out those unable to walk as opposed 
to the very much wider and more diverse group which has 
difficulty in using public transport or difficulty in walking.
165
  
However, the category was subtly different than simply “the immobile”; not only were 
limits placed on the ability end – i.e. those with “too much” ability to walk were excluded – 
there were limits where someone was considered too disabled to benefit. To quote Castle 
again: 
As Alf Morris said in the debate,
166
 there really is no point in 
paying a mobility allowance to those who cannot be moved; 
or to those in a coma or so very severely mentally 
disordered that they have no idea what is happening to 
them. There is no question of excluding locomotor-disabled 
people who are also blind: they may not be able to see 
where they are, but they can certainly appreciate mobility. 
And to further ensure benefit was properly targeted: 
We have made it clear from the outset that taxing the 
mobility allowance is a means of ensuring that limited 
resources are so directed that those most in need benefit 
most.
167
 
A DHSS leaflet from 1977 outlined the qualifying conditions for the benefit. A claimant had 
to satisfy the Department: 
 that he is suffering from physical disablement such 
that he is unable to walk or virtually unable to do 
so; and 
 that the inability or virtual inability to walk is likely 
to persist for at least 12 months; and 
 that during most of the period covered by the 
award his condition will be such as to permit him 
from time to time to benefit from the 
opportunities for mobility provided by the 
allowance.
168
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DA had been critical of the government’s proposals, arguing for much wider eligibility 
criteria; as had DIG, which continued to press for the National Disability Income.169 The main 
problem was the restriction due to age. MA was to be made available only to those over 5 
years old and below pensionable age (60 for women, 65 for men).170 It was also clearly an 
extra-costs benefit for physical barriers and discriminated ‘against the mentally 
handicapped’.171 Far more people qualified for the new MA when it was introduced in 1975 
than had qualified for the old vehicle scheme; but some who had expected to benefit from 
these changes were actually left out, or even believed that their situation was worse. In 1976 
Morris felt that this was ‘the most sensitive issue confronting the Government in relation to 
the disabled’.172 
As part of the planning, a working party was created, headed by George Wilson (then of 
CCD and DA, later of RADAR) and with Peter Large as a member.173 This would suggest a desire 
to widen the debate and include the views of a range of actors. However, the Labour 
Government used a technical device to push through MA without the possibility of 
amendments. By framing it as a financial resolution, they had no obligation to present the Bill 
to either house, precluding the possibility of voluntary organisations or concerned 
parliamentarians pushing through changes.174 Castle’s diaries suggest that this was a tactic 
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designed not to keep voluntary organisations and opposition amendments out as such, but 
rather to placate an increasingly irritable Treasury and cabinet.175 Still, the government made 
clear in an internal memo that MA was quite clearly a ‘compromise’ to try and provide money 
to those who needed it without dramatically increasing expenditure. Because it was obviously 
a compromise, the inevitable question was whether this was ‘the first step, with more to 
come’; or ‘all that could be afforded for the foreseeable future’. The DHSS was adamant that 
MA be presented as the latter.176 
Motability 
MA served a secondary purpose. In 1977, the creation of Motability would allow claimants to 
exchange their MA for payment towards a modified car. It supports Hampton’s conclusion that 
cash had eclipsed services in kind as the main form of welfare provision; but the use of private 
investment, voluntary organisations and state funding shows that a hybrid form of cash 
welfare was being developed during this time. Unlike the thalidomide fund which provided 
cash to “worthy” families with disabled children, however, it was framed in terms of consumer 
choice and providing better access to society for disabled people.  
Motability came about as the government no longer wished to provide “invalid tricycles” 
or “trikes” to disabled people. These were single-seat, three-wheeled vehicles given to 
disabled people to increase their mobility. They were provided to disabled people through the 
Ministry of Pensions after the Second World War. Oswald Denly, a disability campaigner who 
had introduced Peter Large to CCD,177 rode one across the Alps in the 1940s for charity.178 
Disability campaigners – particularly from the Disabled Drivers’ Action Group (DDAG) – claimed 
they were dangerous. By the 1970s the “Noddy Car”’s bodywork was made of fibreglass and 
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had a propensity to overturn or crumple with minimal contact. In order to show their 
dissatisfaction, a delegation including the racing driver Graham Hill went to Parliament and got 
Prime Minister Ted Heath to drive one.179 They also believed that the trikes were insulting as 
they only had one seat. Why could disabled people not carry a passenger? Were they not 
supposed to have friends or family? And what of those disabled people who could not drive 
but would equally benefit from increased mobility? Politically and financially, the provision of 
trikes had become a problem for the government. In the 1970s, the DHSS investigated ways of 
relieving themselves of the burden. This had begun with the commissioning of the Sharp 
Report in 1972.180 
First, it is worth briefly noting how the DHSS had acquired this obligation. Since the First 
World War, Britain had provided appliances for war disabled people through the Ministry of 
Pensions. The Ministry of Health contracted out the provision of aids (such a wheelchairs, 
vehicles and artificial limbs) for non-veterans to the Ministry of Pensions. By the 1950s, the 
size of the Ministry had diminished greatly. Many of the veterans from the 1914 War were 
now deceased, and the 1939 War had caused far fewer casualties.181 The Ministry’s main 
function – providing War Pensions – was absorbed by the Ministry of National Insurance, 
creating the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (MPNI). The provision of aids and the 
few remaining veterans’ hospitals were transferred fully to the Ministry of Health.182 When the 
MPNI (or MSS as it was called by then) merged with Health in 1968, the DHSS had effectively 
assumed all of the Ministry of Pensions’ old responsibilities. In 1974, the government 
published the Sharp report.183 In light of this and after consultation with disability groups, the 
DHSS recommended that the trike be replaced by a four-wheeled, regular car or a cash 
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benefit. 184 This helped to placate groups such as CCD who were concerned that Sharp’s report 
concentrated far too much on vehicles which only benefited a small proportion of the total 
disabled population.185 In another compromise, those who had a trike and wished to keep it 
would be allowed to do so; though this decision was reconsidered in 1983 when it became 
clear that there were too few trike owners left (or soon would be) for the servicing of the 
vehicles and administration of the scheme to remain financially practical.186 While proposing 
these reforms, Castle recalls a meeting with Harold Wilson in August 1974: 
I say desperately that I am perfectly prepared to get the 
Government out of the car-providing business, despite the 
political difficulties, provided I have the political quid pro 
quo of a mobility allowance for all disabled persons with the 
same medical entitlement. This would scotch the Tories, 
who wouldn’t dare to attack our failure to give cars to 
disabled drivers knowing that we had extended the mobility 
allowance to disabled people who can’t drive. The cost of 
giving them cars as well would be prohibitive. I could see 
that officials were impressed. [...] Though the cost would be 
over £20 million, we should be out of the car business for 
ever and the long-term implications would be clear and 
containable.
187
 
However, while MA dealt with the cash side of the equation, the DHSS still had an 
obligation to provide cars. Peter Macbryan, who had led DDAG’s delegation to Heath, 
explained that as a result the Invalid Tricycle Action Group (ITAG) had been established to 
campaign for new, roadworthy vehicles.188 The solution was an organisation called Motability. 
Those eligible for MA could choose to use their allowance to lease an adapted vehicle. 
Motability received some funding from the DHSS, although the Secretary of State was clear in 
insisting that its policy was independent of government. RADAR and its Chair, George Wilson, 
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worked with the organisation to determine its aims and priorities,189 and Joe Hennesy, Chair of 
the Disabled Drivers Association (DDA), was a governor.190 The bulk of initial funding came 
through negotiations with the clearing banks, particularly Barclays, by Lord Goodman and 
Jeffrey Sterling. They were able to secure favourable interest rates for the scheme, although 
because the level of MA was not high enough and there were legal problems in paying the 
allowance monthly directly to the company, disabled people still needed to contribute towards 
some of the cost of the vehicle and the necessary adaptations.191 While clearly keeping costs 
down for the government, it drew criticism from some groups, particularly DDA.192 
In some ways the Motability scheme acknowledged the “social” aspects of disability, 
specifically the disabling barriers of the built environment. The government could provide a 
choice of services to combat this through either a cash benefit or a suitable motor vehicle. It 
was part of a general trend of “accessibility” in Government policy and research. SJC was at 
this time investigating disabled people’s physical and social access to buildings, entertainment 
and services.193 The Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons (Amendment) Act 1976  put a duty 
on new places of employment to provide parking facilities for disabled people. As more 
disabled people demanded to be part of the community, the physical barriers to participation 
were becoming more obvious. As Sir Bert Massie recalls, the trikes were dangerous, but they 
were also a PR coup. The fibreglass bodywork acted like a modern day “crumple zone” before 
the concept had been invented. The pictures of destroyed vehicles were spectacular, but in 
many cases the driver came out unscathed. For him, the key issue was that the vehicles should 
allow a passenger so that disabled drivers could participate in society like any other driver.194 
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MA and Motability were at once a need to rationalise and update a service which had 
outgrown its original purpose and to ensure that costs did not spiral out of control. It must be 
seen as part of a longer trend of de-institutionalisation which continued well beyond the 
creation of Motability and included reforms in education and care in the community. Rather, 
MA and Motability represent the bureaucratic momentum behind providing more for disabled 
people in an economic climate which required restraint. Voluntary sector organisations were 
able to manipulate the ‘politics’ stream by drawing attention to the dangers of the trikes, it 
appears that the ‘problem’ was understood by government as one of cost. Despite the 
rhetoric, MA and AA together still did not cover a range of other “extra costs” associated with 
disability. This was particularly true for those with cognitive impairments. The ‘distributive 
dilemma’ was how to create categories of ‘deemed need’ which were administratively 
practical and which had enough overlap with the actual needs of individual disabled people. 
Government action – Expanding and restricting access 
The new benefits showed that disability was constructed in broadly the same terms at it had 
been in the late 1960s. The Conservative and Labour governments planned to build upon the 
framework established by AA and IVB in the early Heath years. This was partly an attempt to 
ensure that disability benefits did not grow too far in terms of coverage and expense too soon. 
However, as Stone has argued, disability schemes have a tendency to expand once precedents 
have been set. The 1970s saw the biggest growth in new benefits, but they also saw attempts 
to restrict access so that narrow interpretations of eligibility remained in place. This 
accelerated after the financial crisis.  Wilson made way for Callaghan, and Castle was replaced 
with David Ennals. The government began to look for ways of curbing the amount spent on 
social security. In order to understand the government’s construction of disability, I present 
two examples. These illustrate the wider concerns of government officials in trying to keep 
costs down, whilst showing the pressures for expansion from concerned politicians and 
campaigning organisations. One concerns the use of kidney dialysis and eligibility for AA. It 
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shows how changing attitudes caused the eligibility criteria to expand. The other examines the 
interpretation of the “household duties” requirements in HNCIP. In this case, regulations were 
more tightly enforced to restrict access to the benefit. These examples show that while the 
government broadly accepted the moral entitlement of certain groups to state aid, its legal 
definitions were not necessarily in line with popular conceptions of disability. Individual case 
histories and examples continued to highlight the gap between the ‘deemed need’ of broad 
categories of entitlement, and the actual needs of disabled people. Further, benefits had to be 
targeted by both liberal and social-democratic governments in order to balance the social 
security budget. While the DIG argument that all disabled people should be covered was 
publicly and morally accepted, practically the government felt it had an immediate duty only to 
“the most disabled”. 
Expanding Categories – Dialysis and Attendance Allowance 
Deborah Stone covers the reasons for the expansion of incapacity benefits in detail in The 
Disabled State.195 As states create benefit systems for one worthy group, political pressure and 
legal precedent begin to open the floodgates for other worthy groups who may not have been 
intended recipients. Regulations have unintended loopholes; and, by the same token, bar 
intended recipients from the schemes. Doctors also push at the edges of the framework, 
bringing more people into the system under the existing regulations who were perhaps not 
originally supposed to. We can see examples of expansion and the government’s attempts to 
smother it throughout the 1970s.  
AA was intended to help cover the costs of a carer, or the generally higher costs of living 
associated with this need. High profile campaigns, most notably the Jimmy Martin case, failed 
to secure expansion of the AA scheme.196 Hampton has noted that DIG was not able to use the 
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story to further expand the system because it did not lead to a rash of cases being brought to 
the public attention, but it did at least keep disability issues in the newspapers for a while.197 
This public debate did not lead to expansion of AA, but the more technical details of kidney 
dialysis did lead to changes in the regulations. Dialysis patients had additional costs, not just 
for the treatment itself but for the maintenance of the machine. They clearly needed a great 
deal of “attendance”. The problem was that dialysis was not usually a daily treatment; it may 
be three or four times a week, but this was not considered a daily need and therefore made 
such claimants ineligible for AA.198 These dialysis patients were morally intended to receive the 
benefit – or at least their moral case had been articulated successfully – but they were legally 
excluded. After some lobbying in Parliament and a decision by the National Insurance Chief 
Commissioner, the regulations were relaxed to cover this group in late 1973.199 
Four years later, the regulations were tightened again. The Labour government explained that 
The Attendance Allowance Board, as an independent 
statutory authority, has to decide whether the disabled 
person satisfies the medical requirements laid down in the 
Social Security Act 1975 which, broadly speaking, relates to 
the amount of attention and supervision the person 
requires. Last year the Board, noting the ever shortening 
periods of dialysis, considered that the amount of attention 
and supervision required by many dialysis patients did not 
measure up to the requirements in the Act, and have given 
decisions in individual cases which reflect their 
interpretation of the statute.
200
 
Such was the backlash against the cut in benefit that Sir George Young introduced a Ten 
Minute Rule Bill to overturn it, supported by MPs including Lynda Chalker, Tony Newton and 
Dr Gerard Vaughan.201 This was rejected, but the government performed a volte face in the 
next Parliamentary session by once again relaxing the criteria. Patrick Jenkin, opposition 
spokesman and soon-to-be Secretary of State for Social Services, spoke about the controversy 
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and claimed that government had delayed helping disabled people for the sake of party 
politics. 
The disallowance of attendance allowance for kidney 
patients who now need to dialyse only twice a week instead 
of three times has given rise to a great deal of acrimony and 
anguish. It is bad enough to be a patient who has to have 
dialysis two or three times a week. The person who is 
dialysing at home knows that he requires substantial 
support. This was an unkind cut indeed. 
The Government are open to some criticism for having 
failed to deal with this matter sooner. I have studied letters 
to disabled persons from [Morris], and I am unimpressed by 
the arguments why the Department could not accept the 
[Social Security (Kidney Patients)] Bill [...]. The Government 
admit that the Bill could have been amended in the Lords to 
enable it to do everything that was required. The 
Government could have provided a money resolution as 
they did with the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
1969 [sic]. If that had happened, the payments could now 
be being made. One gets the impression that Ministers are 
so determined that this will be their legislation—legislation 
introduced by a Labour Government—so that they will be 
given the credit for it that they are prepared to deprive 
kidney patients of benefits which they could now have 
enjoyed for many months.
202
 
This is just one payment to one group of people in one social security scheme, but the 
story is instructive.203 Since its introduction in 1971, Governments of both major parties had to 
concede that a particular category of citizen was worthy of AA. First the rules were relaxed 
from ‘daily’ to ‘three times a week’; and then from ‘three’ to ‘two’. Groups on the border 
outside the system showed that they were as morally entitled to support as those on the 
border inside the system. In both 1973 and 1978, those on the outside prevailed. 
Restricting categories – HNCIP 
While it may have become slightly easier for dialysis patients to receive AA, eligibility criteria 
for HNCIP were severely restricted. When it was introduced in 1977, the claimant had to prove 
that she was: 
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incapable of doing by [her]self (even with the use of any 
aids or appliances which [she] may have) all or most of the 
duties in [her] home which would generally fall to the 
housewife; for example, cooking, cleaning, shopping, 
washing and ironing, etc. If [she was] actually doing some of 
these duties but only with great difficulty, much pain or 
extreme slowness, [she] MAY still be eligible for HNCIP.
204
 
Such a benefit relies on a concept of the “normal” woman and the “normal” duties she 
would be expected to perform. Access was controlled via a household duties test. DA’s full-
time Organiser administered a sub-group called the Equal Rights for Disabled Women 
Campaign (ERDWC) to lobby government to remove the tests which were seen as 
discriminatory.205  For HNCIP, a woman had to prove she was both incapable of work and 
incapable of performing her ‘household duties’.206 DA sought to have the regulations clarified, 
and so supported one woman’s case as it went to tribunal.207 They argued that the test should 
look at the limitations of the claimant, and not simply assert that if she was capable of some 
household duties then she was ineligible. The tribunal agreed with the claimant, finding that 
‘substantial’ should not refer to what a woman could do, but what she could not do.  This 
caused a significant problem for the government.  
By excluding consideration of what a woman could do in her 
home, this represented, in practical terms, a substantial 
easement of the household duties test by requiring a much 
lower degree of disablement than had originally been 
intended. In other words, the decision showed that 
legislation had not correctly identified those for whom the 
benefit was intended. 
The result could have been a doubling or tripling of the initial budget calculation for the 
benefit.208 
The tribunal’s conclusions were published 8 September 1978. Four days later, new 
regulations which formally asserted the narrowest interpretation of eligibility were imposed, 
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without reference to National Insurance Advisory Committee (NIAC).209 The ERDWC began a 
campaign to have the new regulations removed, and believed it was close to securing a U-turn. 
However, at the last moment Ennals decided to refer the matter to NIAC, thereby ensuring 
that there would be a delay in any final decision, keeping the regulations in the interim.210 A 
significant number of voluntary organisations were invited to submit evidence, including 
MIND, ERDWC, DIG, DA and CPAG.211 ERDWC accused DIG of providing the government with a 
‘face saving exit’ when Peter Large advised Alf Morris to refer the issue to NIAC.212 Large 
replied that DIG had nowhere near enough influence to ‘stop 635 Members of Parliament in 
their tracks’ and that ERDWC’s victory was not as inevitable as they had hoped.213 Jo 
Richardson MP felt otherwise, claiming that Parliament was about to vote on a prayer with 150 
signatures calling for a change in the regulations.214 It is not entirely clear whether ERDWC 
would have got their way without Large’s letter. The correspondence may well have simply 
given the government some backing for a decision they had already taken. As Large argued, 
better that the debate continue in NIAC than the whole matter be rejected entirely. Giving the 
Government the option to delay their decision may just have kept the end goal of more lenient 
criteria alive.215 
Through “consultation” and imposition of strict interpretation of guidelines, the 
government was able to restrict access to benefit. This inevitably excluded a number of 
“disabled housewives” whom ERDWC felt were entitled but the government did not. The 
household duties test, alongside other insurance and earnings-related criteria, created a legal 
category of “the disabled housewife” which was very different from the category as 
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understood by the voluntary organisations. It is clear that the initial plan had been to only pay 
to those who were ‘substantially’ impaired and by focusing on proving what the claimant was 
capable of doing. Providing there was a certain degree of capacity, the claimant was not 
incapacitated. It is also clear that the principle of the family unit – with a male breadwinner – 
was more important than the provision of an extra costs allowance for married women. Yet 
there was an obvious flaw in the way the test was administered and the DHSS’s concept of the 
allowance. Since married women were not supposed to be earning money, HNCIP should be 
seen as an extra costs benefit. In fact, the DHSS did not see it as an extra costs allowance at all; 
as the housewives’ equivalent of NCIP, it was actually a means-tested form of income 
maintenance.216 The household duties test remained inadequate for this reason, and it would 
become important in the 1980s when HNCIP was replaced with the Severe Disablement 
Allowance. More crucially, ways of proving “incapacity” and the arguments surrounding are 
central when we come to the introduction of Incapacity Benefit in 1995. 
Conclusions 
The events in this chapter constitute the period of greatest activity within the government for 
planning and producing new legislation in the social security field for disabled people. New 
benefits built on a framework expressed by DIG and codified in law through the work of the 
Labour and Conservative governments over the ten years since the Group’s formation. 
Disability was a category of need for people who were denied full access to society (in the 
social-democratic approach) or required help to alleviate their poverty (in the liberal 
approach). Economic and political restrictions meant that, in effect, support was targeted at 
the “most in need”. These were claimants with a) the most severe impairments and b) the 
least income. This conception of disability as a welfare category meant that new schemes were 
targeted primarily at unemployed disabled people. This legacy would continue throughout the 
twentieth century. 
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The striking feature of the developments up to 1979, however, was the consensus in action 
between the various governments. All claimed that small changes in the present would be built 
upon to construct a full disability income in the future.217 All believed that disabled people 
should be entitled to benefit as a right rather than being reliant upon means-tested 
Supplementary Benefit. Statistical data suggest that these attempts worked (Figure 3.3), as the 
number of Supplementary Benefit claimants classed as ‘sick and disabled’, especially those 
claiming other NI benefits, declined significantly. Although DIG and the DHSS had very different 
approaches, there appears to be a consistent thread in DHSS thought. At the very least, the 
new minister upon arrival did not reverse the work already done by the Department. Both 
Joseph and Castle built on existing research, informed as it was by DIG,218 and continued to 
push reform at inter-departmental level. The continuity from Joseph to Castle can be explained 
in a similar way to that between Crossman and Joseph. Indeed, the consensus was greater for 
two main reasons: first, Castle and Joseph had stronger political commitments to disabled 
people than Crossman; and second, the DHSS had years of data and internal planning to call 
upon by the mid-seventies. In 1975, it was still the case that the liberal and social democratic 
approaches saw new disability benefits as an adequate solution to the “problem” of disabled 
people’s poverty. In Castle’s case, the gender issue further ensured HNCIP made it onto the 
statute books .  
                                                          
217
 Crossman said of his White Paper (and subsequent Bill) ‘it does not altogether deal with the problem 
of disability — and I frankly admit this — it is a notable advance in an area where, for a long time before 
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One could argue that the piecemeal approach was a ‘sop’,219 a way of saving money while 
making concessions to a group which attracted ‘public sympathy’. That would not fully explain 
the amount of effort the Department made to plan and enact the benefits, let alone extract 
the cash from the Treasury. There were genuine logistical and financial reasons for limiting 
access. Given that the conclusions of the Finer report were rejected, with no declaration of any 
prospect of them being met in the future,220 the consistent promises of evolution are 
significant. We can see it in all three Secretaries of State from 1968 to 1975. Crossman 
explained regarding an expanded version of the proposed attendance allowance: 
I cannot go further [...]. The attendance allowance is a new 
principle and needs a great deal of careful consideration. I 
am not going to rush it, because we are introducing a brand 
new principle into National Insurance. We are giving a small 
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amount of it here. I think we would be wise to wait and do 
it all together in the big new Bill.
221
 
Joseph, in reply to a question about when a benefit for disabled housewives would be 
introduced, argued:  
I think it is common ground that this is a group for which 
the Government would like, when we find the right way and 
have the resources, to do something, but I must warn the 
hon. Gentleman and the House that there is no proposal in 
sight which will satisfactorily meet the difficulties of the 
moment.’
222
 
And Castle: 
This is the package of compassion [the Social Security 
Benefits Bill 1974] which we confidently put to the House. 
[...] We would all like to be able to do even more. But what 
we have proved in the Bill is that at a time of acute 
economic stringency the Government will not sacrifice the 
neediest in our society. I suggest that we should not belittle 
what these improvements will mean to those who receive 
them.
223
 
Again, both the liberal and social democratic approaches accommodated this rhetoric and 
course of action. For Joseph, expansion of disability benefits was reasonable and morally 
justified, but only insofar as it did not overburden the state. For Castle and Crossman, 
expansion was a goal in itself to protect disadvantaged groups, but there was an economic 
imperative to ensure expansion did not happen too quickly. The political and economic context 
of the 1970s ensured continuity of action if not thought. 
For the voluntary organisations, the DIG’s legacy is important. Its campaigns were the 
foundation of the DHSS’s understanding of disability issues. As the Department itself noted: 
A leading article in ‘The Spectator’ was able to say that “of 
all the pressure groups which harry government – especially 
the social welfare pressure groups – none is more mature, 
more influential, more considered in its actions than the 
Disablement Income Group”. Whether this is true or not, 
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this kind of belief has given DIG both authority and 
charisma.
224
 
By the end of the decade, however, the virtual monopoly DIG had over the disability 
incomes issue was broken. The splits in DIG from the middle of the decade produced new 
approaches to disability – a more radical Fabian approach in DA and an oppression approach in 
UPIAS. Pressure continued on government, and many of the leading campaigners were still 
highly respected. But with the coming of RADAR, the decline in DIG’s branch membership and 
the emergence of DPOs, the disability lobby had a greater plurality of voices than before 1974. 
This would become an important issue in the 1980s as government became less open to direct 
contact with lobbying groups and as the social security budget began to be squeezed further.  
With the fiscal crisis, the lobby faced with new challenges. I have shown how HNCIP was 
heavily restricted, and it is clear even during the passage of the Social Security Benefits Act 
1975 that Labour was keen on targeting support at the individuals considered in most need at 
the lowest cost. As the following chapter shows, the system of benefits and services for 
disabled people which had developed since 1965 came under attack after 1979. Yet because 
disability had been so firmly established as both an area of policy and a subject of public 
concern, the government was not able or willing to attack it head-on. While Labour’s defeat 
would signal the end of the social-democratic approach to disability, it would not be for many 
years that the liberal approach would be rejected. 
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Chapter 4 – Liberal disability versus Neo-Liberal Welfare – 1979 – 
1988 
Introduction 
The election of Margaret Thatcher is commonly seen as a watershed moment for social 
security policy and the welfare state in general. Regardless of the spending cuts introduced by 
the Callaghan government, it is clear that Thatcher’s administrations stuck to a determined 
policy of reducing government expenditure even in the face of rising unemployment and 
negative public opinion.1 I argue that the fate of disability benefits during this period was as a 
result of the “liberal” conception of disability which was expressed by Joseph in the early 
1970s. Since disabled people were “deserving” of state welfare, they were not targeted 
specifically by welfare reforms aimed to reduce expenditure and discourage “welfare 
dependency”. However, there were clear tensions between the liberal approach to disability 
and the general neo-liberal approach to welfare.  
I argue that disability was largely “neglected” as the government could not square its 
liberal concerns for disabled people and its neo-liberal drive to cut costs. This is not to say that 
disabled people were not adversely affected by wider changes to the social security system, 
nor that there were no reforms in disability policy. The eighties are significant for 
improvements in access to independent living, changes to the planning laws to improve access 
for disabled people to new buildings and two Private Members’ Bills which nominally provided 
improved rights to services. With regard to benefits, however, there were no fundamental 
changes of the type seen during the 1970s. The few reforms that we can see were either 
“collateral damage” as the DHSS attempted to reduce general welfare expenditure, or 
enforced changes to regulations following successful court cases. Rather, I argue that the 
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 This is the traditional narrative of the late 1970s and early 1980s. For example, Michael Sullivan, The 
Development of the British Welfare State (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp. 232-37; Eric 
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Conservatives refrained from large-scale reform because disabled people were considered 
“deserving”, and because being seen to attack disabled people would have been electorally 
damaging. This has been note by Pierson as the ‘fairness issue’ which neo-liberal governments 
on both side of the Atlantic had to acknowledge when trying to cut valued welfare services.2 
The trend of disability policy over the previous fifteen years had made the political costs of exit 
much larger than any potential financial savings. 
This chapter begins with the 1979 election, and runs to the introduction of Income Support 
in April 1988. In the same year, the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) 
published a new survey on the numbers and needs of disabled people, a Social Security 
Advisory Committee report on disability benefits policy was released, and the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) was broken up into the Department of Social Security (DSS) 
and the Department of Health. The chapter is split into four main sections. The first outlines 
the political changes during the 1980s and the first two Thatcher governments’ attitudes 
towards social security and the welfare state. The second highlights some of the key debates 
within the disability lobby. The government was far less open to pressure from poverty lobby 
organisations, and the Disablement Income Group (DIG) no longer had senior personnel with 
direct, permanent contact with ministers. The British Council of Organisations of Disabled 
People (BCODP) was formed in 1981, and the importance of Disabled People’s Organisations 
(DPOs) increased. The Disability Alliance’s (DA) archives show how this was a difficult time for 
the lobby as a whole, and it was forced to defend what had been won during the seventies 
rather than press for further reforms and the National Disability Income. Still, Dafydd Wigley 
and Tom Clarke, backbench opposition MPs, were able to get Bills through Parliament which 
gave extra rights to disabled people with regard to accessing services. Like the Chronically Sick 
and Disabled Persons Act, however, they were rarely enforced, and many clauses were never 
implemented. 
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The last two sections show how disability benefits were affected by the government’s 
welfare policies. First I analyse how disability benefits were protected from the brunt of the 
attack on expenditure. Disability was seen as a category of genuine need and disabled people, 
especially severely disabled people, seen as worthy claimants. However, disabled people were 
undoubtedly affected by wider reforms. I take three main areas of policy to show this – fraud, 
National Insurance cuts and the Fowler Reviews. The Thatcher government apparently showed 
little desire to completely remove the system which had been created during the 1970s, but it 
was keen to limit the amount it spent on those categories of need. 
The following section explains the areas of reform which did affect disabled people and 
were designed to change the way in which benefits were paid. These fall under two categories. 
The first was the replacement of Supplementary Benefits with Income Support. The 
government removed the discretionary parts of Supplementary Benefit, replacing them with a 
set of entitlements to support based on various categories of need. Discretion had been a key 
part of the system, allowing it to adapt to the specific needs of individuals, and therefore many 
disabled people lost out. This sets the scene for the following chapter and discussions on 
Disability Living Allowance and the Independent Living Fund. The second part of this section 
focuses on changes that were enforced by the European Council . Invalid Care Allowance (ICA) 
and Housewives’ Non-contributory Invalidity Pension (HNCIP) were found to be in breach of 
European regulations on gender. As a result, access to ICA was extended, but the housewives’ 
benefit was repackaged as Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA). The new entry criteria were 
seen as restrictive, meaning many people lost their entitlement to benefit. 
Policy context – Claimant and expenditure trends 
Reforms to disability benefits cannot be explained without reference to the general attitude of 
the Thatcher governments towards social security. As I have already contended, disability was 
not directly attacked; but because disabled people were at greater risk of poverty and were 
therefore more likely to be in receipt of benefit, wider cuts to the social security budget 
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affected disabled people by reducing their incomes from other sources. More importantly, 
disability benefits may have escaped the worst of the cuts, but the real value of weekly 
payment rates declined over the period. 
The Conservative period as a whole was one of increasing expenditure despite attempts to 
curb social security spending. Figure 4.1 shows the claimant figures for the major benefits. The 
largest increase in the early 1980s came from the rise in unemployment, both in contributory 
Unemployment Benefit (UB) and non-contributory social assistance (at this time, 
Supplementary Benefit). Concurrently, Invalidity Benefit (IVB) claims continued to grow, so 
much so that by the time unemployment was back under control IVB had become the largest 
single out-of-work benefit. The relationship between IVB and UB is explained more fully in 
Chapter 5, but here it is important to note that during the first two Thatcher terms 
unemployment was a bigger financial headache than IVB, even though the costs of IVB were 
steadily mounting. The extra-costs benefits also continued to expand, with Attendance 
Allowance (AA) and its successor, Disability Living Allowance (see Chapter 5), rising steadily. 
The dip and subsequent rise in the number of social assistance claims from ‘sick and disabled 
people’ is attributable to reforms made to Supplementary Benefit in 1986 and implemented in 
1988 (as discussed in this chapter). Expenditure trends (Figure 4.2) unsurprisingly follow 
claimant numbers. Worth noting, however, is the acceleration in the cost of IVB in the early 
1990s. This is because of the combination of an increased number of claims and a rise in the 
real value of the benefit after years of devaluation in the late eighties (see Figure 4.5). 
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For the lesser-claimed schemes (Figures 4.3 and 4.4), we also see growth in extra costs 
benefits, particularly in Mobility Allowance (MA). Sickness Benefit appears in all four Figures to 
provide a comparable scale, but it also highlights that as this traditional benefit declined in 
importance, new, more focused payments took its place. Statutory Sick Pay was the obvious 
replacement, and continued to grow until reform in the early 1990s. Non-contributory 
Invalidity Pension (NCIP) and ICA saw significant growth as well, especially after the 
government was forced to relax eligibility criteria for married women as a result of rulings by 
the European Council (see this chapter). The compensation benefits, or “duty pensions” saw 
very little growth, with IIB remaining static and war pensions declining steadily as the veterans 
of the two world wars passed away. This was bucked only by the effects of the Gulf War.  
This would appear to suggest that the Conservative government was either not serious 
about welfare retrenchment, or that it had failed spectacularly. However, overall expenditure 
did begin to fall in the years preceding the 1990s recession as unemployment was brought 
under control.3 Furthermore, while total expenditure and the number of claimants continued 
to rise, the real value of social security for claimants declined. Figure 4.5 shows the trend in 
the values of some of the major benefits. The “saw-tooth” pattern in the 1960s was as a result 
of benefits being uprated once every two years. During the 1970s, partly in response to 
inflation, benefits were uprated according to average earnings and rising prices. As we can see, 
all benefits remained relatively static over the first years of the 1980s, before losing value 
between 1985/86 and the end of the decade. These recovered in the early Major years, before 
levelling out over the rest of his premiership and the New Labour administration. The “attack” 
on the welfare state, therefore, provided a mixed and complicated picture. On the one hand, 
the government was politically committed to reducing expenditure and welfare dependence. 
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On the other, state expenditure on social security continued to grow both in real cash terms 
and as a percentage of Britain’s Gross Domestic Product.4 
Policy context – General social security changes 
It has only been in more recent analyses of Thatcher’s overall social security policy that the 
question of disability has been explicitly tackled.5 However, from the general picture, we can 
pick out five clear themes, each of which impacted upon disabled people:6 
 Many benefits lost their real value. Benefits had hitherto been uprated to the 
higher of either prices or the average earnings of the country. The Conservatives 
broke the link with earnings early on, and for certain benefits (such as child 
support) they significantly devalued them by years of below-inflation rises or price 
freezes (see figure 4.5).7 
 Insurance benefits were scaled back. Earnings-related additions to long term 
benefits such as Sickness Benefit were removed. Qualification rules for 
Unemployment Benefit were also changed. Sickness Benefit then effectively 
became privatised through Statutory Sick Pay, where employers became 
responsible for covering absence. Initially this was part-funded by the state, but 
this support was eventually scrapped. Maternity and death grants were also 
abolished.8 
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 Supplementary Benefit was reformed. The Supplementary Benefits system was 
rationalised and based on entitlements rather than discretionary rules. The 
amounts given tapered off quickly as earnings rose. Special addition grants were 
abolished and the system was replaced by Income Support, the Social Fund and 
the Independent Living Fund (see the next chapter).9 
 Entitlement was cut to certain groups. 16 and 17 year olds were excluded from 
claiming benefit, as were married women in work and prematurely retired people 
with access to private pensions.10 
 The “undeserving” were encouraged to be more “responsible”. More rigorous 
controls were put in place for those on employment-related benefits who were not 
“actively seeking work”. Child Support attempted to force absent fathers to pay for 
the upkeep of their children. There was also a crackdown on “fraud” and a general 
culture of what has been dubbed “scroungerphobia”.11 
This was all done to “target” benefits at those who were seen to need and deserve them 
most. Like the Heath government, the Thatcher administration believed that selectivity within 
the benefit system would direct scarce resources where they were most needed.12 Critics 
claimed that the desire to return to nineteenth-century liberalism also included a desire to 
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return to the New Poor Law.13 The government was accused of increasing poverty, and this 
became a difficult political argument for both sides. Conservatives were able to argue that 
relative definitions of poverty, usually based on a percentage of mean earnings, or the 
Supplementary Benefit rate, were meaningless because increases in the standard of living or of 
benefit rates would automatically create more poverty. The increase in poverty caused 
embarrassment for the government, but the argument appeared logical to enough of the 
electorate for it not to produce an electoral crisis.14 
The Conservatives began with two Social Security Bills in the 1979/80 Parliamentary 
Session.15 The first primarily re-organised Supplementary Benefit and changed the uprating 
rules,16 while the second removed earnings related supplements and sought to achieve 
substantial cost saving.17 Both were highly controversial. Stanley Orme, a Labour spokesperson 
on health and social security, spoke about a ‘battle in committee rooms’ over the provisions in 
the Bills.18 The second Bill was passed with a guillotine motion. As part of these changes, the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission (SBC) and National Insurance Advisory Committee (NIAC) 
were dissolved and replaced with a Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC). Jeff Rooker 
proclaimed that disability rights were ‘under attack’ and that ‘the consequences of an 
undebated Bill could be grave’.19 Furthermore, the logic of squeezing social security 
expenditure appeared to be in conflict with the government’s overall vision for British society. 
One commentator observed that:  
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 For example, Frank Field saw changes to UB as akin to the reinstatement of the Poor Law, a theme 
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the combination of tax cuts, increased charges and reduced 
public services is largely hitting two sets of people whom 
Conservative philosophy holds dear: families and those low-
paid earners whose work incentives should be kept as 
sparkling bright as a houseproud doorstep.
20
 
“Small government” affected more than simply benefit and tax rates. Cuts were made to 
departmental intelligence gathering services. Sir Derek Rayner, CEO of Marks and Spencer, was 
brought in to review the government’s statistical services.21 It attempted to reduce wastage by 
only collecting data that was essential and leaving other statistical gathering to outside 
pressure groups, think tanks and academic institutions. It would further take advantages of 
improved computation technologies. In the report, the DHSS was to have its statistics 
manpower and budget cut by 38%, saving £2.13 million a year. The OPCS was set to lose 28% 
of its manpower, saving £3.3 million.22  Rayner was also drafted in to review the way in which 
the administration of various departments could be made more efficient. For example, could 
the payment of benefits through bank accounts reduce man-hours and costs?23 Alf Morris was 
particularly critical of these proposals, claiming that without the statistical services the changes 
made to social security for disabled people during the 1970s would not have been possible.24 
Morris believed that the reviews ‘looked at administrative costs but ignore[d] the value of 
information’ and its ability to help ministers make informed judgements.25 This can be seen as 
part of the wider trend towards using policy information from professional, private “think 
tanks” rather than internal Whitehall or quango bodies. The SBC had developed a reputation 
for challenging government under the direction of Titmuss and Donnison, but the SSAC was far 
less able or willing to do so.26 This affected the ability of the poverty lobby groups to exert 
influence as they no longer had allies in government or the traditional channels of raising 
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issues in Whitehall.27 The better-funded think tanks, with more connections to those in 
positions of power, began to wield more influence in policy circles.  
This is crucial to understanding how and why the tactics of voluntary organisations 
changed during this period. Access to those in power was restricted, and government was less 
minded to accept the advice or evidence presented by disability organisations. Cuts to the 
social security budget meant that rather than campaigning for extension of the benefits 
system, groups were forced to defend rights already won. New forms of campaigning and new 
causes were therefore championed as the lobby attempted to secure policy change to improve 
the services available for disabled people.  
The lobby – Disunity and Disillusionment 
The disability lobby underwent significant change during the 1980s as DPOs grew in number, 
membership and influence. Tensions within the lobby were stoked further. The Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation’s (UPIAS) distrust of DA and other poverty lobby 
organisations extended beyond the publication of Fundamental Principles. While the Fabian 
groups continued to campaign as experts on social security policy, DPOs fought a wider battle 
for disabled people to take control of their own lives. This is significant as it explains how the 
voices which reached government were of a very different type to those in the previous 
decades. Moreover, it shows how the government was presented with more wide-ranging 
concerns than simply the National Disability Income. 
Disillusionment with the insider Fabian approach 
As voluntary organisations found it increasingly difficult to influence government policy 
directly, the oppression approach gained support. In the previous chapter I discussed the 
foundation of UPIAS and alluded to the creation of BCODP in 1981. It was during the eighties 
that DPOs would become more prominent, and the oppression approach to disability would 
begin to be more widely recognised. Partly we can explain this as the perception that the 
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major lobbying organisations like DIG were “undemocratic”. I argue that while these were 
contributing factors, there is another more practical consideration. The traditional poverty 
lobby was clearly unable to gain further concessions from a government that was no longer 
open to direct communication. Bagguley has looked at the novelty of self-advocacy groups in 
the wider context of social security claimant’s organisations, and concludes that one of the 
reasons for their rise has been the break down in corporatist politics from the 1980s from 
which the poverty lobby drew most of its influence.28 The Thatcher governments were far less 
open to “consultation” with such groups.29 DPO causes, however, were more amenable to 
political change. Issues such as “deinstitutionalisation” were in line with neo-liberal politics 
and ideas about self-reliance and self-responsibility. Although it had begun in the 1960s, 
deinstitutionalisation accelerated under Thatcher. Figure 2.1 shows that the numbers of 
patients in psychiatric hospitals had been decreasing both before and during this period. In the 
1980s we see the first British independent living project in Hampshire;30 reforms in education 
to nominally reduce the numbers of children sent to special schools;31 further commitments to 
care in the community over the use of psychiatric hospitals;32 and amendments to the planning 
laws so that new buildings had to be built with the access requirements of disabled people in 
mind.33 Beyond the philosophy, there were also pragmatic concerns. Segregated employment 
was seen as discriminatory, and the Conservative government reformed Remploy; however, 
cost and efficiency were seen as more important than imposing regulation on open industry. 
Remploy underwent significant rationalisation after 1983 to ensure it no longer took more 
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money in government grants than the cost of its wage bill.34 It succeeded. Yet despite claims to 
IVB (the main out-of-work benefit for disabled people) increasing dramatically over this period, 
the number of disabled employees at Remploy remained static at around 9,000.35 
The record confirms that BCODP was never as well-connected in Westminster as DA, DIG 
or the Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation (RADAR), but in part this did not 
matter. Its purpose was to wrest control of the disability movement away from non-disabled 
experts and paternalists. Indeed, Rachel Hurst argues that she lost her role as Chair of BCODP 
in 1987 partly because of her desire to work more closely with the traditional charities and 
central government.36 Further, projects such as independent living usually relied on local 
campaigning and organisation with local authorities rather than lobbying Westminster. The 
relationship between the DPOs and the other campaigning organisations is an important part 
of the last fifteen years of the period covered in this thesis, especially when we look at the 
events surrounding anti-discrimination legislation. Despite the reluctance of certain factions 
within the organisation to co-operate with those whom they saw as oppressive, BCODP was 
not without influence – they helped draft Tom Clarke’s Private Members Bill (which became an 
act) in 1985/86.37 Whether directly because of the work of BCODP or a growing general 
acceptance of many of the arguments against segregation and dependency, government policy 
did make further movements towards deinstitutionalisation over the period. 
Fabian groups also adapted their tactics as their inability to influence government became 
apparent. DA considered severing all ties with a government they believed had no intention of 
working with disability organisations and was bent solely on the destruction of the welfare 
state.38 It became clear that the poverty lobby would have to defend against cuts to provision 
rather than proactively seek expansion of coverage to other groups in need. These discussions 
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are dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. What is important to note is that the climate 
for voluntary organisations advocating political change was very different to what it had been 
in the sixties and seventies. The government was no longer committed to corporatist 
negotiation with interest groups, nor did it accept the core arguments about structural 
inequalities causing poverty. At the same time, it did encourage submissions to various 
government enquiries and committees. DIG, DA, RADAR and other poverty lobby groups 
regularly produced material for these, and SSAC files show that their responses were debated 
and analysed.39 This indirect influence was nowhere near as effective as direct contact had 
been. A good example of this change in climate is the way in which the Committee on 
Restrictions Against Disabled People (CORAD) was treated and its final report was received. 
CORAD and anti-discrimination legislation 
CORAD was formed in 1979 to follow the Silver Jubilee Committee (SJC). The latter had 
investigated the issue of disabled people’s access to services and wider society, and had 
argued that, while outside its terms of reference, Anti-discrimination Legislation (ADL) would 
be an important tool in ensuring disabled people were not physically or bureaucratically 
segregated.40 CORAD was designed to investigate the merits of such legislation and make a 
recommendation to government. Peter Large (DIG) was appointed chair, with Colin Low (DA) 
and George Wilson (RADAR) also members, ensuring close links with the disability lobby.41 
Within months, Callaghan had lost the General Election, and Thatcher appointed Reg Prentice 
as minister for disabled people and social security. At the time, the government was 
committed to reducing the number of “quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations” 
(quangos), and CORAD was listed as one of those likely to be cut. Closing down CORAD was 
seen as politically dangerous, since it could be used to argue that the Conservatives did not 
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care about disabled people; yet the constitution of the Committee effectively ensured that it 
would recommend ADL once it was published. Prentice wrote to Large saying that CORAD 
would be spared, albeit with reduced resources.42 When it finally published its 
recommendations in 1982,43 they were rejected. Jack Ashley immediately introduced a Bill to 
the House of Commons, though this failed to make significant progress.44 
The role of ADL would become more significant in the 1990s, when the oppression 
approach groups had more confidence and a wider network of support. It is significant here, 
however, because it indicates that there was a push to put into law the rights of disabled 
people to have control over their own lives. Two Private Members’ Bills over this period 
succeeded in becoming Acts. Both received input from voluntary organisations, and both 
struggled to gain genuine governmental support for full implementation. As with the decision 
not to scrap CORAD, I argue that this shows that disability was a sensitive political issue, and 
one about which the Conservative government could not be seen to be callous. A combination 
of “philanthropic” or “liberal” Conservative backbenchers and dedicated campaigners from the 
social-democratic parties ensured that the Bills became law. Even if they were not fully 
implemented, they gave campaigners ammunition inside and outside Parliament to attack the 
government on their perceived lack of support for disabled people. 
The first was the Disabled Persons Act 1981, introduced by Dafydd Wigley (Plaid Cymru) in 
the International Year of Disabled People. This was a United Nations event designed to 
highlight the needs and aspirations of disabled people around the globe. Wigley and his 
colleagues successfully argued that it would be an embarrassment for a country as prosperous 
as the United Kingdom not to do something for disabled people, and with government support 
the Act was rushed through before parliament dissolved for the summer recess in 1981. Yet 
the Bill had initially been rejected by the government, only being revived when it became 
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politically sensitive. After a well-supported Early Day Motion showed that over 300 MPs were 
in support of the Bill, a second Bill was introduced with government backing and was passed as 
the 1981 Act.45 The Bill’s passage through Parliament was remarkably smooth. There was no 
debate at second reading and none in the third before it went onto the Lords.46 However, as 
one commentator put it, the Act had not only had its teeth removed ‘but its gums as well’.47 It 
was a modest Act, putting a duty on highway authorities and those applying for planning 
permission to consider the needs of disabled people. Despite its limitations, it had shown that 
the government felt politically obliged to do something for disabled people in the International 
Year. This should not be taken as a given; that disability and disabled people had become a 
sensitive topic shows that attitudes towards disabled people had changed significantly since 
the early sixties. 
The second piece of legislation was the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and 
Representation) Act 1986. Tom Clarke’s (Labour) Bill was resisted through Parliament.48 
Designed to guarantee disabled people’s access to services and a say in how those services 
were run, the load put on Local Authorities (LAs) if the Bill was fully implemented would have 
been much higher than the government was willing to countenance.49 Clarke succeeded with 
significant help from his campaign team. He drew on the expertise of Wigley and his 
experience of getting his Bill through the house, as well as drafting advice from MIND, 
MENCAP, RADAR, BCODP and others. This was significant for two reasons. First, it showed that 
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a variety of different types of disability organisation could have an input into a piece of 
legislation, and that they had developed to such a “professional” state that they could do so 
competently.50 Alf Morris’s 1969 Bill had to be written from scratch because no disability group 
had even considered that a Private Member’s Bill was a legitimate way to encourage policy 
change; by 1986, most credible organisations had ready-made proposals which Clarke and his 
Parliamentary allies could use and adapt.51 Second, the clauses which allowed a disabled 
person to nominate a representative to deal with LAs and government on their behalf gave 
much more freedom for those with mental impairments to access services. Clarke’s personal 
commitment to mental health and cognitive impairment causes ensured that disability was no 
longer being seen as simply loco-motive impairment. 
Although the Bill was passed, many of the key clauses which would have put specific 
responsibilities on local authorities to provide services for disabled people were never fully 
enforced. The government’s official line was that while the spirit of the Act was clearly 
desirable, the resources were not available for its full implementation. Frustrated, a campaign 
group housed at RADAR asked: ‘The Disabled Persons Act received the Royal Assent on 8th July 
1986. Seventeen months later... where is it?’ Called Act Now, it included ‘35’ voluntary 
organisations in 1987.52 The clauses have still never been enforced. This is not really the point 
of these two Acts, however. Private Members’ Bills are rarely fully implemented, and have very 
limited scope on any issue which requires public expenditure. Their real strength lies in their 
campaign potential. Even if a Bill does not become an Act it can be used to raise an issue in 
Parliament and force public debate; then if it does become an Act, failure to implement can be 
used to submit questions to ministers in Parliament. Their answers are on record, and these 
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can be used to shame or encourage the government to do more on a given issue.53 The 
amount of questions asked on the 1986 Act, for instance, meant that the Thatcher and Major 
governments consistently had to justify their policies towards disabled people. Campaigners 
were able to use these answers as part of their lobbying. 
To conclude this section, then, we must understand two main developments. First, the 
traditional “insider” Fabian approach was no longer an option, or at the very least it could not 
be used as a tactic in isolation. This lead to and coincided with greater professionalisation 
amongst the major organisations, allowing concerted campaigns over the 1981 and 1986 Acts. 
Second, with the poverty lobby approach shown to be ineffective, campaigns began to focus 
on wider disability issues such as independent living and deinstitutionalisation. This was a 
more comfortable fit with the oppression approach rather than the Fabian incomes approach. 
Further, the Thatcher government appeared more sympathetic to these policies than on the 
incomes question, meaning the DPOs could be more effective. In the next chapter, it will 
become clear that these arguments about independence and desegregation became 
increasingly popular with the government, albeit with unintended consequences for disability 
organisations. While the oppression group may have manipulated the ‘politics’ stream 
successfully to get accelerated deinstitutionalisation on the agenda, the government’s main 
concern was limiting cost (as shown through the opposition to the 1986 Act) rather than 
promoting structural equality. Meanwhile, the poverty lobby groups were forced to fight a 
defensive battle to protect the social security coverage which had been established in the 
previous decade. It is this campaign which I will now cover in greater detail. 
Government action – Collateral Damage 
Fred Reid of DA was somewhat prescient with his assessment of Margaret Thatcher’s election: 
Now of one thing we can be quite sure – she will not single 
out the disabled in anyway [sic] that people can readily see 
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for expenditure reductions. Social security benefits can 
easily be manipulated to appear virtually intact.
54
 
I argue that – for the first two terms at least – the Thatcher government did not single out 
disability, concentrating more on unemployment and other sections of “the poor”. The 
‘fairness issue’55 meant that the political costs of radical reform to disability-related benefits 
far outweighed any financial savings. Thus, the government was constrained in what it could 
do due to a new ‘Beveridge strait-jacket’56 as created by DIG and exacerbated by policy 
developments over the 1970s. 
This section takes three elements of the Conservative’s social security policy and shows 
that while the party may not have attacked disability benefits directly, a number of their 
policies did impact upon disabled claimants. The first is the question of fraud and abuse. While 
the Thatcher government was not the only one to be concerned with the issue, various 
attempts to reduce fraud during the eighties impacted upon disabled people. At the same 
time, disability was not the prime cause of concern. Indeed, in some areas, controls over 
medical certification were relaxed for administrative simplicity. I argue that the government’s 
“liberal” conception of disability meant that disabled people were not targeted as aggressively 
by anti-abuse rhetoric as other claimant groups. Second, cuts to National Insurance (NI) 
benefits had an impact on all claimant groups. Again, however, disability benefits received 
different treatment to other areas of welfare. Industrial Injuries Benefit (IIB) and IVB were cut, 
but the basic entitlements for unemployed and injured workers under NI remained intact. 
These policies show that while disability was not completely sheltered by cost-cutting 
measures, there was no desire to remove the basic protection for disabled people which had 
developed since the Second World War. Third, I show how disability was deliberately excluded 
from the Fowler Reviews on social security. Research into policy alternatives for disabled 
people was conducted throughout the eighties, yet for political reasons radical reform was 
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never chosen. All of these attempts to exclude disability from the general drive to reduce 
expenditure – or, at the very least, to shield disabled people from the brunt of the cuts – 
betrays a “liberal” conception of disability. I do not claim that disabled people were not 
seriously adversely affected by these policy decisions (as I will show in more detail later). The 
rhetoric, however, shows how disabled people firmly remained the “deserving” poor. 
Fraud and Abuse 
Concern about fraud and abuse was not new or unique to the 1980s but as unemployment 
grew rapidly, social security costs brought about a reassessment of government expenditure 
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Fraud was highlighted as being a major drain on resources, though 
even the government admitted it accounted for only a small proportion of the total benefit 
bill.57 Verity Archer has written about a similar contemporaneous development in Australia 
fuelled by the dominant neo-liberal rhetoric which had spread from the United States.58 This 
had not always been the case. In 1965, the National Assistance Board (NAB) had decided not to 
advertise their anti-abuse measures; even though they believed this would deter would-be 
fraudsters, their main concern was over the low take up of National Assistance by the elderly. 
Thus, the greater concern was underpayment to vulnerable people rather than the risks of 
overpayment to select individuals.59 Even in 1980, the DHSS did not press for convictions 
where it would go against their ‘social responsibilities towards the sick, the old, the mentally 
handicapped, etc. [...] where the offence is trivial or where there are humanitarian 
considerations’.60 Voluntary organisations would continue to insist that low-take up was a 
much larger problem than that of fraud.61 It was also clear that while historically there have 
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been fears about malingering and the “wrong” people receiving aid, the government was 
confident that medical testing would root out most fraudulent individuals in the case of 
disability.62 Indeed, doubts must be raised as to whether the attack on fraud was ever more 
than a public relations exercise. Despite hiring more staff to prevent the problem, in 1985 the 
Public Accounts Committee found that the DHSS still had no reliable way of estimating the true 
scale of fraud within the system.63 Moreover, if pure economic considerations were the driving 
force, why was tax evasion not targeted more severely?64 Many at the time publicly argued 
that the campaign would have a detrimental effect on benefit take-up, while implying that this 
was at least part of the government’s strategy.65 For those who continued to claim, and in 
keeping with the liberal approach, the sick – who, it was believed, could be reasonably easily 
identified through the medical profession – continued to be viewed as deserving of state 
support. 
Reg Prentice announced new anti-fraud measures through a written reply to a 
parliamentary question from John Major: 
Efforts to control fraud and abuse have been inadequate for 
several years. [...] The main problems are people who work 
but purport to be unemployed, people who avoid taking 
work or mis-state their assets, income or family 
circumstances, and people who evade their responsibilities 
for maintaining their wives and children.
66
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Further: 
Where existing rules have been found over time to lead to 
abuse and to people becoming eligible for benefits in 
circumstances that the House never intended, we are taking 
steps to tighten up the rules. Into this category fall [...] 
unemployment, sickness and other short-term benefits.
67
 
Disability was not explicitly mentioned, which is part of a historical trend. The Fisher 
Report (1972) had found that there was ‘less danger of wrongful claims by the long term sick 
than those who are sick for shorter periods’.68 Disability was considered long-term, and 
therefore not lumped in with Prentice’s pronouncements on ‘unemployment, sickness and 
other short-term benefits’. This not to say that disability was left untouched by the anti-fraud 
campaigns. DA was concerned that the campaign could reduce take up.69 Nor does it mean 
that disabled claimants have never en-masse been suspected of malingering. “Proving” 
disability and gatekeeping procedures have been a key feature of welfare provision from the 
earliest poverty relief policies.70 However, I argue that disability was not explicitly targeted 
during the first two Thatcher terms because disabled people were part of the “deserving 
poor”. For instance, when announcing reduced payments for board and lodgings through the 
supplementary benefit system, the government specifically excluded ‘the chronically sick and 
disabled’.71 The New Right’s policies of selectivity within the benefits system combined with a 
moral campaign against certain behaviours put disability in a relatively advantageous position 
compared to other poverty groups. 
Debates within the DHSS at this time are important because they show how fraud was 
dealt with on a practical and administrative level. The word most commonly used was “abuse”. 
This was a useful term because it did not automatically assume criminal intent by the claimant. 
Abuse could mean that a genuinely injured person was receiving a benefit, but was perhaps 
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not using that money in an appropriate manner; or perhaps the individual could work if forced, 
but had become reliant upon the state handout. This has also been framed by neo-classical 
economists as ‘moral hazard’. Individuals are assumed to take what is on offer rather than 
what they genuinely need.72 Abuse could therefore be applied as a concept to justify 
tightening eligibility criteria without accusing large sections of the population of criminal 
behaviour. Guidance was given to DHSS staff on how to detect fraud; but although the amount 
of cases coming to court had been steadily increasing, the SSAC reiterated that small-time 
offenders would not be prosecuted if their ‘youth, age or physical or mental health’ made such 
action inappropriate. The Department was proud that its selectivity had kept conviction rates 
at around 98%.73 By tackling the problem throughout the whole social security system the 
government hoped to achieve a saving of £53 million.74 
Even more useful was the way that these concepts could be turned on staff. Employees at 
the SBC could be blamed for being too lenient and developing a culture of abuse. The SBC 
believed that anti-fraud measures would be compromised because ‘staff normally saw their 
primary responsibility as the payment of benefit, not the prevention of fraud’.75 As we will see, 
this was one of the reasons for removing discretion from the Supplementary Benefits scheme. 
Discretion leads not only to inconsistent decisions, it allows sentimentality to extract more 
cash from the system.76 Doctors were also subject to this scrutiny. This will become most 
relevant with regard to Incapacity Benefit in the next chapter, but it is worth saying that the 
role of the doctor as gatekeeper to the social security system77 was already being questioned. 
The Ogglesby Report, a review of the procedures for claiming MA and AA, argued that doctors 
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should probably be involved in certificating individual’s mobility and attendance needs. The 
DHSS must be careful: ‘a GP may tend to be partial when reporting his own patients’. Still, 
when an adjudicator doubted the genuineness of a claim they could telephone the claimant’s 
GP for ‘inside information’.78 DA noted in their review of the control procedures for IVB that: 
The medical profession has an important role in the 
assessment of capacity for work. Doctors are asked not just 
to make medical judgements but also to express an opinion 
on capacity for work. This pre-supposes a knowledge of 
working conditions and of the physical demands made by 
work. Most doctors are unenthusiastic about this role. [...] 
Their concern is with the medical welfare of patients rather 
than the rules and regulation relating to a claim for 
benefit.
79
 
It was clear that there was a difference between disability and incapacity, yet for the 
purposes of determining benefit eligibility the social security system was happy to conflate the 
two. Medical proof of certain diagnoses was “proof” of eligibility for IVB. In the 1990s the 
equivalency of “the sick role” and “disability” would be challenged; but for now, the system 
was not substantially reformed. 
In some respects, however, rules on proof of medical incapacity were relaxed. For spells of 
sickness under seven days in length, the government proposed to allow workers to “self-
certificate”. Doctors had pointed out that it was a waste of time for people to come to them 
for certificates for short bouts of sickness since: 
many of them are given to people who have recovered from 
illness and simply want a note for their employer or DHSS. 
Others visit their doctors with common colds, flu, backache 
etc, when rest is the only treatment necessary. In addition, 
diagnosis is often very uncertain in the early stages of 
illness.
80
 
Business groups were less enthusiastic. One law firm felt it would increase the ‘loss of 
working days due to alleged sickness’. The Confederation of British Industry noted there was a 
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divided opinion amongst its members, with many expressing ‘apprehension’. Ferris, Craig & 
Moore, a firm of surveyors, argued that ‘the only persons who will benefit [...] are the 
malingerers and [GPs]. Employers will be receiving a lower return from staff and good 
members of staff may be denied the making-up of salary in the event of genuine illness.’81 
Despite these concerns, the regulations were passed, suggesting that the government was 
more concerned with administrative ease and lower GP workloads than it was with a potential 
malingering crisis. The reservations from business about productivity and cost also suggest 
that the perception of malingering as a wide-spread problem (or potential problem) was very 
different from the government’s. Without a full-scale study into the attitudes of various 
groups, I can only speculate as to why this might be the case; however, I would argue that it is 
interesting that the bodies with access to and experience with a large amount of data on the 
issue of health-related benefits were far less critical of this proposal than organisations with, 
presumably, little more than anecdotal experience on the matter. This is not to cast a moral 
judgement on these businesses, or to declare them “wrong” – rather it is to draw attention to 
the fact that different organisations understood the socially constructed phenomenon of 
“malingering” in different ways. The same can also be said of “disability”. 
Throughout, these debates on abuse of disability benefits were based on technicalities and 
borderline cases. Many cases were publicised where disabled people were denied these 
benefits, but the issue was not whether or not they were “really” disabled or sick, rather 
whether or not they were entitled to the benefit as the rules stood.82 There is little evidence 
that the social security authorities suspected that masses of people were faking their illnesses 
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to avoid work (for Invalidity or Supplementary Benefit) or to claim additions (for Mobility and 
Attendance Allowances). This is in stark contrast to the campaigns against the unemployed.83 
Claimants to disability benefits needed to be kept under surveillance through medical reports 
and, if suspicion was raised, home visits. There was, however, more confidence that this 
objective measure of eligibility was easier to police. Moreover, to be ill was not to be morally 
inferior. “The sick” were, in the liberal approach, worthy of support.  On the other hand, the 
unemployed, or the single mother of an illegitimate child,84 were not. 
National Insurance Benefit Cuts 
Cuts to general NI benefits affected disabled people claiming IVB or the duty pensions. DA 
discussed a paper they had written in 1983 called Hard Times: The Tories and Disability in 
which they outlined their opposition to government policy. Although they felt that ‘for 
pragmatic reasons – electoral popularity – they have not, as yet, mounted an obvious full 
frontal attack on the existing system’, it was clear that the changes that had been and would 
be made ‘add up to very bad news, particularly for the majority of people with disabilities’.85 I 
argue, however, that these benefits declined in value because all NI benefits were cut. They 
were not attacked specifically because they were disability benefits, nor was there any great 
desire to do away with entitlements to support entirely. The increasing returns and 
bureaucratic momentum from previous governments not only made large-scale reform of 
disability benefits costly in financial and administrative terms; but any attempts to take 
entitlements away from a long-neglected group which had only recently been recognised 
would have carried great electoral risks.86 Cuts came through general reductions in rates and 
modifications to the eligibility criteria. 
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Disability benefits were therefore not uniquely affected, but they were treated differently 
in some ways. Both NI income replacement benefits –IVB and Sickness Benefit –  were cut. 
Sickness Benefit was effectively replaced by Statutory Sick Pay.87 Employers took responsibility 
for the payment and administration of short-term sickness benefits by covering the first eight 
weeks of incapacity in return for rebates on NI payments.88 It is important to note here that 
the government felt that short-term sickness and injury was a matter for employers. 
Administratively and financially it made more sense for them to pass the burden to the 
employers who could more effectively monitor for absenteeism and reimburse their workers 
through existing wage-payment procedures.89 Sick people with jobs could provide for 
themselves through co-operation with their employer. Those without work and adequate 
insurance contributions were still entitled to Supplementary Benefit until their period of 
incapacity became long enough to qualify for one of the other disability-related benefits. 
While Sickness Benefit was being phased out, the value of IVB was being cut (as 
demonstrated by the dip below the rate in retirement pensions in Figure 4.5). It seemed that 
the removal of the earnings link for long-term benefits would affect ‘pensioners, widows and 
war disabled people’.90 Looking deeper, DA was concerned that ‘it is very hard for anyone to 
calculate with accuracy the cumulative effects of the various hidden “clawbacks”91 and obvious 
cuts that have been made’.92 The real value of IVB decreased by five per cent. This was 
portrayed as a temporary measure until it would be taxable in 1983, at which point its real 
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value would be restored. The argument was that long-term benefits should be taxable – 
retirement pensions were, so invalidity pensions should be too – but in the meantime the 
value of the benefit had to be reduced to make up for the lost tax revenue.93 This was, for 
disability campaigners, cruel and absurd. The lowest earners paid no tax on IVB since their 
incomes were below the taxation threshold.94 According to a reply to Alf Morris, this applied to 
400,000 IVB recipients in 1980.95 When the link with pensions finally was restored in 1985, it 
appeared to be a ‘generous’ addition to the benefit. However, it was brought about because 
the government realised that taxing IVB was ‘operationally impossible’. The lost income over 
the preceding years was not to be compensated, and the benefit was effectively “cut” further 
from its 1980 rate by changes to the earnings-related addition rules.96 
IIB received more attention and underwent more significant changes. A White Paper was 
published on reforming the scheme in 198197 as a response to the Pearson review on 
compensation for personal injuries.98 The Conservative government removed IIB in its previous 
form, keeping the disablement benefit (the part which compensated for injury on a percentage 
basis), but removing the basic-rate IIB which was effectively a higher-rate version of Invalidity 
Pension.99 Other changes were made, such as removing disablement benefit for those judged 
to be less than 10% disabled. This was combined with a revised scale of awards (where 20% 
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disablement only secured a 15% pay out of the full pension) to save in the region of £33 
million. In total, the 1981 white paper predicted savings of £54 million. As Norman Fowler 
wrote in the foreword: 
The times we live in mean that we cannot improve benefits 
without, at the same time, producing matching savings in 
other parts of the scheme. But this approach will use our 
resources more sensibly and make further progress in 
simplifying the social security scheme.
100
 
The arguments from voluntary organisations were helpful to the government in this 
regard. Since the pressure groups had protested against the preferential rates in the duty 
pensions, there was a logical claim that IIB could be reduced to bring it into line with civilian 
benefits. The document quotes the DA’s objections to IIB preference as justification for its 
plans, although it conceded that the ultimate goal of the poverty lobby was to remove the 
differential all together and provide benefits on the basis of need. The Trades Union Congress 
and Industrial Injuries Advisory Council both pressed the case for retaining the difference as a 
premium for workers ‘acting under orders and also because their employment is necessary to 
maintain and increase the wealth of the community’.101 Another consultation paper on IIB was 
circulated in late 1985, separate from the wider consideration of disability and the Fowler 
reviews on general social security. Tony Newton, the Minister for Social Security and the 
Disabled, wrote in the introduction that the government felt this was a ‘sensible further step 
towards a more coherent system’ for disabled people. It was seen as part of earlier packages 
such as the introduction of SDA (on which more later).102 It proposed to further restrict 
payments, this time removing payments for those assessed as below 15% disabled. Constant 
attendance allowance was also to be rationalised and brought into line with civilian AA.103 This 
was, in effect, an extension of work already done. The precedent of the Social Security Act 
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1982 allowed the government to once again restrict qualification requirements at the edges of 
the scheme and re-distribute money within it. 
We see here liberal approaches to disability conflicting with neo-liberal approaches to 
welfare in general. The government was constrained in the policy choices it could make by 
potentially damaging electoral effects of being seen to be “cruel” to disabled people. At the 
same time, the increasingly complex tangle of social security benefits made individual changes 
difficult due to the impact upon other schemes. IIB preference could not be removed entirely. 
The absurdity of it was not so profound as to cause a crisis.104 Instead, the costs of exit from 
the policy paths created in the 1970s were too great at this time to allow radical reform.105 By 
this, I argue that the electoral and administrative investment in the idea of disability benefits 
and the way they were constructed at this time was as (if not more) important as the raw 
economic costs of changing the system. More fundamental changes would only be possible 
once there was the political will and the economic and administrative data to provide clear 
policy alternatives to the government. As the next section demonstrates, however, disability 
benefits were deliberately excluded from general plans to overhaul social security.  
Fowler Reforms 
The tension between neo-liberal desire to reform the benefits system and liberal attitudes 
towards “the disabled” went unresolved over Thatcher’s first two governments. As the 
Conservatives looked to redraw eligibility for other forms of benefit, disability was specifically 
left out of the Fowler Reviews. Instead, a separate investigation into disability was 
commissioned after Fowler had reached his conclusions. Significantly, however, the question 
of disability benefit had been asked, and tentative answers drafted, throughout the decade. 
Despite a lack of concrete action in reforming the system, the government’s various advisory 
committees continued to investigate alternative schemes. Disability largely escaped the major 
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reforms in the Social Security Act 1986; but it did not fully escape government attention. I 
argue that there were two main reasons for inaction. First, as we have seen elsewhere, 
disability was still seen as a worthy area of state support. And second, disability was clearly a 
hugely complicated and potentially expensive area to reform in a way which would not 
damage the government’s chances of re-election. As with the previous section, the potential 
cost to the government was just too high. 
Part of the rhetoric of the Reviews was to rationalise a system of benefits which had clearly 
become complicated and difficult to administer for both claimants and government since the 
1940s. As Alcock has argued, social policies are ‘the product of history, not of logic’.106 In this 
sense, disability was no different. In 1981, SSAC reported: 
The overriding criticism of existing benefits [for disabled 
people] is that they are too low to fulfil their purpose. 
Another general criticism is the patchwork nature of the 
system. As public and political awareness of the problems 
caused by disablement grew, benefits were introduced 
piecemeal when resources permitted. [...]. Each [...] has 
different qualifying conditions and different rules for 
receipt, and caters for a different aspect of disablement. 
Critics argue that there has been no rationale behind 
creation of the present structure [...] and this has resulted 
in the present system being anomalous, confusing and 
failing to meet the extra costs disablement brings.
107
 
Yet a comprehensive review of disability benefits was not conducted until after the initial 
reviews for other aspects of the social security system.108 In the meantime, SSAC advised that 
since the government had committed itself to a disability income it needed to first conduct a 
survey to find out the number of disabled people and their need; then it would need to decide 
if the resources were available for a full-scale restructuring of the system or whether 
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piecemeal development was ‘the only practical way forward’.109 The two bodies set up for this 
task were the OPCS survey and the SSAC Disability Working Group (DWG), both of which 
published their findings in 1988.110  
Basic reviews of the “state of play” with regard to disability benefits were conducted by 
the nascent SSAC. Consideration of these questions was necessitated by promises made in the 
Conservatives’ 1979 manifesto. 
Much has been done in recent years to help the disabled, 
but there is still a long way to go. Our aim is to provide a 
coherent system of cash benefits to meet the costs of 
disability, so that more disabled people can support 
themselves and live normal lives. We shall work towards 
this as swiftly as the strength of the economy allows.
111
 
Disability organisations took this as a specific commitment to reform benefits, although 
they knew that it was unlikely that this Conservative party was ideologically committed to 
improving support.112 DA accused the government of dragging its feet over its manifesto 
promises, arguing that disabled people were already taking the brunt of the cuts through other 
reductions in expenditure.113 For the International Year of Disabled People (1981), DA 
produced a booklet called The Government’s Record on Behalf of People with Disabilities. It 
contained an introduction by Peter Townsend and essays from Lynda Chalker (Conservative) 
and Jeff Rooker (Labour).  
Chalker was a junior member of the government and an attendee of All-Party Disablement 
Group meetings before starting her role at the DHSS. She defended the Government’s record 
with a cricket analogy: ‘the Government is scoring by singles. We would like to score 
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boundaries, but we must recognise that the circumstances are not yet right.’114 Rooker was 
more strident. 
It will now have dawned on people that the sufferers are to 
be the old, disabled and chronic sick. Are these the 
scroungers the Tory party talk about? Of course not. But 
they are the ones to bear the brunt of the cuts. It is not as 
though it has happened by accident. The former Minister 
for the Disabled, Reg Prentice, was on record as saying that 
the disabled are pleased to share in the cuts. People who 
lobbied the Minister last year on behalf of the disabled 
were described as “phonies”.
115
 
Attempts to amend the first Social Security Bill 1979 to include a disability income within 
the Supplementary Benefits system were rejected.116 However, it was clear that the policy 
recommendations of the poverty lobby were being considered.117 A SSAC memo from 1981 
outlines the costs of some of the changes which had been suggested. For example, extending 
Mobility Allowance to the over 65s was estimated to cost around £350 million; removing the 
‘household duties’ restriction on HNCIP would cost £220m.118 In both the first and second 
reports, therefore, SSAC did not recommend the immediate introduction of a comprehensive 
disablement allowance. Although a partial incapacity benefit was considered, this and the 
comprehensive income were rejected on grounds of practicality and cost.119 
It was not until 1984 that the government took SSAC’s advice and properly investigated 
disability benefits. This was a necessary part of the review procedure, as the Harris survey was 
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by then fifteen years old.120 It investigated not only the prevalence of disability but also the 
financial impact of disability on disabled people.121 It was due to publish in 1988, and therefore 
DWG began a two-year investigation in 1986.122 It recommended four guiding principles for 
policy makers: 
(i) the social security system should provide an adequate 
basic income for all disabled people who cannot support 
themselves fully, with parity of income between all groups; 
(ii) there should be help towards the extra costs which 
people incur because of their disabilities, assessed in 
relation to their particular disabilities; 
(iii) the benefit structure should provide incentives for 
disabled people to achieve independence through 
employment; 
(iv) benefit entitlement rules should be readily 
understandable, disabled people should have ready access 
to social security offices and should be able to obtain help 
with a minimum of delay and inconvenience.
123
 
Publication of the results of the survey was delayed. Many campaigners believed this to be 
a deliberate attempt by the government to withhold information.124 The debate was more 
heated than had been the case over the Harris OPCS survey in the late 1960s. Linda Lennard of 
DA wrote to Nicholas Scott (the Minister for Disabled People): 
[DA believes] that the proposed publication of the disability 
survey in September, in a manner apparently designed to 
stifle public debate, is demeaning to millions of people with 
disabilities. We would urge you most strongly to make these 
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survey results available immediately, so that they can be 
fully discussed before Parliament goes into recess.
125
 
However, in some circumstances it appears that speed was considered damaging. Reforms 
to other sections of the social security system, for instance, were made without recourse to a 
full survey. A number of organisations wrote to The Times. 
The Government has justified its refusal to provide figures 
to illustrate the likely impact of its proposals on the grounds 
that the debate should, at this stage, centre on structures. 
While deploring the absence of figures, we also wish to 
make clear our serious reservations about the 
Government’s chosen structures. 
We do not believe that a 15-week consultation period, over 
the summer, to be followed swiftly by legislation, can 
provide adequate time for the public debate that such a 
shift in welfare provision merits. Indeed, it is our view that 
the implications for the future of our society are sufficiently 
serious to warrant placing the whole question before the 
electorate at the next election.
126
 
While surveys can be used as delaying tactics for a government hoping to postpone a 
decision, I do not believe this was entirely the case with disability benefit reform. The cynical 
view would be to say that disability benefits were so politically sensitive that the government 
could not attack them head on. Thatcher was known for her pragmatism. Although areas such 
as social care were opened up to market competition, she avoided radical privatisation of 
health and education as it was considered too electorally risky.127 Yet there were also genuine 
reasons to wait. There were little fresh data on the numbers of disabled people in the country, 
and disability benefits were a complex and costly area of policy. To reform quickly could have 
disproportionately affected disabled people, or opened the government up to unsustainable 
expenditure increases. It was clear, however, that the government was far more concerned 
with the latter than the former. Both of these interpretations add weight to the argument that 
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the “liberal” concept of disability remained in place. Without proper planning, the resultant 
legislation could have opened the government up to massive increases in expenditure, and/or 
would end up excluding “worthy” claimants from the support they needed. These were at 
once unacceptable to neo-liberal and liberal tendencies in the government. At the very least, 
the government feared reprisals if it were seen to be attacking disabled people; if not, it 
genuinely wanted to ensure that it did not allow the “deserving poor” to be excluded from the 
new, more rational system. Fred Reid’s prediction was broadly correct. Instead, disabled 
people were disadvantaged as a result of a package of changes that disadvantaged “the poor” 
rather than being specifically focused on “the disabled”. 
Government action – Active Reform 
There were areas, however, where benefits for disabled people underwent significant reform. 
For women, access to certain benefits was improved as the result of judgements in the 
European Court. HNCIP was abolished along with the household duties test, and married 
women became entitled to ICA. For those reliant on means-tested benefit, eligibility for 
support became more complicated. “Discretionary” payments, which had often been used to 
tailor support to claimants’ individual needs, were scrapped. They were replaced by 
“entitlements” via a disability premium, which provided payments on top of the basic rate of 
support but with no relation to the actual needs of the individual. These reforms show 
concerns for “the sick” and welfare retrenchment were clashing. The government did not want 
to increase its expenditure on housewives and carers, but even though the moral case had 
been made for their inclusion in the social security system, it was only when forced by 
European law that it finally acted. Further, while attempting to rationalise and simplify 
payments to the uninsured poor, the government realised that disabled people would be 
adversely affected. Unable to allow this “deserving” group to go  without support, policy was 
modified in an unsatisfactory way to try and satisfy the competing ideals of protection for 
disabled people and reducing expenditure. 
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Income Support and Disability Additions 
Supplementary Benefit reform shows that disability was not the prime target for government 
during the early Thatcher years. Income Support, which replaced Supplementary Benefit in 
1988 as a result of the Social Security Act 1986, was the Conservative government’s attempt to 
rationalise means-tested social assistance and, in turn, cut costs and promote independence. 
The nature of these reforms shows that the side effects of policies aimed at reducing benefit 
expenditure had a direct impact on disabled people. I argue that disabled people were a sub-
section of “the poor”; negative impacts upon disabled people were concerning for the liberal 
tendencies of the Conservative government, and steps were taken to correct some of the 
unintended consequences. However, these remedies could not interfere with the overarching 
neo-liberal goal of reducing benefit expenditure. Their “desert” was trumped by economics.  
The purpose of Supplementary Benefits reform was to simplify the system so that 
claimants had more rights and fewer allowances based on discretion. The logic suggested that 
this would also make the system more reliable. This was broadly done in two stages: the first 
in the Social Security Act 1980 and the second in the Social Security Act 1986.128 Initial changes 
to means-tested benefit were made within the context of the review established by the Labour 
government.129 The poverty lobby had provided evidence to this review, but DA was 
specifically critical of the SBC and what appeared to be a ‘block’ on disability. Despite repeated 
attempts to work with the SBC to reform provisions for disabled people, DA saw little progress. 
Hence Townsend wrote to David Donnison, the Chair of the SBC: 
This letter gives notice of the end of gentlemanly 
endeavours to persuade the Commission and its officers 
with sweet reason. We propose now to harangue the 
organisation at every opportunity and to make public the 
reasons for our profound dissatisfaction with its policies. 
[...] We will oppose root and branch the possible 
abandonment of [Exceptional Circumstances Addition] and 
[Exceptional Needs Payments] because at least they 
amount to a fitful and indirect recognition of disablement. 
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We want a more consistent recognition of disablement in 
the structure of payments.
130
 
DA criticised the 1980 Act, but the system before the changes was clearly detrimental too.  
DA described the poverty trap caused for a disabled child on her 16th birthday. The ‘choice’ 
was to claim NCIP or Supplementary Benefit. The former paid £14.00 a week, the latter £12.95, 
with the possibility of additions for diet, heating or special needs. However, once she turned 
18 and became eligible for the long-term rate, Supplementary Benefit rose to £20.65. The 
choice therefore, was a complicated calculation of whether it was better to lose money in the 
short term or in the long term – and this was dependent upon a very specialised knowledge of 
the benefits system which few would have had without help from organisation such as DA or 
the Citizen’s Advice Bureau. For the very poor, this was not a ‘choice’ but ‘in fact more of a 
problem’. Similarly, the long-term rate of Supplementary Benefit was higher than the NI 
benefit, IVB.131 SSAC acknowledged this, explaining that the way to avoid such anomalies was 
to make it so that claimants on IVB for one year effectively qualified as long-term 
Supplementary Benefit claimants. However, this would likely affect 70,000 claimants, cost £15 
million a year and ‘involve about 250 staff in the first year and about 150 in subsequent years. 
In the [DHSS]’s view, the high benefit and staff costs militate against early introduction of the 
change.’132 A disablement working group133 investigated the disincentives to work such as the 
low level of ‘therapeutic earnings’ alongside other ‘invalidity trap’ arguments, but SSAC 
concluded that ‘there is already a wide range of provisions for the disabled in the 
supplementary benefits scheme. The Working Group may like to consider [...] bearing in mind 
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financial and staffing consequences, whether to recommend [...] that any further extensions 
are necessary or desirable.’134  
The reasons for this complexity were historical. The purpose of National Assistance in the 
Beveridge scheme was to act as a safety net for those who fell through the holes of the NI 
system. Thus, discretion was a central part of the process. Officials could ascertain the real 
needs of the claimant, provide support during times of crisis and, because only a few people 
would be claiming from the NAB, the system would be able to cope. However, successive 
governments had become reliant on means-tested benefits as they allowed selectivity or 
“targeting”. It was a useful way of keeping expenditure low and ensuring benefit only went to 
target groups.135 The rhetoric up to this point had always been that there would be a move 
towards universal provision. 1986, according to Nicholas Timmins, marked 
the end of a postwar consensus to which every government 
until this one has paid at least lip-service. No longer does 
this government pretend to want to make a significant 
move away from means-tested benefits to ones given 
universally and as of right. [...] Its slogan – concentrating 
help where it is most needed – means in the long run more, 
not less, means-testing.
136
 
“Simplification”137  became necessary because the SBC was overloaded with hundreds of 
thousands more claims that it was ever designed to process. Administrative costs were 
prohibitive. However, by replacing discretionary awards, adaptable to individual 
circumstances, with “premiums” and “entitlements” at flat rates for certain categories of 
claimant, the government could cause more problems than it solved. ‘Although it is better to 
have genuine rights to benefits rather than discretion, nevertheless inadequate rights without 
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discretion could make the claimant much worse off.’138 The challenge was to create categories 
of need within the means-tested system so that certain groups in poverty had an automatic 
right to support. 
Certain health-related categories already existed within the National 
Assistance/Supplementary Benefit scheme, but these were also problematic. Two such groups 
were “the blind” and “the tuberculous”.139 Tuberculosis was removed in the 1960s, but the 
special blind scale remained. This was reviewed in the investigation on Supplementary Benefits 
in the 1970s, and was retained despite the fact that ‘the review paper came to the conclusion 
that the blind seldom had special needs beyond those of other disabled groups and that the 
preferential scale was anomalous’. Politically, it was difficult to remove ‘except as part of a 
wider change’ as it could be seen as an attack on a vulnerable group. Therefore while the scale 
was removed, a blind addition remained as part of the normal scale rate for Supplementary 
Benefit even after the 1980 Act.140 Organisations for and of blind people were also 
campaigning at this time for a blindness allowance to cover the extra costs associated with 
visual impairment along similar lines to MA and AA. They argued that while there was tax relief 
for blind workers and Supplementary Benefit additions, those who did not qualify for either 
received no extra-costs payments unless they could demonstrate acute need for MA or AA.141 
DA broadly supported these aims, with the caveat that they were not supporting 
discrimination for or against one particular impairment group. They were supporting a more 
comprehensive benefits system, in which a blind allowance could play an important part.142 
The idea of awarding supplementary payments to particular categories of people was 
therefore nothing new, nor contradictory to the demands of disability organisations. 
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In the 1986 reforms, disabled people were to be covered in the new Income Support 
system through the disability premium because disability was a category of deemed need. 
However, such reform was only possible because the government acknowledged that  
it was clear from discussions in Committee and on Report 
and from quarters outside the House that the general 
statement of intent about our aim to find a new solution to 
the problem of those severely disabled people had fallen 
short of satisfying those who rightly and properly represent 
the interests of that group.
143
 
Minister for Disabled People, John Major, responded to criticism of the premium by stating 
that ‘the Government policy remains to direct more resources to disabled people’.144 The 
government went on to reject a House of Commons Select Committee report urging a rethink 
on the premium.145 However, as the next chapter shows, it  was forced to provide additional 
help through the Independent Living Fund as Income Support proved to be inadequate. 
Throughout this reforming process the reality of the reform programme did not meet the 
rhetoric. DA gave written evidence to SSAC on the implementation of the new SBC rules in 
1981: 
The new legal basis of entitlement was supposed to have 
ensured the “simplification” of the scheme; to have made it 
easy to understand and easier to administer. So that even 
though cuts would be made, claimants, at the very least, 
could be confident that they would and could gain their full 
legal entitlement. Our experience suggests that even this 
minimum requirement is not yet fulfilled.
146
 
Tony Aston of the Royal National Institute for the Blind (RNIB) argued that the disability 
premium in 1986 was ‘no victory for disabled people’ as ‘fewer people will receive the 
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payment than the Government originally estimated and many disabled people will be left 
out’.147 
Perhaps more pertinently, the tactic of treating social security as one mass of claimants 
and expenditure failed to take into account the real lives of the people who depended upon 
the support offered by means-tested benefits. Thus, apologies for small reductions in income 
or promises that some new people would be brought into the scheme were considered 
insulting. 
We believe that any loss of income for those living on the 
margins of poverty is totally unacceptable. Talk of “rough 
justice” or of “losers and gainers” at this lowest level of 
subsistence simply must not be allowed by the Government 
to form part of the agenda, especially for those with 
additional expenses for maintenance arising out of their 
disability who would have no alternative source of 
support.
148
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Figure 4.6: Claims to Supplementary Benefit and Income Support 
by claimants classed as 'sick and disabled', 1978 to 1990. 
Sick and Disabled w/o NI Benefit 
Sick and Disabled w/ NI Benefit 
Source: See Appendix note on statistical data. Breakdown of claimants not available for 1980 or 1985, 
but total 'sick and disabled' claimants were 216,000 and 263,000 respecitvely. 
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In any event, a combination of reductions in the rates and entitlement to NI benefits, 
coupled with the introduction of Income Support saw a reversal in the trend noted in the 
previous chapter (Figure 3.3). The number of sick and disabled people on social assistance rose 
over the 1980s. The increase in claimants with NI benefits indicates that the rate of these 
benefit payments was no longer sufficient in itself to move households above the 
Supplementary Benefit subsistence line. Although there was a clear drop in claimants in 1988 
when Income Support was introduced, the number of claimants was back above 1986 levels by 
1990. The majority of this increase came from those not claiming to National Insurance 
benefits (Figure 4.6). The consequences of this are discussed in more detail in the section on 
the Independent Living Fund in the following chapter. 
The problem was that disability is a social construct. Whether or not a person is disabled or 
not is subjective. The government believed that it could objectively determine categories of 
need and desert, and failed. The gap between actual need and presumed need in disability 
benefits is notoriously difficult to bridge.149 Discretion was removed for short-term reductions 
in expenditure, but the side-effect of “entitlements” was that many new sub-categories of 
need proliferated. As we saw with AA and MA in the 1970s, this caused further administrative 
headaches as the system was forced to allow more and more exceptions to tightly defined 
qualification rules.150 Thus, despite new social definitions of disability emanating from 
voluntary organisations, disability firmly remained a medico-legal category of eligibility for 
state aid.  
Europe and Housewives 
Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure 
that any laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment are 
abolished.’
151
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The European Council directive on equal treatment of men and women within the social 
security system had an impact on two key disability benefits which explicitly discriminated 
against women.152 From the early DIG campaigns, the position of the wife within social security 
had been a major concern. HNCIP and ICA addressed some of these issues by acknowledging 
the role of the carer and the needs of disabled married women. Yet the eligibility criteria for 
both benefits in May 1979 were restrictive. Married women were denied access to ICA on the 
grounds that they should be maintained by and were financially dependent upon their 
husbands, despite the increased numbers of working married women. For HNCIP, a restrictive 
‘household duties’ test remained in place, despite the recommendations of NIAC which were 
explored in the previous chapter. This shows how disability remained a legal category and part 
of a complex hierarchy of other legal and political sub-categories.  Liberal approaches to 
disability, which acknowledged the moral desert of disabled women, competed with socially 
conservative views of “the family” and neo-liberal concerns with restricting expenditure. 
Further, the breakdown in direct contact between the poverty lobby and the government 
forced disability organisations to influence policy through other channels. The use of the 
courts is an example of such a change in emphasis. 
Severe Disablement Allowance 
Having accepted that women were entitled to some form of benefit in the 1970s, pressure 
grew for the more overtly discriminatory aspects of HNCIP to be removed. Pressure from 
voluntary organisations, the European Communities (via the European Council) and claimants 
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resulted in HNCIP reform. In this case, however, rather than increasing returns leading to 
expansion of the benefit, regulations were loosened in some areas and tightened in others, 
creating “winners” and “losers” and keeping growth in expenditure reasonably static. 
The arguments against the duties test were articulated in the previous chapter, but it is 
important to note that these discussions did not cease with the referral of the matter to NIAC. 
The Committee published its findings in 1980. It noted the high level of agreement between 
voluntary organisations and the quality of evidence submitted. Further, while the abolition of 
the test was outside the terms of reference of NIAC, it felt compelled to report that the 
majority of organisations were demanding just such an outcome.153 It concluded: 
There is no doubt that much of the strong feeling expressed 
against the household duties test arises from the fact that it 
applies only to married women (or cohabiting women) and 
thus it is seen as discriminatory. The Department have 
explained [...] that they have been advised that neither the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 nor the EEC [European 
Economic Community] Directive [...] apply in this field. 
Nevertheless we feel that, when considering the question, 
we cannot ignore changing attitudes to the role of women 
and the growing demands in all spheres for greater equality 
between the sexes. It seems to us possible that a test which 
applies only to married women will begin to seem 
increasingly inappropriate.
154
 
There was a moral or political imperative to recognise this discrimination, even if the law 
was not thought to be binding. Regardless, the government had still not abolished the tests in 
1982. A joint campaign on gender discrimination in disability benefits was launched by DA, 
DIG, RADAR, MENCAP and others, which included a ‘week of parliamentary activity’ from 12 
July 1982 to mark the second anniversary of NIAC’s report.155 The government was 
investigating the issues,156 and published a review on 1 December 1983 recommending that 
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HNCIP and NCIP should be scrapped and replaced with a new benefit (later called SDA) 
payable: 
 to those already incapable of work by the age of 20, on 
a simple test of that incapacity; 
 to those becoming incapable of work after that age, if 
they are also 80 per cent. or more disabled by 
reference to the measure of loss of faculty successfully 
used in the industrial injuries and war pensions 
schemes; 
 to all existing recipients of non-contributory invalidity 
pension, including married women who have satisfied 
the household duties test.
157
 
The Bill to achieve this was presented to the House of Commons the very next day. The 
government maintained that they had not been compelled to change the law because of the 
European regulations, but Labour MPs during the second reading of the Bill were incredulous. 
Brynmor John claimed that ‘the only conclusion that we can reach is that the Bill represents 
the weakest and cheapest scheme that will formally comply with the appropriate European 
directive.’158 
An internal report recommended the creation of SDA as far back as April 1982. This was 
sent to SSAC members for consideration, but only in the ‘strictest confidence’ as ministers 
were yet to reach a conclusion on how to act.159 Without access to the internal files from 1984 
I cannot be sure that this decision was deliberately avoided until the DHSS felt it could no 
longer justify delay. However, it appears probable that the government knew what its realistic 
alternatives were to HNCIP but were unwilling to open themselves up to a new, revised 
scheme that might cost more money in the long run. Hugh Rossi, the minister for disabled 
people, had declared in July 1982 that the review was almost complete and that ‘we intend to 
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publish the results of the review and then to invite consultation’.160 The narrative that has 
survived, certainly, is that HNCIP was defeated by a combination of campaigning and the EC.161 
The new regulations were opposed by the Fabian groups because they introduced a ‘new 
form of discrimination’ with claimants having ‘to meet two tests to qualify for SDA’.162 
Incapacity for work was a difficult measure in itself, but the use of a ‘percentage’ of disability 
was particularly problematic. Both government and various voluntary organisations admired 
the medical tests used in the duty pensions and their ability to determine the degree to which 
someone was impaired, but it was rejected as a model for a generalised disability pension in 
the 1970s. The “percentage of disablement” method of assessment was not a test of 
employability within IIB and war pensions; it was used to determine the level of benefit 
payable. A person with a degree of disablement (and therefore a degree of payment) could still 
have a full or part time job. Here, 80% disablement was used as an arbitrary – and, according 
to DA, ‘harsh’ – level at which a person without NI contributions was considered incapable of 
work.163 Conflating high levels of impairment with incapacity would become a major issue with 
Incapacity Benefit. Here it was obvious that the government used medical criteria to target 
benefit spending; but rather than focusing on the “most in need”, it equated “the most 
impaired” with “the most in need” regardless of other individual circumstances. 
Concerns were raised in the SSAC about the use of the tests. Adrian Stokes, who was also a 
committee member at RADAR and had been a member of CORAD,164 welcomed the end of the 
household duties test, but worried about the ‘absolute cut-off for disabled people whose 
disability was assessed at less than 80% loss of faculty’. He made the argument that IIB was 
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paid in grades depending on the percentage of disablement.165 There was a general concern 
from members of the Committee that the method of assessment would make it difficult for 
claimants to understand ‘the basis of the decision which governed their entitlement to 
benefit’.166 Overall, however, they appeared to be in favour. Stokes felt that voluntary 
organisations were being counter-productive in opposing the measures since they not only 
removed the despised household duties test, but also provided more money than might have 
been expected in the economic and political climate.167 In a draft letter to Ministers, produced 
as a result of a meeting with DA, they delivered a qualified endorsement: 
We are aware that there has been a long experience of the 
use of this test for industrial injuries and war pensions 
purposes, and if it can be successfully applied to the kind of 
civilian disablements most likely to be encountered in 
NCIP/HNCIP, we would regard SDA and the loss of faculty 
test as a potentially important building block in the 
development of a comprehensive benefit system. As you 
know, in our Second Report we proposed a loss of faculty 
assessment ourselves as the basis of one of our two 
suggestions for a partial incapacity benefit. 
However, representations have been made to us that a loss 
of faculty test is not, in fact, an appropriate basis for a 
maintenance benefit such as SDA is intended to be, because 
there is no necessary correlation between loss of faculty, as 
measured in the industrial injuries scheme, and loss of 
function or ability to work.
168
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The opposition identified “winners” and “losers”. Although more people were expected to 
be brought into the purview of a non-contributory benefit for disabled people, Alf Morris 
believed that, despite Fowler’s claims that 20,000 people would be newly entitled to the 
benefit, 16,000 would cease to be. Fowler did not deny that there would be losers, but failed 
to confirm the exact figures.169 The SSAC was under the impression that the proposals would 
cost more money as more people would be brought into the scheme – such as blind people 
and some severely disabled housewives – but that there would also be people who were 
disabled according to the household duties test, yet not according to the 80% disablement 
criterion.170 The figures from Table 4.7 suggest that the changes made little immediate impact 
on the number of women claiming non-contributory benefit. However, the growth rate 
decreased considerably between 1985 and 1988, before recovering again up to 1991. We also 
cannot tell from these figures how many women lost their entitlement, nor how many 
previously-ineligible women were able to claim. 
DA produced a book on SDA criticising the allowance. Its primary objections were that: 
 SDA still paid at a lower rate than IVB, and hence was discriminatory; 
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 the 80% test was still discriminatory against married women, as many would not 
qualify under these criteria and were still more likely to be excluded from IVB 
because of the contributory principle and female working patterns; 
 SDA discriminated against those whose onset of disability occurred after the age of 
20; 
 SDA as a name was ‘found to be alienating and confusing’ – MIND was quoted as 
saying that ‘many people would not consider themselves to be “severely disabled” 
[...] and yet they may find it difficult to sustain any form of employment. The very 
name [...] is detrimental to the claimant’s self-esteem and motivation for 
recovery’; 
 the word ‘Allowance’ made it seem like MA or AA (extra costs benefits) whereas it 
was actually an income replacement benefit and an alternative to IVB (as was 
explicit in the previous name).171 
SDA is important in the context of what preceded and what would follow it. It apparently 
made men and women equal in NCIP, yet it continued to be paid at a lower rate than IVB; a NI 
benefit and therefore unavailable to a lot of women. This had been one of the more 
compelling arguments for introducing HNCIP in the 1970s.  It eliminated the household duties 
test, but replaced it with what was seen as an even more restrictive form of medical 
assessment. Moreover, it explicitly argued for aid to be targeted at the “most needy”. It is 
ironic that a change designed to remove one form of discrimination enhanced another. The 
European Council was therefore able to enforce policy change, aided by campaign groups and 
a lingering sense that the ‘absurd’172 HNCIP system was in dire need of reform. However, the 
government was able to secure reform in such a way as to minimise the real electoral and 
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financial risks of destroying the benefit all together, or replacing it with something more 
universally available. 
Invalid Care Allowance 
On the other hand, ICA saw a massive expansion in coverage as the government was unable to 
restructure it in such a way as to deny access. It is an example of the increasing returns that 
had been building since the 1960s. With carers recognised as a legitimate category within the 
welfare state, and with the principle that married women should not be discriminated against 
accepted, the government was no longer able to resist the moral and legal pressures to ease 
restrictions. 
NIAC proposed in 1980 that ICA be extended to non-relatives,173 although SSAC maintained 
that married women should not receive it. This was because the benefit was ‘intended to 
replace in part the earnings from employment of those potential breadwinners who forgo 
earnings in order to care for a severely disabled person and for whom in general earnings 
would provide their only source of income’. Housewives were not ‘breadwinners’.174 However, 
in one of the last issues to be referred to NIAC before it was dissolved, the Committee made it 
clear that this was an issue that needed to be considered. Much like the HNCIP question, NIAC 
went out of its way to make recommendations which fell outside of their remit, such was the 
strength of evidence and feeling provided by the consultation process. 
We realise that when the benefit was introduced resources 
were limited. However, although we accept what the 
[DHSS] say [about the cost implications] we think that the 
point should be made that in some cases at least it may be 
less expensive for disabled people to be cared for in their 
own homes than in hospital or in Local Authority 
accommodation. There may therefore be an economic 
argument for paying ICA to married women. [...] In 
comparison with the number of persons claiming or 
receiving other social security benefits, the number likely to 
qualify for ICA will be small because the benefit is payable 
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only to someone caring for a severely disabled person 
receiving an attendance allowance or some similar 
payment.’
175
 
The government did not act on the recommendation immediately, but in 1981 did agree to 
extend ICA to non-relatives. Certain groups remained ineligible, including children under the 
age of 16 and married women.176 On one level, at least, the needs of disabled people and the 
needs of their carers were acknowledged. This also accepted that disabled people were not 
solely the responsibility of either their direct family or institutions.  
Many questions were asked on the subject throughout the early 1980s. Ministers referred 
to the high costs of implementation, and that the resources simply were not there. Rossi’s 
reply to John Hannam – ‘this allowance is one of a number of competing priorities in the 
disablement field which the Government will wish to consider as new resources become 
available’ – is typical.177 The belief was also that the European directive did not cover ICA, and 
so there was no obligation to legislate.178 The decision to extend ICA further, however, was 
taken out of the government’s hands due to a judgement by the European Court. A campaign 
was created by voluntary organisations to bring a test case against the government so that 
married women could become eligible for ICA.179 Jacqueline Drake was chosen, a 42-year-old 
married woman who had given up work to look after her elderly mother. Her husband, Clive, 
had a full-time job. This disqualified the family from the benefit, since married women were 
not allowed to claim under existing rules.180 A tribunal found in favour of Drake on 1 March 
1985. Campaigners advised married women to begin claiming ICA immediately so that (if the 
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action was successful) payments would be backdated to the original date of the claim.181 The 
government appealed, so the case went to the European Court. The Court found that the 
refusal to pay married women was in breach of the equal opportunities regulations, and the 
DHSS was forced to change entitlement rules. It announced that payments would be 
backdated to December 1984 providing claims were received before the end of 1986.182 
As with the introduction of ICA by Castle, the arguments about cost-efficiency remained 
central. Sir David Price (Conservative) asked, following the announcement that the benefit 
would be extended: 
As one who has campaigned for years for the extension of 
[ICA] to married women, I congratulate my right hon. Friend 
and thank him and the Government, and I extend my thanks 
to that least thanked of all Departments, the Treasury. [...] 
May I put it to the Treasury that it has set an example today 
from which I hope it has learnt that by looking not for 
narrow accounting but for total national cost benefit it may 
do a great deal more to help the carers in the future and 
that it may earn for itself, as well as for my right hon. Friend 
some Brownie points?
183
 
Despite the potential savings, there had been consistent opposition to ICA for married 
women. An attempt was made to modify the first Social Security Bill 1980 in the Lords, but this 
was rejected. The government argued that a married or cohabitating woman was maintained 
by and dependent upon her husband, and even if her husband were disabled he would be 
receiving benefits for the family. This was also consistent with the arguments made by the 
Labour government when they introduced the benefit.184 Figure 4.8 shows just why the 
government had resisted for so long. The number of claims to ICA increased dramatically from 
1986 onwards. Similarly, expenditure rose from £13 million in 1985/86 to £104 million in 
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1986/87.185 Despite being a relatively small proportion of the disability benefits budget this 
represented a major increase in expenditure at a time when the government was seeking to 
reduce the amount spent on social security. 
Even though the government was advised on numerous occasions that married women 
were morally entitled to coverage, reform was resisted as long as possible in order to stop 
disability being a financial burden on the Treasury. There was little doubt in the medical status 
of these impaired women or their dependents, but in bureaucratic terms the government 
preferred not to class them as disabled – at least for the purposes of social security. This status 
brought into question other more important Beveridge concepts such as the nuclear family, 
male bread winner and the insurance principle. However, voluntary organisations were able to 
use previous declarations and new laws to enforce policy change on the government and 
expand the definition of disability in these areas. In the case of HNCIP, new regulations were 
drafted to limit the government’s exposure to new claims. With ICA, the floodgates were 
opened, albeit to a benefit which cost significantly less.  
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Figure 4.8: Claims to Invalid Care Allowance, 1983/84 to 1989/90. 
Source: See Appendix note on statistical data.  
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Conclusions 
As the political and economic landscape changed from the 1970s, so too did the tactics of 
those campaigning for the welfare of disabled people. New organisations were formed and 
gained popularity as the traditional groups could no longer secure major reforms. Oppression 
approach groups such as BCODP opened debates about independent living and anti-
discrimination legislation, while the Fabian organisations learnt to be more critical of 
government, using court cases and the media to try to defend the gains that had been made in 
the previous decade. The result was a growing emphasis on the rights of individuals to support 
and to be treated equally under the law. This would reach a head with the campaigns for the 
Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bills in the 1990s.  
Despite the neo-liberal rhetoric of decreasing expenditure, the government clearly 
considered disability to be an important part of the welfare state. It did not attack disability 
benefits and services head-on, even if other reforms and restrictions in public expenditure had 
an adverse effect on service users. Whether this was because it genuinely felt that disabled 
people were “deserving” of support, or whether it believed that it was too risky electorally, I 
argue that the disability lobby had successfully established disability as a policy area which 
governments were forced to consider. DA used its expertise in the social security field to resist 
and publicise changes to complicated sets of regulations. This only serves to highlight how the 
benefits system had become opaque for most claimants, and Fabian organisations were forced 
into a defensive stance rather than pressing for greater expansion. 
Still, the government would have found it difficult to attack disability benefits even if it had 
wanted to. The piecemeal system which had been cobbled together caused problems for both 
sides of the debate. For the disability lobby, it meant that the right to a National Disability 
Income had never been truly accepted, giving the Thatcher governments no obligation to 
expand coverage to all. For the government, the costs of exit – that is to say, the political and 
financial costs of fundamentally overhauling the existing disability system and starting from 
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scratch – were far too great.186 This is an important point given how much expenditure had 
increased by over the 1970s and 1980s (see Figures 4.2 and 3.2). Despite reforms and 
decreasing weekly rates of benefit, the number of claimants (and therefore the overall costs) 
of social security continued to rise. To really attempt to bring down the costs of disability 
benefits whilst improving efficiency, the government would have to wait until the OPCS and 
internal DHSS surveys were completed. Reform would have to both save money and not be 
seen to be cruel to disabled people. 
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Chapter 5 – Neo-liberal reform – 1988 – 1995 
Introduction 
The rising costs of disability-related benefits meant that the government felt more drastic 
action was necessary to curb expenditure. Relative to unemployment, outlay on disability was 
now too large to ignore. The distributive dilemma became the subject of greater scrutiny, 
resulting in new conceptions of which groups were expected to work. This was problematic in 
an era of (relative) high economic inactivity. At the same time, the increasing returns of the 
piecemeal system which had grown in the 1970s and been largely maintained in the 1980s had 
severely restricted the possibilities for reform without significant administrative, financial and 
political investment. In this chapter, I argue that neo-liberal cost-saving policies became less 
electorally risky and less ‘absurd’ than the status quo. 
After 1988, the Conservatives had data and the political confidence to act on welfare 
reform. During this period, they used the oppression approach’s arguments to further 
individualise disability rather than accepting structural explanations of poverty and 
discrimination. As the disability lobby pushed for Civil Rights Bills in Parliament and the rights 
of disabled people to work, the government turned this into an expectation that disabled 
people work if any form of employment was considered possible. Using Waddell and Aylward’s 
explanation of Incapacity Benefit,1 I argue that the neo-liberal approach asserted its 
dominance by splitting sickness from disability. Sick people, totally unable to work, could still 
receive liberal charity; disabled people, however, were capable of some form of work and 
must be expected to do so, no matter how difficult that might be. 
This was not asserted immediately after the second the Office of Population Censuses and 
Surveys (OPCS) survey was published. Benefit reforms were initially limited to providing a 
safety net for those most adversely affected by the introduction of Income Support. Only 
under the Major government were significant steps taken to reform disability benefits. In 1993 
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there was a slight restructuring and rationalisation of Attendance Allowance (AA) and Mobility 
Allowance (MA) to create a single benefit, Disability Living Allowance (DLA). Hailed as a radical 
innovation and part of a far-reaching commitment to “care in the community”, in reality DLA 
was little more than a bureaucratic simplification for the Department of Social Security (DSS) 
and for claimants. More significant reforms were made under the right-wing Secretary of State 
Peter Lilley who created a new test for “incapacity for work” and replaced Invalidity Benefit 
(IVB) with Incapacity Benefit (ICB) in 1995. The tests were designed to be more “objective” by 
measuring “functional limitations” rather than relying on a “sick note”. Yet they worked on the 
basis of a hypothetical typical work environment, continued to rely on individual medical 
rather than socially dependent definitions of disability and, in the final analysis, were designed 
more to cut costs than genuinely meet the needs of disabled people. 
At the same time, the oppression approach to disability – with disability seen as a socially 
constructed phenomenon, and individual control seen as a political priority – had gained 
significant support. The Royal Association for Disability and Rehabilitation (RADAR) had a 
disabled person as director, and more traditional charities had begun to reform their 
management structures to be more democratically accountable to their members. The 
campaign group Voluntary Organisations for Anti-discrimination Legislation (VOADL), later 
called Rights Now, brought various types of organisation together to campaign in unison for 
legal protections for disabled people. The government was embarrassed when it attempted to 
block the Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) 1993 Bill, eventually resulting in the government-
sponsored Disability Discrimination Act 1995. These two developments, neo-liberal benefit 
reform and the pursuit of individual rights, must be seen as part of the same change in 
approach to disability in British politics. Concurrently, the Fabian approach to the incomes 
question had not entirely disappeared. The Disablement Income Group (DIG) worked alongside 
the government to create the Independent Living Fund (ILF), and the umbrella group the 
Disability Benefits Consortium (DBC) challenged the government on its reforms over the 1990s. 
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This chapter is split into four main parts. The introduction provides some of the historical 
context about the late-Thatcher and Major years. The second section explains the alliances 
formed by voluntary organisations in the period, using the case of the Civil Rights (Disabled 
Persons) Bill 1993 as an example of how they operated. Voluntary action had come a long way 
since the mid-sixties, but the unity between the different types of group was fragile. Before 
the end of 1995, the lobby would be once again split along “insider/outsider” lines, raising the 
question: is it better to gain limited reforms and push for gradual policy change; or continue to 
reject flawed policies in the hope of more radical reform in the future? 
The third and fourth sections analyse the debates the poverty lobby had with the 
government over welfare reform. The third investigates the ILF, Disability Working Allowance 
(DWA) and DLA. All were designed to help disabled people to live within the community. 
Contemporary developments in care in the community policy fit these rhetoric. However, cost 
reduction was also an important motivation. In the case of the ILF, discretionary grants were 
limited to the most severe cases rather than being available to all on the basis of need. When 
the fund became too popular, it was re-constituted to be even more selective. DWA was never 
given enough funding or wide enough entry criteria to meet the needs of many disabled 
people. DLA was effectively a re-packaged version of pre-existing benefits.   
The fourth section deals specifically with ICB and the All Work Test (AWT), the new medical 
assessment. Based on a biopsychosocial model of disability, it assessed an individual’s 
functional limitations rather than declaring an individual unfit for work on the basis of his/her 
disease or injury. It borrowed oppression approach ideas which the lobby had tried to push 
through in the Civil Rights Bills: such as the right for disabled people to work; the rejection of 
disability being defined by medical diagnosis; and the need to assess all aspects of an 
individual’s health and their relationship with the “real world”. However, it was used in such a 
way as to try and restrict access to benefit and compel those on the margins of disability to 
work, regardless of the difficulties they faced in the open labour market. Far from being 
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“objective”, the test assumed subjective concepts such as “the workplace”, “employability” 
and “normal” levels of functioning were natural and unproblematic. 
Policy context – John Major’s government and expenditure trends 
Although Margaret Thatcher remained in power until 1990, the majority of the extensive 
reforms to disability benefits in this period were completed under John Major. Hywel Williams, 
a critic of Major wrote that Anglo-Saxon conservatives had never won the argument over 
welfare and poverty, but were seen as the only viable options for maintaining economic 
stability. Once the opposition began to accept monetarist politics the Tories lost their electoral 
advantage.2 It is clearly a work filled with anger at the post-Thatcher Conservative Party, with 
sleaze allegations and economic mismanagement (such as Black Wednesday) highlighted as 
proof of Major’s incompetence. Others have made similar, if less loaded, observations. In the 
social security sphere, for instance, Peter Lilley was appointed as minister at the DSS. Lilley was 
a notorious right-winger,3 and his appointment has been seen as part of a compromise as 
Major tried to hold his cabinet together.4 In this analysis, Major bought off the right of the 
party who were opposed to the Maastricht Treaty by letting them reform social security, the 
highest spending ministry.5 Others feel that reform under Major was essentially ‘Thatcherite’ 
but with a ‘softening’ of approach.6 Similarly, Major extended policies which had been started 
in the eighties. Benefit reform for disabled people had been outlined in 1988, as discussed in 
the previous chapter.7 The implementation of “Care in the Community” – the closing down of 
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the old mental hospitals and the desegregation of people with cognitive impairments and 
mental health issues – was accelerated.8  
Lilley, along with Michael Portillo, began a renewed attack on single mothers and 
unemployment benefit was replaced with Jobseekers’ Allowance including a ‘genuinely 
seeking work test’ which had not been seen since the 1930s.9 A renewed anti-fraud campaign 
also began in 1995.10 The Major years could in this sense be seen as the last attempts of the 
New Right to impose their will on the social security system and the welfare state in general. 
Although they had a slim majority in the 1992 General Election, it was clear even to the 
Conservative Party that they stood no chance of winning in 1997.11 On the other hand 
expenditure on social security continued to rise through the 1990s as it had done through 
much of the 1980s under Thatcher. To the right, this is seen as proof that those who claimed 
the Tories were trying to destroy the welfare state were clearly exaggerating.12 To the left, this 
increase in expenditure was attributable to the demographic changes over which the 
Conservatives had little control. Had the systems of 1979 remained in place, expenditure 
would have been much higher. By the same token, all sides of the debate argue that some 
reform was necessary precisely because of these demographic shifts.13 As Carol Walker notes, 
‘more money [had] been spent on the social security programme’ but ‘it [had] been spread 
among far more people’.14 
Social security policy must be seen in the context of rising expenditure and economic 
inactivity. Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show that the cost of disability-related benefits and the 
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number of claimants rose almost continuously from the 1970s onwards. By the late 1980s, 
therefore, it was no longer possible for the government to delay action as it had done by 
excluding disability from the Fowler Reviews. At the same time, the dramatic increase of claims 
to IVB after the mid-eighties reflected a number of demographic and economic changes in 
post-Fordist Britain. The issue is explored in more detail in the section on ICB, but it is 
important to note that many people became unemployed during the eighties’ and early-
nineties’ recessions. Some of these people qualified for IVB. Unlike Unemployment Benefit 
(UB) claims, however, when the economy recovered the number of new people signing up for 
IVB continued to exceed the numbers of people who recovered and/or found work. Disabled 
people on the margins of employment found it more difficult in times of recession to maintain 
or find employment. Rather than being used as a ‘reserve army of labour’ for times of higher 
employment, to be called upon when there were not enough non-disabled people to fill 
vacancies, many became reliant on IVB long-term.15 Claims to Income Support also began to 
increase noticeably during the early-nineties. Further, the benefits had been relatively young in 
the 1970s, but by the 1980s and 1990s more people were aware of what they could claim and 
how to do so.16 The important issue is that, regardless of the “real” reasons, expenditure had 
risen substantially and this provoked government concern. 
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The lobby – Rights not Charity 
While there was a hardening of policy towards social security, voluntary organisations changed 
their emphasis towards wider considerations of disabled people’s participation in society. 
Rather than campaign for an extension of social security as it had done in the 1970s, the 
poverty lobby groups came together with oppression approach organisations to launch 
campaigns for anti-discrimination legislation. At the same time, umbrella groups such as DBC17 
brought together organisations from different traditions to resist and critique government 
policy. These maintained Fabian campaigning tactics and, as in the earlier Thatcher period, had 
to defend existing benefits rather than pushing for new ones. The more high-profile campaigns 
came from VOADL18 and Act Now19 which performed a similar function in the sphere of 
disability rights. Therefore a mix of Fabian and oppression approach traditions co-existed at 
this time in different policy arenas. However, these alliances were never that strong. This 
section shows the debates within the disability lobby over two key areas. The first analyses the 
ways in which different groups worked together, but also the inherent tensions that were 
never far from the surface. The second takes the case of anti-discrimination legislation (ADL) 
and shows how the oppression approach to disability had made significant gains over the 
1980s, creating a high-profile, co-ordinated campaign which resulted in the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. 
An uneasy alliance 
Groups which had been at loggerheads in the 1970s had come to work together by the end of 
the 1980s. DIG and DA found they were able to forge a new relationship, cooperating on 
seminars and publicity material with British Council of Organisations of Disabled People 
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(BCODP).20 The “common enemy” of Conservative cuts to services and social security had 
resulted in a pragmatic alliance. The traditional charities and Fabian groups had far more 
resources, experience and contacts, and these could be leveraged for specific, targeted 
campaigns. ADL was one such area, as is discussed later in this chapter. However, the 
ideological tension between the oppression and incomes approaches was never fully resolved.  
As Mike Oliver declared in 1991: 
It is perhaps ironic that many of us spent the 1970s 
criticising the welfare state, only to find that these 
arguments were built upon and taken much further by a 
government determined to reduce state expenditure. 
Consequently, we spent the 1980s defending what we had 
previously attacked. In sum, we defended the indefensible 
and I do not propose to spend the 1990s doing the same.
21
 
A campaign of “Rights not RADAR” had been pursued by some Disable People’s 
Organisations (DPOs) who were angry that RADAR, seen as a traditional charity, had far more 
resources and influence with government than the “democratic” groups such as BCODP.22 By 
the same token, the Fabian groups became worried that newer, brasher forms of disability 
politics risked permanent damage to the relationship between the lobby and Westminster. The 
Direct Action Network (DAN) had begun civil disobedience protests.23 Peter Large was 
concerned that ‘too much of this high militancy is going to turn the public off and give people 
in parliament the excuse to say disabled people are a bunch of hooligans and not listen to their 
arguments’.24 
The union between the groups was, I argue, defensive. In response to perceived threats, 
the major organisations could co-operate for a short time on specific issues. Individual 
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campaigns continued, such as for the comprehensive income25 or for independent living 
centres;26 but for specific purposes, the lobby came together in ways that they could or would 
not in the early seventies. The professionalisation which was shown in the campaigns for 
Dafydd Wigley and Tom Clarke’s Private Members’ Bills was a contributing factor.27 While 
ideologically incompatible, DPOs had begun to adopt some of the tactics of the more 
traditional groups, even if this was done reluctantly. BCODP, for instance, applied for and 
received significant sums from the Department of Health;28 it had begun to help politicians 
draft Bills; it was contributing evidence to government enquiries; and, as we have seen, it was 
contributing towards campaigns such as DBC and VOADL. It was still deliberately “outsider” in 
terms of its campaign tactics in many ways, but it had also developed to the point where it was 
directly influencing politicians using some of the tools of the establishment. Concurrently, 
ideas about individual rights and the wider debate beyond incomes had largely been 
recognised. All of this is important to note, because it was clear that Parliament and 
government had also become aware of the basic “social” approach to disability issues and the 
wider social needs of disabled people. The case of the 1990s ADL campaigns shows how all of 
these aspects came together, and demonstrates that the government’s concept of disability 
adopted some of these ideas whilst actively resisting others. 
Civil Rights versus Disability Discrimination 
The oppression approach tactics regarding the Civil Rights Bills campaigns showed how fragile 
these alliances could be. While the lobby as a whole skilfully created a political crisis for the 
government, forcing it to create ADL, there were heated disagreements about what 
constituted “success”. 
                                                          
25
 Thompson, Buckle, and Lavery, Not the OPCS Survey; Pauline Thompson, Margaret Lavery, and John 
Curtice, Short Changed by Disability (London: Disablement Income Group, 1990). 
26
 Project 81, Project 81 - One Step On. 
27
 See Chapter 4 and Hilton et al., A historical guide to NGOs in Britain, pp. 349-51. 
28
 Oliver claims that BCODP received around £10,000 a year for its first three years. It later received 
£30,000 in 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92, and £45,000 in 1992/93. HC Deb 24 April 1990 vol. 171 cc. 
160-3W; HC Deb 21 May 1991 vol. 191 cc. 435-9W; HC Deb 1 July 1991 vol. 194 cc. 47-51W; HC Deb 21 
June 1993 vol. 227 cc. 34-9W. See also Campbell and Oliver, Disability Politics, pp. 189-90. 
  238 
Rather than accepting the need for ADL, ‘education and persuasion’ had become 
government policy by the 1990s. The Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bills from 1991 to 1995 
were all rejected on this principle.29 The 1993 version sought to criminalise unjustified 
discrimination in employment, and the provision of goods and services. This was to be 
enforced via the creation of a disability commission similar to the Commission for Racial 
Equality.30 Disability minister Nicholas Scott was unwilling to block attempts to legislate 
overtly. He argued that ‘I remain unrepentantly and benevolently neutral in my attitude and, if 
[Jack Ashley] calls that sitting on the fence, then in essence it probably is, for there are 
arguments both ways’31 The government as a whole was more dismissive, contending that 
extra regulation was unnecessary. Businesses would change their practices once they saw their 
moral duty towards disabled people. Yet there was a blatant absurdity to these claims. Roger 
Berry listed some of the costs which an unattributed document had listed as necessary should 
ADL be passed: 
the cost of lifts at British Rail stations, the cost of improving 
access to schools and the cost of refurbishing a cinema. 
Each and every one of those costs would have to be 
incurred if education and persuasion worked. How is it 
possible to be told on the one hand that we do not need 
legislation, because education and persuasion will give 
disabled people what they are entitled to, and on the other 
hand that, if we do those things, it would cost money and 
that is why we should not pass the Bill?
32
 
It is at this point that the role of voluntary organisations in policy change can be seen most 
explicitly. The government’s hand was forced in 1994 when it misjudged its tactics in defeating 
the Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bill 1993. Whitely and Winyard quote ‘a research assistant 
for the all-party group on disablement’ who claimed that Private Members’ Bills were not that 
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significant in securing legislative change for disabled people.33 However, this case, alongside 
the other Bills mentioned in this thesis, would suggest that their campaigning potential had 
definite secondary effects. Pressure had been mounting for ADL for a number of years. VOADL, 
although initially being dominated by the poverty lobby and traditional charities, convinced 
BCODP that the best way forward was for the disability lobby to show a united front.34 While 
“traditional” pressure was applied through political channels, direct action protests had made 
it clear that disabled people could be a disruptive influence and could not be ignored. One 
famous example was the campaign against ITV’s Telethon, which, protesters claimed, 
portrayed disabled people as pathetic, passive recipients of charity.35 DAN, whose most 
prominent member was disabled protest singer Johnny Crescendo, was a central player in 
these events. Not a formal organisation in the same way as BCODP, the loose affiliation 
organised events of direct action to cause disruption. Crescendo argued that, ‘Direct Action is 
feared because it is not controllable by the establishment. It cannot be managed, it comes as a 
surprise.’36 
Rights Now, the rebranded VOADL, went on the offensive, although it was not the only 
group calling for legislative and social change. Members of formal and informal voluntary 
organisations chained themselves to public transport and caused disruption to draw attention 
to barriers in society.37 Some crawled to Westminster to emphasise their point.38 This 
movement had been fuelled by developments in the United States and the Americans With 
Disabilities Act 1990. That the right-wing Bush administration could pass such legislation in the 
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States was seen as a rebuttal of traditional Conservative opposition to ADL. More practically, it 
gave the campaign a legal framework which they could adapt to British circumstances. RADAR 
sent Victoria Scott, later the lead campaigner with Rights Now, to the US to report on the 
implementation of the Act and which lessons could be learnt.39 From 1991 to 1995, ten bills 
were introduced in Parliament under the short title Civil Rights (Disabled Persons).40 Drafted by 
voluntary organisations, the Bills had the lobby firmly behind them.41 
The 1993 Bill was introduced by Dr Roger Berry. It received a favourable second reading, 
but was blocked at third reading by government-supported amendments. Campaigners had 
already tabled a motion in Parliament to ask the government for sufficient time to debate the 
Bill as the Parliamentary session was drawing to a close.42 The government acquiesced, but five 
Conservative MPs, Nicholas Scott (the minister), Lady Olga Maitland, Michael Stern, James 
Clappison and Edward Leigh tabled enough amendments (eighty in total) to talk the Bill out.43 
Campaigners were suspicious. Having heard a rumour that the amendments had been drafted 
by DSS civil servants, Alf Morris asked the minister in Parliament whether Parliamentary 
Counsel had provided support.44 These clerks were not supposed to be used to draft 
opposition to Private Members’ Bills. Scott denied the allegation, while Maitland took full 
responsibility for her own amendments. 
I would like to make it abundantly clear that I raise my own 
amendments. I sought consultation, but it would be totally 
unfair to suggest that they came from any other source. It 
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seems that disabled people are being used as a political 
football for political purposes by the Labour Party.
45
 
Berry remained suspicious, claiming that she seemed remarkably ignorant of the Bill’s 
content and at which stage of the legislative process it had reached. Given the complexity of 
the amendments, it was not credible that a non-expert could have drafted them herself.46 
When it transpired that the amendments had been drafted by the Department, the media held 
it up as an example of Government corruption. The Sun in particular supported the 
campaign.47 It was exacerbated by the familial connection –Victoria Scott was Nicholas Scott’s 
daughter. When Victoria did everything short of calling for her father’s resignation on the 
Today programme (which would have been a breach of Charity Commission rules), media 
interest intensified.48 The Bill was given another Friday for debate after the scandal but it 
coincided with the funeral of John Smith, the ex-Leader of the Opposition. Berry offered to 
accept all of the tabled amendments as there were not enough MPs present for quorum. 
Conservative MPs insisted on discussing their proposals, and the Bill was talked out with Scott 
the final speaker.49 Despite Smith’s funeral and the speculation over who would become the 
next leader of the Labour Party, news of the Bill’s defeat made the front page of The Times.50 
Scott apologised to the House for misleading it.  
My statement on Friday that my Department had not 
drafted any amendments
51
 was true, but, as I explained in a 
letter to [Dale Campbell-Savours, Labour], the Department, 
with my authority, had been involved in their preparation. I 
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therefore felt that I should offer this clarification of my 
remarks to the House as a whole.
52
  
Maitland later apologised, but only after being rebuked by the Speaker.53 It did not force 
Scott to resign or be sacked, but months later in a reshuffle he was moved aside.54 
In response, the Conservative government proposed its own Disability Discrimination Bill 
for the 1994/95 Parliamentary Session. It did not include the commission, and many of the 
other clauses were significantly weaker than the Civil Rights Bills. Campaigners supporting Civil 
Rights presented it again through Labour MP Harry Barnes. Local versions were also 
introduced in Scotland (Gordon McMaster, Labour), Wales (Barry Jones, Labour) and Northern 
Ireland (Rev. Ian Paisley, Democratic Unionist).55 BCODP, believing the government’s Disability 
Discrimination Bill to be inadequate, continued to back Barnes’s Civil Rights Bill. RADAR and 
other groups closer to the establishment, however, chose to support the government 
initiative, believing that, since the Barnes Bill had no chance of getting through Parliament, it 
was far better to try and hone the government Bill and seek concessions than back a lost 
cause. RADAR sent lawyers to the DSS to help them draft the legislation. This caused significant 
rifts within the Rights Now coalition, and was damaging to the fragile relationship between 
BCODP and RADAR.56 William Hague – Scott’s successor – was accused by ‘civil rights 
campaigners’ of using wrecking amendments to kill off the Civil Rights Bill, but by this point it 
was largely irrelevant.57 
The government Bill had significant clauses which betrayed the government’s construction 
of disability. For instance, clauses on discrimination in the work place only applied to firms 
employing more than twenty people; no such clauses existed in the gender or race 
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discrimination Acts.58 The idea that disabled people were a drain on company resources, 
therefore, was explicitly accepted. The definition of disability and a disabled person was, 
however, rewritten for the first time since 1944: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Schedule 1, a person has a 
disability for the purposes of this Act if he has a physical or 
mental impairment which has a substantial and long term 
adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day 
activities. 
(2) In this Act “disabled person” means a person who has a 
disability.
59
 
Further, the Act applied to past disabilities, so that it was illegal to unjustifiably 
discriminate against people who in the past had been injured or had mental health issues. Still, 
the explicit definition relied upon medical diagnosis and its relationship to ‘normal day-to-day 
activities’ – a medical definition of disability. It must be stressed, however, that the 1993 Civil 
Rights Bill contained similar terminology.60 
John Major’s government had a general commitment to “deregulation”. Regulation was 
often related to cost. Expenditure on disabled people was seen as a major barrier to ADL, 
though official estimates of the true extent of the costs involved were often challenged. The 
government published a report arguing that ADL in the form proposed in the Civil Rights Bills 
would cost the exchequer £17 billion. Rights Now accused the government of double-counting 
certain changes and completely ignoring the £5 billion a year directly lost to the economy by 
excluding disabled people from the workforce.61 This, I argue, was rooted in a conception of 
disabled people as a “burden” upon the state and upon capitalism in general. Arguments 
against ADL from government were framed more in terms of the immediate cost to the 
                                                          
58
 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, c. 7. 
59
 Ibid., c. 1. 
60
 ‘In this Act “disability” means, with respect to a person (a) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of that person; or (b) a history of having such 
and impairment; or (c) a reputation as a person who has or had such an impairment.’ Civil Rights 
(Disabled Persons) Bill 1993, c. 1. 
61
 Rights Now, Accounting for Discrimination : estimating the costs of excluding disabled people from the 
workforce (London: Rights Now, 1994). For £5 billion estimate, see p. 4. Indirect costs were estimated at 
£10 billion. A more detailed rebuttal was published in Rights Now, What Price Civil Rights? (London: 
RADAR, 1994). 
  244 
exchequer and to businesses rather than any social or financial gains that could be made in the 
longer term. Indeed, the government’s record on expenditure was held up as an example of 
how things did not require radical legislative change. The usual figure given in 1994 was £16.5 
billion, or 225 per cent more than when the Conservatives came into office.62 Gross 
expenditure, rather than the numbers of people being helped or the amount receiving such 
help, was quoted, despite the fact that the rights to support from the state had contracted 
since 1979. In short, the government was not willing to pool the risks of disability any further, 
placing the responsibility of maintenance on the individual and her family.63 Rather than have 
businesses or tax revenues absorb any initial or future costs in restructuring workplaces to 
integrate disabled people, individuals would have to conform to the needs of business. 
The Civil Rights story is an important one for understanding both the government’s 
concept of disability and the wider debates that the government had to deal with. Once again, 
the disability lobby had succeeded in manipulating the ‘politics’ stream.64 It had also diverted 
the ‘solution’ stream enough so that ADL was considered a legitimate response. Baggott and 
McGregor-Riley have argued that the Major administration was more open to consultation 
than Thatcher had been,65 and the involvement of disability organisations in the process of 
drafting the 1995 Act might support this. However, despite the fact that the government could 
no longer ignore disability issues, it was also unwilling to make major changes to the law in 
order to increase disabled people’s participation in society. The ‘problem’ was not considered 
big enough or understood in the same way as oppression approach campaigners. This is 
reflected in some of the government’s other policy responses. Disabled people were seen to 
demand the same opportunities and responsibilities as non-disabled people. This is crucial for 
explaining the changes to disability benefits over this period. The tension between providing 
for the “deserving” sick, whilst encouraging disabled people to become self-sufficient was 
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significant. Neo-liberal and liberal concepts of welfare jarred as they had done in the previous 
chapter. Here, however, neo-liberal concerns came out on top. 
Government action – Extra Costs 
This process can be best seen through developments in social security. To begin the analysis of 
late-Conservative benefit reform, I outline the changes to the extra costs benefits. These came 
in two forms. The first was the creation and evolution of the ILF from 1988. This was effectively 
a state-sponsored charity designed to lessen the damage caused by reform to means-tested 
benefits in the Social Security Act 1986.66 The second is the Disability Living Allowance and 
Disability Working Allowance Act 1991 which built on proposals outlined in the White Paper 
The Way Ahead.67 Both of these developments show the tension between liberal concepts of 
“the sick” and neo-liberal attempts to reduce expenditure and encourage personal 
responsibility. ILF was a way of ensuring that the “most in need”, equated with the “most 
severely impaired”, were given support; but the fund was cash limited and relied on a system 
of trustees. In a sense, it re-introduced some of the discretion which had been lost in Income 
Support and the disability premium at the price of more restrictive medical criteria. When it 
received far more applications than originally intended, it was further limited to cut costs. DLA 
was, at face value, more universal as it was not means tested or cash limited. The introduction 
of lower rates for people on the borderline of medical eligibility was welcomed. However, as 
with AA in the 1970s, rates of payment remained much lower than many disabled people’s 
actual needs. DWA was far too restrictive and poorly advertised ever to make a significant 
impact.  
Independent Living Fund(s) 
The Disability Alliance (DA) claimed that disabled people were ‘among the main losers’ after 
the introduction of Income Support. It estimated that ‘over one million people with disabilities 
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lost out’, and that they were particularly affected by ‘the loss of weekly additional 
requirements to the former Supplementary Benefit’.68 The removal of discretionary payments 
had been especially damaging. Although designed to save the government money, they had 
been a key safety net for those with exceptional or irregular need.69 According to Alf Morris, 
DIG had shown that ’20 to 30 per cent’ of disabled people were reliant upon Supplementary 
Benefit.70 ILF was therefore born in the context of major changes in the government 
departments related to social security. It also borrowed from the heritage of other 
discretionary funds such as the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Fund (for “congenitally disabled” 
children), the Thalidomide Trust, and the Macfarlane Trust Fund (for victims of contaminated 
blood transfusions). These had been administered by independent charities with significant 
funding from government and other sources. What was new was the move away from “cause” 
and “tort”. ILF was available to all disabled people who met the financial eligibility criteria. Yet 
the use of trustees and discretionary grants to eligible claimants borrowed heavily from pre-
1948 philanthropic tradition. 
The fund provided grants which were designed to help disabled people live at home, and 
exceptional payments could be given at the discretion of the trustees if this would avoid the 
claimant being institutionalised.71 It began operation in June 1988,72 and must be seen in the 
wider context of care in the community and deinstitutionalisation. The government had 
become concerned over the costs of institutional care and the ways in which it was funded. 
The Audit Commission had found that means-tested payments to claimants actually 
encouraged residential care. Money was available to cover the costs of staying in an old 
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persons’ home, for example, but not for the necessary adaptations and home helps for the 
claimant to live in her own house or flat.73 SSAC considered these issues in August 1987,74 and 
the Griffiths Report on Community Care was completed in 1988.75 Thus, it would have been 
politically unsustainable for the government to continue to pursue a care in the community 
rhetoric while providing no resources to allow individuals to make use of such a policy. 
Besides, as the Audit Commission showed, it cost significantly less to care for people in their 
own homes than in long-stay hospitals.76 To enable the fund to determine the best way to use 
the limited amount of cash available, it was administered by ten trustees. Five were appointed 
by the DSS and five by DIG. DIG initially nominated Pauline Thompson (leader of DIG), Stuart 
Lyon (a founder of DIG and prominent member), Joseph Hennessy (director of Wales Council 
for the Disabled, chair of the Disabled Drivers’ Association and governor of Motability), Jack 
McGregor (chair of DIG (Scotland)) and Gillian Micklewright (a former adult education 
teacher).77 In 1992, Thompson was vice-chairman of the Fund, and Bert Massie, the director of 
RADAR, had been appointed.78 
The Fabian approach lobby groups were therefore a key part of implementing government 
policy, even though there had been concerns about its effects. Discussions between the DHSS 
and voluntary organisations had taken place in late 1987 about an alternative fund for severely 
disabled people. Ian Bruce of the Royal National Institute for the Blind (RNIB) had apparently 
been told that the government intended to create a £5 million fund which would be 
administered by the Rowntree Trust. ‘Their idea... is for this to run for three years until the 
review of disability benefits [which was due to be published in 1988]. It would  not be “new” 
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money but “substitution money” i.e. from within the Department’s existing budget.’79 When 
the government announced that ILF would be created, it acknowledged that it was a 
temporary measure designed to see disabled people through the major social security changes 
of 1988, and would likely be replaced by a full state scheme ‘within the next three to five 
years’.80 Initially, however, the fund was seen as a sop and inadequate compared to what had 
preceded it. Margaret Beckett accused the government of setting up the fund ‘at the last 
minute’ in order to cover severely disabled people who were excluded by the new schemes.81 
Furthermore, although Supplementary Benefits was removed in April, it was not until June that 
ILF’s deeds were signed and it could begin to dispense payments.82 Despite the misgivings, it 
soon became popular as it allowed disabled people to remain in their own homes.83 
DIG’s involvement in the scheme is particularly interesting because voluntary organisations 
had been opposed to the restructuring of benefits following the Social Security Act 1986.  The 
Chairman of RADAR, the Duke of Buccleuch, wrote in the organisation’s annual report that the 
changes were:  
causing charitable organisations, of every kind, a quite 
exceptional degree of anxiety. Fears are rife that the system 
of safety nets for the less fortunate members of society, 
that have become accepted as an integral part of our social 
fabric, are being steadily dismantled, with grave doubts 
concerning the adequacy of the alternatives.
84
 
DA went further. ‘The Social Fund is different from other appalling aspects of the social 
security system’, an internal document for discussion at its policy sub-committee contended. 
This was because it was cash limited; there was no independent right of appeal;  much of the 
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budget was ‘in the form of loans repayable from already inadequate weekly benefits’ rather 
than grants; and payments were only made if ‘all other possible sources had been exhausted – 
friends, relatives, charities’.85 And: 
The Social Fund is based on an unacceptable system of 
priority needs and priority “client groups”: it is 
discriminatory and reinforces the notions of the “deserving” 
and “undeserving” poor.
86
 
Prioritising the “most needy” is, of course, nothing new. Indeed, DA and DIG had, for 
pragmatic reasons, encouraged this themselves when campaigning for disability incomes in the 
seventies. What appears to be most concerning is that prioritisation was an interim measure 
for the poverty lobby in the 1960s and 1970s, the start of a longer process towards total 
coverage. Here, prioritisation was an end in itself. As we have already seen, targeting, 
selectivity or prioritisation was an integral part of Conservative social security policy. 
DIG, then, appears to have gone against the grain by associating itself with the Department 
of Health and Social Security (DHSS) and DSS in creating this new “alternative” fund. Bruce 
offered an explanation as to why this might be so at DA’s Steering Committee meeting. Linda 
Lennard, the organiser, reported that she had ‘attended a highly confidential meeting’ with 
Bruce, Peter Large and Peter Barclay (chair of SSAC and Rowntree Trust) to discuss a proposed 
fund to help disabled people. Bruce stated that while ‘6 out of the 7 of the original group were 
against the proposal... DIG represents the most severely disabled people it was to be expected 
that they would support [it].’87 Indeed, Nicholas Scott would later commend DIG for their 
position. ‘It may be hard to recall what a courageous step that was for [DIG] at a time when 
many disability organisations wanted nothing to do with a discretionary fund but wanted a 
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statutory, regulated system continued.’88 DIG’s press release following the announcement of 
the scheme quoted Large, proclaiming ‘it is an important interim measure... DIG’s expertise 
should help ensure that the Fund successfully meets the needs’ of disabled people. However, 
DIG too stated that it would ‘continue [its] campaign for improved financial support within the 
framework of social security for all disabled people’. It stressed that ILF would have a ‘limited 
life... until long-term arrangements to enable very severely disabled people to live at home are 
made’.89 
DIG’s papers for this time are unavailable, and without them it is difficult to understand 
fully the thought processes of its senior officers. What we must ask, however, is why Bruce 
would consider DIG to represent ‘the most severely disabled’ in 1988, when their original remit 
had been to campaign for all disabled people. Reportedly, Large had been pressing for an 
additional premium in Income Support to cover the care needs of the most severely disabled 
people.90 Further, why was DIG willing to ‘put its head above the parapet’?91 A plausible 
explanation, as Sir Bert Massie commented in a personal interview, is that DIG got too close to 
the establishment. Large is mentioned personally by Nicholas Scott in the second reading of 
the Disability (Grants) Bill 1993, along with Pauline Thompson, the Chair of DIG, to whom ‘we 
owe a particular debt’.92 
In the old days, DIG were actually far more effective 
campaigners than DA. In the last sort of fifteen years [i.e. 
since circa 1995] that’s changed, DIG’s just about 
disappeared. Largely, I think they got too close to 
government, if I’m being honest with you. Became part of 
government and disappeared up.
93
 
This was not a new criticism to be launched at DIG  – the Equal Rights for Disabled Women 
Campaign, for example, had attacked Large for enabling the government to refer the 
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household duties tests to National Insurance Advisory Committee. Another factor that may 
explain why Bruce attacked DIG for its position, however, could be the long-running antipathy 
between DA and DIG stemming from the mid-1970s. In any case, it seems, from the comments 
of Scott and Frank Field, that DA was not alone in questioning DIG’s motives and actions over 
ILF. What is clear is that the government wanted cooperation from a major voluntary 
organisation to administer the fund; and in DIG they got it.94 
Despite the reservations, the fund was seen by many organisations to be something of a 
success. With the exception of reports of claimants in the South East being hassled to reduce 
their care costs so that the Fund could pay out less to claimants, DA was content in 1989 that 
‘the ILF seem[ed] to be operating in a reasonably friendly and flexible way’.95 Initial estimates 
were that successful applications would number in the hundreds. £5 million was set aside for 
the fund, which Lord Skelmersdale estimated would reach around 250 people. Although 
different figures had been quoted by different ministers and DIG, the government was ‘in 
broad agreement’ that the numbers involved would be small – ‘up to 1,000’.96 By 1993 the 
fund received £100 million a year and had helped 21,000 people.97 The fund was costing more, 
had reached more people and had run longer than the government had originally intended. In 
an attempt to rationalise it and bring it under statutory control, the Disability (Grants) Act 
1993 wound up the ILF and replaced it with two new funds. One, the Independent Living 
(Extension) Fund continued to service those who were already claiming from the original ILF. 
The other, the Independent Living (1993) Fund, had new, more restrictive entry criteria in 
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order to reduce the burden of a clearly-expanding fund to which the government had 
committed itself.98 
The 1993 fund was only open to those who already received £200 per week from their 
Local Authority (LA). The fund would top this amount up to £500 by providing an additional 
£300. This represented an increase in provision of £50 for most of the country; however, the 
old ILF had different payments based on regional costs of living. People in the South East were 
entitled to £520, and those in London £550. The proposals would leave those in London worse 
off but would save central government (or, at least, the funds that central government 
provided money for) £250 per week per claimant.99 Barry Sheerman expressed the 
Opposition’s reservations. 
The £500 limit does not make sense economically as, in 
many areas, residential care is more expensive than that—
as [Alf Morris] pointed out the other evening. The Greater 
London Association for the Disabled [GLAD] did some 
research on residential care costs and came up with a 
sample of figures—£510, £605, £800 and £925 a week. 
Similarly, [BCODP] found that residential charges at the 
Royal Hospital Putney, not far from the Minister's 
constituency, varied between £605 and £807 a week—
again, significantly higher than the £500 ceiling. As a means 
of saving public money, that ceiling is frankly bizarre and, in 
our view, will lead to more money being spent rather than 
less.
100
 
When the new ILF came into effect, DA was very concerned about the way it was to be 
administered. Payments could only be made to those expected to need care for 6 months or 
more. This could exclude terminally ill people. Further, the £200 LA contribution threshold put 
individuals at the mercy of LA spending cuts or changes in priorities. This was made more 
important because of the method of calculation for the costs of care. Standardised rates were 
applied across the country, meaning that regardless of the actual cost of care, the government 
would only allow contributions up to the standard rate to be counted in the calculations of 
how much support an individual received. The same was not true the other way – i.e., a LA 
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paying under the standardised rate would not have their contribution “topped up” by the 
Fund.101 
ILF was in many ways a victim of its own success. However, it was not part of any 
comprehensive income for disabled people. For DA it showed that ‘the Government shrugged 
off the agreement to reform the structure of disability benefits’ and was a concession 
‘grudgingly allowed... as  fall-back for a very few individuals with severe disabilities’.102 When 
even that fall-back cost the government too much money, the fund became even more 
restrictive. Partly this was done by targeting. Support was aimed at the “deserving” poor, with 
the definition of “desert” becoming increasingly narrow, based on medical and income criteria. 
In this case, the return of discretion was also used to help target funds to even more specific 
areas. Responsibility for decision making could be handed down to a group of “trustees”, 
allowing the government to finance the scheme, yet claim that adverse decisions were not of 
their making.103 The other area of restriction came from cash limiting support. By setting a 
hard cap on how much could be spent in any given year, ILF borrowed from other neo-liberal 
attempts to limit expenditure such as the Social Fund which provided loans rather than 
discretionary grants to claimants of means-tested benefits.104 Unlike the Social Fund, claimants 
to ILF did not have to pay the money back, but the principle of limiting expenditure, regardless 
of the real needs of the population, was maintained. In effect, ILF was state charity, a curious 
mix of Victorian-era philanthropy (with discretion and limited funds) and post-war concepts of 
welfare (which provided payments to groups considered “in need”). 
ILF shows that disability remained an important part of government policy. Liberal 
concepts of providing for disabled people remained. However, cost reduction had become a 
priority. When the creation of Income Support was seen to adversely affect severely disabled 
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people, the government created a ‘fall-back’ scheme, but ensured it was cash limited and 
created an administrative framework to limit the number of grants by discretion to the “most 
in need”. It shows that the government’s concept of disability meant that it had an obligation 
to provide for “the sick” – or those who through no fault of their own could not provide their 
own income – but that disabled people in general were not entitled to support if their needs 
were less acute. Splitting the two would become crucial in justifying the introduction of ICB in 
the mid-nineties. 
Disability Working Allowance and Disability Living Allowance 
Not all reforms were aimed at “the sick”. From 1990 onwards, benefits were restructured to 
emphasise the difference between “the sick” and “the disabled”. Following on from The Way 
Ahead’s recommendations, new benefits were created to provide support to disabled workers 
and provide extra-costs benefits to disabled people regardless of their employment status.105 
However, the resources provided for these schemes were well below what most voluntary 
organisations would deem adequate. It was more important to restrict expenditure than to 
reduce benefit dependency or better aid participation in society. 
DLA was effectively an attempt to rationalise the existing extra-costs benefits AA and MA. 
It created new lower rates of the ‘mobility component’ (the old MA) and the ‘care component’ 
(AA), nominally to provide some support to those who were on the borderline of medical 
eligibility. DWA was more radical. By providing a benefit to those disabled people in work but 
at a disadvantage in the labour market, it challenged the orthodoxy of the “incapacity” system 
of benefits. However, disability organisations had serious reservations about both. DLA was 
considered to be simply a repackaged benefit and far from the comprehensive review that the 
DSS had promised; and DWA was never given the resources or flexibility to be valuable to or 
claimed by enough disabled people to make a noticeable difference to disability employment 
rates. Yet at the same time, they acknowledged key recommendations from research bodies 
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(such as the Social Security Advisory Council’s (SSAC) Disablement Working Group (DWG)) and 
voluntary organisations. 
DLA created a single benefit with a single application procedure. This had been 
recommended by DWG in its 1988 report, although it was provisionally called an Integrated 
Disablement Allowance.106 The care component was split into three rates, whereas previously 
there had only been two; and the mobility component was split into two where previously 
there had only been one. The weekly amount of the higher rate of the care component was 
the same as the higher rate of AA. The care component middle rate was the same as the AA 
lower rate, so that the care component lower rate became a new band, payable at less than 
half the middle rate. MA was discontinued when DLA came online, but the higher rate of the 
mobility component was paid at a similar rate to the old benefit.107 These new lower rates 
were in response to the 1988 OPCS survey which identified a problem with the old 
qualification criteria. Although these worked well in targeting the benefit at the intended 
groups, the ‘cliff edge’, as Tony Newton, the Secretary of State, described it in the Commons, 
meant that those who did not quite meet the standards for the lower rate of AA or for MA got 
nothing. The new rates offered some gradation for claimants.108 This is significant given the 
increased numbers of claimants (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) and expenditure (4.2 and 4.4) on these 
extra costs benefits. Unrelated to employment status, the argument could be made for these 
types of benefits as encouraging independence and, by association, employment. Yet any form 
of extension, no matter how minor, causes us to question whether the Major years really were 
all about retrenchment. 
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DWA was introduced as a credit for disabled people capable of limited low-paid work, as 
had also been recommended by DWG.109 It was intended to encourage those who might be 
capable of limited work (in terms of work hours, hourly pay or both) to enter the labour 
market. This was significant in that it explicitly broke the idea that earnings-replacement 
benefits should only be provided to “the unemployable”. The claimant had to satisfy the 
condition that ‘he has a disability or an illness that puts him at a disadvantage’.110 This would 
initially be assessed by whether a claimant had already received IVB or one of the extra costs 
benefits. Subsequent claims would be made via a self-assessment form.111 Although it was a 
long way from the partial incapacity plans of the voluntary organisations and civil servants of 
previous years, it was at least a benefit that could be paid to those who were disabled and 
were able to find employment. One of its main features as outlined in the second reading of 
the Bill was that it allowed claimants of IVB to ‘try out the world of work, or re-try it, even for 
as little as 16 hours a week, reasonably secure in the knowledge that they will not have to 
suffer a drop in income through having to re-qualify for their old benefit if the attempt does 
not work out’. Previously, IVB claimants had to wait 28 weeks to re-qualify for the benefit if 
they worked for more than eight weeks. The proposal was to change this eight weeks to two 
years.112 
Tony Newton declared that the Bill: 
breaks new ground in shifting the benefit system away from 
focusing exclusively on incapacity—on what disabled people 
cannot do—towards doing more to encourage people with 
disabilities to make the best of the capacity that they 
have—the things that they can and wish to do. In assessing 
entitlement, it seeks to give to disabled people a greater 
role, rather than relying almost exclusively on the 
assessments of professionals.
113
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The Opposition was, however, unconvinced. Michael Meacher, Labour’s spokesman on 
social security replied: 
I am sorry to disappoint the Secretary of State, but I must 
tell him that when I had finished studying the Bill I recalled 
what was said of Napoleon III—that the most impressive 
thing about him was his name. The same could be said of 
the Bill. It seems that the less a measure contains, the more 
grandiloquent is its title. 
The first part of the Bill is largely concerned with the 
amalgamation of two existing benefits. The second part is 
so significant as to involve no net extra expenditure, 
however much it may improve the ability of disabled people 
to get back into the labour market, which was the gloss that 
the Secretary of State put upon it. Having waited 10 years 
for the Bill—five years while the Government attended to 
the economy and another five while they procrastinated 
with half a dozen [OPCS] studies—disabled people expected 
a great deal more from it. They will be bitterly disappointed 
that it is so thin and misleading.
114
 
The ‘10 years’ comment may relate to the publication of CORAD in 1981, although that 
report was concerned with ADL rather than social security. It could simply be a rhetorical 
reference to the length of time the Conservative Party had been in power. In any case, it had 
indeed been ‘another five’ since the review of social security benefits for disabled people was 
started by the then-DHSS.115 Regardless, the main charge, that this was nothing new, was 
considered ‘a stroke of evil marketing genius’.116 DA was also unimpressed. It felt the Bill would 
lead to ‘new words, new meanings, new case-law, new confusions’. In failing to offer anything 
radically new, this was a change that simply confused rather than improving the situation.117  
We remain angry that the promised comprehensive review 
of benefits never transpired. After all those years people 
with disabilities are instead offered this silly tinkering 
around and renaming of two current benefits [...] and a 
harshly means-tested disincentive to move off incapacity 
benefits into very low paid work.
118
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It was also an administrative failure. Severe delays meant that claimants were denied 
access to DLA, which in turn affected their eligibility for other benefits, such as access to help 
from LAs and the ILF. The House of Commons Social Security Committee described the whole 
process as ‘a nightmare’. The government, in response noted that it had: 
apologised for the fact that service to some claimants to 
DLA fell short of what Benefit Agency customers might 
reasonably expect. In recognition of this, on 4 May 1993, 
the Secretary of State [...] announced special compensation 
arrangements for those customers who claimed [DLA, AA or 
MA] on or after 3 February 1992 (the date from which 
claims for DLA were accepted) and were paid before 1 April 
1993, who suffered unacceptable delays in the processing 
of their claims.
119
 
In 1993, the Disability Living Allowance and Disability Working Allowance Act broke the 
divide between “in work” and “out of work” for “civilian” disabled people. It was possible now 
to be considered disabled, and therefore receive state benefits, and to earn money. It is true 
that there had not always been a rigid distinction between the two; family allowances, 
Supplementary Benefit and so on were paid to low earners through the ‘therapeutic earnings 
limit’. Yet this was a significant step by the Conservative government to acknowledge that 
disabled people were capable of work providing they had the right support. Again, this was a 
neo-liberal attempt to separate “the sick” from “the disabled”, and provide incentives for the 
latter to participate in the labour market. At first glance this is quite a social way of conceiving 
of disability. It acknowledges the discriminatory nature of free-market labour and provides 
resources to try and combat the disadvantage this causes impaired individuals. When 
combined with DLA, which aimed to streamline various benefit schemes such as MA and AA 
into one, easier-to-administer payment, there was a range of benefits based on needs rather 
than impairments (although, of course, one still needed a medical certificate to show that one 
was impaired and therefore had needs). What remains questionable is whether this was 
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anything new. DWA was means tested and did not significantly bolster the earnings of disabled 
people. It did not directly help people gain work since it offered no “rehabilitation” or work 
training, although it could in theory help people to maintain employment through improving a 
disabled person’s take-home pay. In some ways, then, it was little more than an extension to 
the therapeutic earnings limit. Take up was strikingly poor – according to the House of 
Commons Social Security Committee (using the government’s own statistics), only 2,500 
people were in receipt of DWA a year after it was introduced. As the National Association of 
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux (NACAB) pointed out – ‘based on the evidence to date, it must be 
concluded that [DWA] has failed dismally to reach the groups who need it most’.120 
Rationalisation was more important to the government than genuine expansion or reform. 
DLA, DWA and ILF represented an approach to disability in which the government 
acknowledged a moral (or electoral) obligation to those considered incapable of participating 
in society without significant help, but was unwilling to direct too many resources to pay for it. 
Benefits were therefore targeted at the poorest through means testing rather than necessarily 
those most disadvantaged. The sticks – withdrawal of benefit – were always better supported 
than the carrots – schemes to encourage disabled people to work. As I will now demonstrate 
with ICB, it also began to formalise the distinction between “the sick” – incapable of work and 
“deserving” – and “the disabled” – capable of work, and under moral obligation to rehabilitate 
themselves.  
Government action – “Incapacity for Work” 
Incapacity Benefit (ICB) was the final benefit to be created during this period and also the most 
significant. In April 1995 it replaced Invalidity Benefit (IVB) and Sickness Benefit with a new 
contributory scheme. New tests were created to measure “objectively” whether a claimant 
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was capable of work. Instead of using doctor’s reports or “sick notes”, it fundamentally 
restructured the medical relationship between claimant and state by focusing on an 
individual’s “functional limitations” as defined by DSS-approved health care professionals 
rather than family physicians. As the largest item on the social security budget after retirement 
pensions, the Conservative government could no longer allow IVB to go unreformed if it was to 
continue its political commitment to lower spending and lower taxes. As Figures 4.1 and 4.2 
show, both the number of people claiming and the cost of the benefit had grown substantially 
over the 1980s, despite various attempts to reduce the rate of benefit, tighten eligibility 
criteria and privatisation of Sickness Benefit. The solution was to continue the process of 
splitting “the sick” from “the disabled”.121 Medical certification was a good place for the 
government to target as these have historically been the ‘central issue of controlling the sick 
role’.122 In this new system, social-model criticisms of medicine had been taken on board – no 
longer was it acceptable to label someone “incapable” of work or participation in society based 
solely on a medical diagnosis.123 However, the entire process of reform was fundamentally 
flawed because a system built on the inherent subjectivity in concepts such as “capacity for 
work” or “the workplace” could not adequately tackle the deeper reasons for the rise in IVB 
claims and economic inactivity in general. The right to work that disabled people had been 
campaigning for was turned into an expectation of work through limiting benefit eligibility to 
only those deemed “incapable”. At the same time, it showed that the liberal approach survived 
in that the “deserving” poor would continue to receive support, even while the neo-liberal 
government attempted to cut costs in the social security budget. 
ICB was not the first attempt to reform sickness-related benefits. During the eighties, the 
introduction of Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) had effectively transferred financial and administrative 
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responsibility for short periods of illness to employers rather than the government. Sickness 
Benefit had remained for the few people who had built up insurance contributions and were 
unemployed, but who had not been incapacitated for long enough to claim IVB. The theory 
was that if employers were responsible for the benefit, they would be more vigilant about 
absenteeism, knowing that they were directly footing the bill.124 Short-term coverage for 
sickness was still available for those without adequate contributions through Income Support. 
Voluntary organisations and trade unions opposed the scheme, seeing it as ‘bowing to the 
employers’ and a step down the road to ‘privatisation’ of the social security system.125 ICB 
finally removed the rump of Sickness Benefit, merging it with IVB.126 
Reform of IVB had begun in 1993 with the introduction of new medical controls.127 Peter 
Lilley, the Secretary of State, announced these changes after the debate on the budget in 
November 1992: 
It is [...] necessary to look carefully at how well benefit 
spending is focused on those whom Parliament intended to 
help. There has been a significant increase in the numbers 
on [IVB] and in spending on it. There are now more than 
twice as many people drawing this benefit as in 1979, at a 
cost nearly two and a half times as great. By 1996 invalidity 
benefit will cost well over £7 billion a year. Against that 
background, I intend to tighten up the administrative and 
medical procedures for controlling this benefit. That will 
ensure that medical examinations are better targeted and 
that more effective action will be taken when people fail to 
attend for their examination or are found to be capable of 
work. Those changes are expected to reduce spending by 
£240 million over the survey period. A major research study 
into invalidity benefit was launched last year. Some results 
have been received, and others will be received during 
1993. I shall consider those results carefully as they become 
available.’
128
 
Examining Medical Practitioners were asked to declare whether a claimant was ‘medically 
incapable of work’ or ‘medically incapable of suitable work’. In the past they would have 
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simply been asked whether the claimant was ‘incapable’ or ‘fit within limits’. This was designed 
to take all non-medical factors out of consideration for medical personnel.129 Costs had 
spiralled due to the uptake of IVB; this was a way of restricting access. It followed a National 
Audit Office report in late 1989 which had concluded that ‘non-medical factors have 
contributed to this growth rather than any underlying increase in the incidence of sickness’, 
that GPs had not received sufficient guidance to be able to make accurate and reliable 
decisions on eligibility for IVB and that the Regional Medical Service was inadequate for 
dealing with the large amount of claims it was expected to process. While believing that the 
DSS had created ‘a potentially effective control system... in a difficult and complex area’, it 
recommended that extra training and monitoring arrangements were necessary in order to 
save, potentially, ‘£11 million a year’ simply by reducing successful IVB claims by 1%.130 
SSP and new medical controls had not worked as well as had been hoped. Alternatives 
were therefore considered. On 10 June 1993, a letter from Lilley to John Major was leaked to 
the press.131 Outlining Lilley and Portillo’s debates about how best to trim the social security 
budget, it contained a set of proposals for reducing the burden of IVB on the Treasury: 
I propose a three-pronged course of action which would 
focus the benefit more closely on the long-term sick, make 
it less generous and make it taxable. This would result in 
significant expenditure reductions of about £180 million in 
1995/96, £495 million by 1996/97 and £1.3 billion by the 
turn of the century. The changes are bound to be 
controversial but IVB is one of the few areas of social 
security expenditure where, realistically, savings could be 
made over the [Public Expenditure Survey] period.
132
 
This lead to a flurry of activity attempting to explain why the numbers of IVB claimants had 
grown and why the government’s assumptions were incorrect. For example, the claim that 
costs were much higher than 1979 due to ‘the generosity of benefit and the ease with which 
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people are able to get on to it’ was challenged by DA.133 First, the level of benefit was little 
different in 1993/94 to 1979/80. Figure 4.5 shows that the real weekly rate of IVB had only 
increased from £67.42 to £67.91 at 2000/2001 prices. Second, the reason for the increase in 
benefit uptake was not due to more people exploiting the system134 – or, at least, this is not 
what the data used by DA suggested. It quoted a working paper called Invalidity Benefit: 
Where will the savings come from which was also published in June 1993. According to its 
figures, the increased number of claimants broke down as follows: 
 29% came  from people over pension age who took IVB over the regular state 
pension for tax reasons (IVB was untaxed and was claimable for up to five years 
after retirement age – i.e. 70 for men and 65 for women).  
 16% from women in the labour market – this meant more women had their own 
NI records and could claim IVB if they became disabled. 
 13% came from other ‘demographic changes’ – that is to say, there were 
proportionately more disabled people and older people in the country. 
 42% from ‘an absolute growth in the rate of claiming IVB among a stable 
population of disabled people’. 
The report went on to conclude that ‘either an increasing proportion of unemployed 
people are being judged “incapable of work” or an increasing proportion of disabled people 
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are being excluded from employment’.135 DA also argued that the problem was that more 
disabled people were becoming unemployed and therefore becoming eligible for IVB.136 
There has been a lot of press speculation about claimants 
“swinging the lead”; doctors’ over-eagerness to issue sick 
notes and the employment service “instructing” people to 
go on to sickness benefit or IVB in order to keep the 
unemployment figures artificially low. On the other hand, 
welfare rights agencies continue to report a range of 
problems encountered by sick and disabled people in 
getting onto the benefit or staying on it – with indications 
that claimants have been increasingly targeted since 
February [1993].
137
 
Figure 5.1 shows that IVB claims had indeed increased during the 1980s, while claims to 
unemployment benefits fell. This would lend weight to the hypothesis that IVB had masked 
economic inactivity. Although the nineties’ recession saw fewer UB and social assistance claims 
from unemployed people than in the early eighties, the total number of incapacity and 
unemployment benefits was significantly higher. Across the period, peaks and troughs in the 
total number of claimants appear to be dictated by unemployment claims rather than 
disability, but the growing number of IVB claims had made those peaks more pronounced. This 
had an obvious knock-on effect with expenditure (Figure 5.2) and became most dramatic after 
1990, despite the solid reduction in total unemployment expenditure over the late 1980s. 
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There was another oft-quoted reason for the rise in expenditure on IVB. The argument is 
that the Conservative government deliberately moved unemployed people onto disability-
related benefits to massage the unemployment figures. It is notable, for instance, that the 
greatest rise in IVB and ICB claimants from the 1980s onwards occurred in geographical 
centres which had seen high unemployment as traditional industries closed down.138 The claim 
has been repeated in the literature on 1980s welfare policy, though with little direct 
evidence.139 I have yet to find the “smoking gun”, though as Freedom of Information and the 
passage of time reveal more documents in the National Archive, perhaps it exists to be 
discovered. I remain unconvinced that this was an active, conscious decision on the part of the 
Government. Personal conversations would suggest that a variety of factors were at play. One 
hypothesis is that Job Centres were handed targets for the numbers they could add to the 
unemployment rolls; this necessarily encouraged middle-management and their staff to find 
ways of supporting their “customers” without affecting their own performance indicators. This 
would be in line with the general “target setting” culture already blossoming in the health side 
of the DHSS.140 Since this behaviour suited the Government’s purposes it was not challenged. 
But this does not necessarily mean it was a centrally instigated policy. The government was 
regularly accused of manipulating unemployment statistics – so it is not difficult to understand 
how this hypothesis came about and why it has endured.141 
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With all these conspiracy theories there is little of substance to go on.142 It is worth 
mentioning, however, because it clearly became ingrained in the mythology of social security. 
It was quoted in the House of Commons by the Opposition and was not refuted by the 
Government. 
Mrs. Thatcher thought that one could not win an election if 
unemployment totals were rising. One did not have to get it 
down to full employment to win; one had to get the total 
falling. Therefore, her Employment Minister, Lord Young 
[...] instructed his officials to persuade those people who 
were drawing unemployment benefit, or who were 
registered as unemployed and drawing the then means-
tested support, wherever possible, to move over to [IVB]. 
In our surgeries, those of us who were [MPs] at the time 
were puzzled at first why the Government appeared to be 
suggesting that people should make themselves better off 
by moving from a lower-paid benefit to a higher-paid 
benefit. Of course, it did not take us long to rumble what 
the reason was. It was part of the massaging of the 
unemployment figures. It was important in the run-up to 
the next general election to see the total fall.
143
 
Even if this was not a conscious decision, people were “reclassified”, moving not from 
“employed” to “unemployed”, but from “employed” to “incapacitated”. Because 
unemployment was usually quoted as the number of people claiming unemployment benefits, 
manipulation of those figures would help present a more favourable view of the government’s 
record on joblessness.144 While IVB might have been used to create ‘hidden unemployment’, 
not enough attention was paid to the phenomenon of ‘hidden sickness’. That is to say, many 
people met the medical criteria for IVB, but had not claimed the benefit because they had a 
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job. Once they had been made redundant, they could (and did) claim IVB rather than the 
lower-rate UB.145 DA replied to a National Audit Office 1989 report on IVB about the rise in 
claimant numbers:  
Since 1982 a large number of changes have been made to 
the administrative count of unemployment. Government 
Ministers have said repeatedly that one of the problems 
about earlier registration was that the numbers of 
unemployed included too many who were unemployable in 
the sense that they were incapable of employment. Any 
scientific enquiry into the reasons for the growth in 
numbers of beneficiaries must therefore include some 
attempt to estimate the likely numbers “switched” from 
one form of administration to another. [...] Disability 
organisations have long argued that Government failure to 
maintain proper registers of the disabled [...] caused many 
disabled people not to identify any of their needs and to 
conceal them, wherever they could, when applying for 
employment. During the 1980s the high levels of 
unemployment have made it much more difficult for people 
with disabilities to obtain employment. In short, there is the 
possibility that there were significant numbers of disabled 
people in employment in earlier years who have satisfied 
medical criteria of incapacity for work. Now being 
unemployed they satisfy the criteria to receive invalidity 
benefit.
146
 
Whatever the “real” reasons for the rising costs, the government made the following 
proposals to follow the leaked document’s ‘three-pronged course of action’. First, it would 
focus the benefit more on the long-term sick than the “mid-term” sick by making the qualifying 
period 52 weeks rather than the 28 weeks for IVB at that time. Second, it would make the 
benefit less ‘generous’. Third, it would be made taxable. As part of the first option, a new 
medical test would be implemented which would only explore medical factors and, the DSS 
estimated, take 20% (or around 60,000 people per year) off the benefit.147 This was significant, 
as IVB and Sickness Benefits had hitherto taken into account the individual’s skills and the 
relevant jobs available in the local area. Now, the government would simply test whether the 
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claimant was capable of any work, regardless of whether or not a local job vacancy actually 
existed. By the time the proposals were ready for the second reading of the Social Security 
(Incapacity for Work) Bill 1994, Lilley claimed that 95,000 would be taken off the benefit in 
year one and 190,000 in year two.148 DA strongly disputed the validity of this approach. 
What the proposed new test fails to take into account is the 
complex nature of disability and the crucial role of non-
medical factors. Functional impairment is not the same as 
incapacity for work. Clearly there is a link in that 
impairment affects employment but it is by no means 
straightforward. We would argue against such an artificial 
test as it cannot fully reflect the difficulties faced by 
disabled people in the labour market – less skills, less 
qualifications, discrimination, lack of physical access to 
workplaces or transport etc. We do not believe it is possible 
to isolate medical factors in this way nor to devise a crystal 
clear medical test above which an individual is incapable of 
work and below which they are capable.
149
 
The DBC, which contained representatives from the major voluntary organisations 
including DA, RADAR, DIG and BCODP, met in September to discuss the existing and proposed 
changes to IVB. They felt that campaigning should focus on combating the government’s 
claims that malingering was a huge factor and that the current system made it difficult to tell 
who was “really” disabled. At a DA policy meeting in September, the Alliance agreed that: 
If the Government goes ahead with the proposals outlined 
in the document leaked in June we will need to argue 
strongly for: 
* a broad incapacity test which is not a functional/medical 
one but takes into account other factors (as at present) 
* transitional arrangements to ensure that people who no 
longer pass the test do not face a sudden drop in income. 
* the importance of employment related help, training etc 
to enable people to get back into the job market.’
150
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The Government sought the advice of voluntary organisations for developing the new 
medical test. A panel of 80 representatives was constituted to comment on and give input into 
the process. The panel used ‘a definition based on the point at which someone is no longer 
expected to work rather than the point at which it is impossible for them to work’.151 As with 
SDA using the 80% disablement criterion, however, this was an arbitrary line drawn in the 
sand. One GP quoted in the DBC report on IVB in 1993 warned that ‘there is virtually no 
disability which totally prohibits all work. Any line drawn would be arbitrary and unfair to 
some.’ Dafydd Wigley took this further by showing how a medical test based on an absolute 
definition of capacity could lead to absurd results. 
Disabled people have been told that, if they are fit to sit as 
artists' models, they are fit to work. Are we really going 
down that ludicrous road? It may be technically true that a 
person who is acting as an artist's model should be paid. If 
that is the definition, and if people are to be refused benefit 
on such a basis, as is already beginning to happen under the 
existing system—the danger is that the regulations will be 
even tighter under the new system, since the whole 
objective is to cut back—the Government must be taken to 
task. 
It is totally demeaning for disabled people to be addressed 
in this way. In addition, there simply are not enough jobs as 
artists' models. It may be that a person could sit in a chair 
for a couple of hours, but if no job is available he should not 
lose benefit on that ground.
152
 
The test and the reasoning behind it explicitly linked disability to employability. It did not 
account for the effect of a person’s health condition on their ability to find or hold down a job; 
rather it looked for the absolute level at which a person would be biologically capable or 
incapable for some kind of work. This might stem from a misunderstanding about the nature 
of disability. As was explained in government documents in the 1970s, the percentage of 
disablement approach in the War Pensions and IIB was not based on unemployability but on 
the effects of impairment on the individual. A person with a very high score may, in fact, be 
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employable if the right job were available. Donald Dewar, the shadow social security secretary, 
explained: 
I am sure that the Secretary of State will accept that there is 
no necessary correlation between disability and ability to 
work. There are many examples—we all have them in our 
personal circle of acquaintances—of people who would 
score a high total in the test, but who are able fortunately 
to hold down demanding and responsible jobs. There are 
real concerns that the cut-off will be too arbitrary and hard-
nosed, and that many who need help will be left outside.
153
 
Dr Liam Fox (Conservative) responded during the debate at second reading that he found it 
‘rather difficult to accept that, as the Opposition would have it, the figures show that the 
population are becoming less healthy’.154 But this is not necessarily what opponents of the test 
were saying. Higher unemployment had hit disabled people disproportionately harder than the 
general population.155 Michael Stephen posed a more interesting argument from the point of 
view of the right of the Conservative Party. 
Opposition Members have sought to explain the increase by 
suggesting that it is something to do with the fact that it is 
difficult to find work at present or that the people are really 
retired. Yet those who are fit for work and cannot find it 
should be on unemployment benefit. Those who are retired 
should receive their pension. Neither of those two 
categories of person should receive a benefit intended for a 
person who suffers from invalidity, if they do not have an 
invalidity.
156
 
This cuts to the heart of the matter. The dominant rhetoric about disability had confused 
the sick role (or “unemployability”) with new social definitions of disability as discrimination 
against people with impairments. For Stephen, IVB or ICB should only be for those incapable of 
work – and by the same token, only those incapable of work are “really” disabled. Any other 
person should be considered capable of work and therefore should draw UB and be forced to 
find employment. This is, of course, the medical model embodied in social security policy. 
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Rather than proposing a benefit for disabled job seekers, the binary distinction between ‘fit’ 
and ‘unfit’ was held up as the guiding principle. Yet at the same time, it chimes with the 
rhetoric of individual rights pushed by the contemporaneous Civil Rights campaign. If disabled 
people want inclusion, then surely they can and should be treated like any other unemployed 
people if they cannot find work? Extra costs benefits would then provide additions to this base 
income. These problematic arguments gave the Conservative government the ammunition to 
attack disability benefits, whilst still professing that they did not wish to punish the “genuinely” 
in need. 
Ostensibly, the new functional limitations approach was objective and relied on 
assessment of the individual by skilled professionals rather than subjective ideas about “the 
patient” from the claimant’s own doctor. Yet as has been made clear, there is no objective 
truth to the category of incapacity – it was a social construct as much as disability. The new 
tests relied upon generalised assumptions about which impairments affected employability 
 
Table 5.3:  Example descriptor on the “All Work Test” – ‘Walking on level ground with a 
walking stick or other aid if normally used. 
 Descriptor Points 
a Cannot walk at all 15 
b Cannot walk more than a few steps without stopping or severe 
discomfort 
15 
c Cannot walk more than 50 meters without stopping or severe 
discomfort 
15 
d Cannot walk more than 200 meters without stopping or severe 
discomfort 
7 
e Cannot walk more than 400 meters without stopping or severe 
discomfort 
3 
f Cannot walk more than 800 meters without stopping or severe 
discomfort 
0 
g No walking problem 0 
Source: TNA: JB 2/30, DSS leaflet, IB214, The New All Work Test, April 1995. 
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 based on the “typical” workplace. The confusing mix of objectivity and subjectivity manifests 
itself in the descriptors in the All Work Test (AWT). Table 5.3 shows the first question on the 
test, investigating the claimant’s ability to walk. Using distance as the main measure, it 
determines how far a claimant can walk on their own without severe discomfort. In many ways 
this is useful. It breaks down the idea that a disabled person is disabled because of their 
diagnosis and focuses simply on the limits imposed by a person’s impairments on a task 
generally associated with most jobs. Severe respiratory complaints will add to the claimant’s 
“score” as much as severe leg injuries. Other ‘descriptors’ are less well defined: 
 
Often sits for hours doing nothing  2 [points] 
Agitation, confusion or forgetfulness has resulted in 
mishaps or accidents in the 3 months before the test is 
applied  
1  
Concentration can only be sustained by prompting  1  
Does not care about his appearance or living conditions  1  
Frequently feels that there are so many things to do that 
he gives up because of fatigue, apathy or disinterest  
1  
Prefers to be left alone for six hours or more each day  1
157
  
 
These mental health descriptors are difficult to measure objectively. One medical 
professional’s judgement could vary wildly from one patient to the next. Further, the 
assumption that a person’s capacity for work could be judged by a single examination was 
inherently flawed. Chronic conditions are often framed as “episodic”.158 Fluctuations in these 
conditions are very hard to spot with medical testing, and are usually those which cause 
problems in the social security system. In a letter to Viscount Astor, Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State for Social Security, representatives of voluntary organisations wrote: 
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In particular we are concerned about the arbitrariness of 
the scoring according to mechanical functions without 
reference to other factors such as age or employment 
history. The concentration on functions to the exclusion of 
all else is contrary to the whole person approach which so 
many of us advocate. 
We know the Department hopes to ensure that the test is 
not a snapshot of a condition frozen in time, but we fear the 
worst. And we have made these views known. 
The letter was signed by Marilyn Howard at DA who had also previously worked for 
RADAR. She then signed on behalf of Pauline Thompson (ex-co-chair of the original ILF and 
chairman of DIG), Bert Massie (chair of RADAR and ex-trustee of the original ILF), Brian 
McGinnis (MENCAP, and civil servant in the DHSS in the 1970s), Andy Barrick (RNIB), Stuart 
Etherington (Royal National Institute for the Deaf), Howard John (Welsh Council for the 
Disabled), Frances Hasler (GLAD), Alison Cobb (MIND) and Richard Wood (chair of BCODP). The 
letter was copied to peers ‘who may have an interest in this subject’.159 Other questions can 
also be posed. For instance, when measuring disability for the 1988 OPCS survey, Fred Reid 
argued that time was an important factor. A disabled person may well be capable of 
performing a certain task, but if it takes many minutes or hours longer than the “average” 
unimpaired person, is that person really “capable”?160 
To conclude, we must take all of these factors together to understand that the government 
was attempting to derive objective results from the subjective concept of sickness. By focusing 
on those who could not work, the tests explicitly split “the sick” from “the disabled” to both 
reduce expenditure and encourage those capable of work to do so. As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 
show, claims to and expenditure on ICB did indeed fall over the following years. Yet it was also 
the case that general unemployment rates fell, casting doubt on whether the new tests 
“really” weeded out malingerers or coerced disabled people into work. What is clear is that the 
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tests did not solve the problem of “hidden sickness”. Just taking the example of the House of 
Commons, we can observe David Blunkett, the future Home Secretary, was a blind Labour MP 
at this time, while Terrence Dicks was a Conservative MP diagnosed with cerebral palsy. The 
tests relied on a list of capabilities drawn up for the average person in the average workplace, 
rather than making individual assessments according to the claimant’s work history, skills and 
the availability of work in their local area. As Noel Whiteside has argued, ‘categories such as... 
the disabled... tend to expand and contract in accordance with varying levels of market 
activity’.161 This was a test of ‘the point at which someone is no longer expected to work, rather 
than the point at which it is impossible’.162 By redrafting the medical border of this 
expectation, the Conservative government sought to continue providing support to “the sick” 
– a group to which British governments had made a moral and political commitment – whilst 
forcing disabled people to participate fully in society. The right to work became an 
expectation. 
Conclusions 
The increasing returns of the previous twenty years had left Britain with a piecemeal and 
increasingly expensive social security system for disabled people. While in previous years this 
could be largely ignored, by the 1990s the financial costs of these benefits outweighed any 
political gains to be made by leaving disability and disabled people alone. Disabled people’s 
attempts to manipulate the ‘politics’ and ‘problem’ streams in other areas of policy, combined 
with neo-liberal attitudes towards social security and employment, gave the Conservative 
government the tools to reform disability benefits to protect “the sick” whilst encouraging self-
reliance for “the disabled”. 
                                                          
161
 Noel Whiteside, "Counting the cost: sickness and disability among working people in an era of 
industrial recession, 1920-39," Economic History Review 40, no. 2 (1987): p. 245. 
162
 PTC: 77.17, Minutes of the meeting on Incapacity Benefit held at MENCAP, 28 January 1994. This had, 
in reality, been the basis for earnings-replacement benefits historically anyway. See Köhler, Zacher, and 
Partington, The Evolution of social insurance, pp. 206-07. 
  277 
While the disability lobby focused its efforts on securing wider legislative reform against 
disability discrimination, the Conservative governments between 1988 and 1995 reshaped 
disability benefits. Though cutting the social security budget may seem antipathetic to the 
spirit of the Civil Rights Bills, the claim that disabled people should not be segregated from 
society had been accepted. Accelerated deinstitutionalisation was accompanied by new 
benefit schemes such as DLA and the ILF to provide support for disabled people to live in their 
own homes. Yet support for the “most disabled” came at the price of support for those on the 
border between “capacity” and “incapacity”. By splitting “the sick” from “the disabled”, ICB 
and other schemes ensured that those disabled people capable of some sort of work were 
treated just as any other unemployed person. This allowed neo-liberal government to continue 
their moral, liberal commitment towards the deserving poor, whilst simultaneously reducing 
expenditure on disability-related benefits. The government could not do away with disability 
benefits entirely as voluntary organisations had successfully established disability as an area 
where the state had financial and moral obligations. Although the government was more 
willing to act in this period than in the early-eighties, increasing returns and bureaucratic 
momentum still constrained their options in a parliamentary democracy. As with the Disability 
Discrimination Act, the government could not be seen to be cruel to disabled people, and had 
to make provisions for them. The cost-neutral reforms from 1988 onwards163 could be sold to 
the public, reduce long-term expenditure and were acceptable to both the liberal and neo-
liberal approaches in conflict within the government. The final chapter, the conclusion, draws 
together these themes to highlight the trends in  disability policy over the thirty years since the 
formation of DIG.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
This thesis has used hitherto under-utilised sources from voluntary organisations alongside 
government documents and policy debates to show that “disability” as a welfare category has 
not been a static entity over the late-twentieth century. It was a period of significant political 
changes within the disability lobby and the British welfare state. From the foundation of DIG in 
1965 to the creation of Incapacity Benefit in 1995, social security and anti-discrimination 
legislation went through myriad changes. This conclusion brings together the themes which 
have run throughout the thesis and situates them in the existing literature on the subject. I 
argue that while a number of aspects support the conclusions of other historians of British 
welfare policy, the specific case of disability raises some interesting counterpoints which need 
to be considered. This is explained through four key concepts. Individually they illuminate part 
of this history, but all need to be understood to give a rounded analysis. They are: Stone’s 
‘distributive dilemma’; the role of the voluntary sector in policy making; the role of the state’s 
bureaucratic momentum, or ‘increasing returns’; and the role of political ideas in shaping the 
actions of key policy actors. 
The distributive dilemma 
Deborah Stone’s Disabled State (1984) has been the central text in understanding the historical 
manifestation of disability in welfare policy.1 Stone referred to the state’s ‘distributive 
dilemma’ of how to provide for those in need who were excluded from the labour market 
without damaging the work ethic. I have shown how this ‘dilemma’ remains a key theme 
throughout the late-twentieth century. Disability had been recognised at the end of the 
“golden era” of welfare state expansion and during a period of almost full male employment. 
With the restructuring of the economy away from traditional industries and the rhetoric of 
rolling back the state, disability helped to mask the extent of economic inactivity. Rising costs, 
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however, forced the government to re-evaluate the boundary between “sickness” and 
“unemployment”. 
By focusing on the campaigns by voluntary organisations during a time of political upheaval 
in the disability movement and in the welfare state, I have had the benefit of greater historical 
distance to show how the events contemporary to Stone played out in the British context. 
Great care was taken to ensure that eligibility criteria remained restrictive in the new benefits. 
However, as Chapter 3 showed, this was not always possible, and guidelines were continually 
changed as the result of opposition from politicians and voluntary organisations. Schemes 
expanded, some due to legal pressures (Invalid Care Allowance, Chapter 4) or demographic 
and cultural shifts (Invalidity Benefit, Chapter 5), in similar ways to those Stone describes.2 This 
thesis has been able to go further than this to show that the definitions of categories of 
disability and the way in which they were understood could undergo significant change within 
a relatively short time period of thirty years. The competing demands from the government – 
seeking to restrict access to need-based distribution – and the pressure to expand can only be 
explained when we investigate the actors involved in policy making and the process of 
‘increasing returns’3 which flowed from the redefinition of disability in the mid-1960s. 
The role of the voluntary sector 
The use of voluntary organisation archives was a key part of this analysis. I have shown that we 
cannot understand the way in which disability policy in this country developed without 
reference to the campaigning and academic work of the Disablement Income Group (DIG) and 
the key members of the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) and the 
British Council of Organisations of Disabled People (BCODP). The lobby had a central role in 
defining disability. Using Kingdon, I showed how these groups had varying degrees of success 
in manipulating the ‘policy’, ‘politics’ and ‘solution’ streams,4 but were ultimately unable to 
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direct policy formation exactly as they wished. “Insider”5 groups were able to make small 
changes to legislation (such as with the introduction of Housewives’ Non-contributory 
Invalidity Pension (HNCIP)), but were unable or unwilling to criticise the government forcefully 
enough to secure radical reform (such as with thalidomide). After 1979, there was far less 
direct contact with high-ranking politicians.6 “Outsider” groups therefore focused on critiquing 
government policy and attempted to further the wider cause of disability rights. The tendency 
has been to class the poverty lobby and the Fabian approach as a “failure”, as it did not (and 
perhaps never could) secure the level of wealth re-distribution necessary to eliminate 
poverty.7 Certainly the case of disability would support this, as the National Disability Income 
was never created. However, their influence over policy cannot be ignored. The strength of 
DIG and others was in establishing disability as a category of ‘deemed’ need8 within the social 
security system. As I have demonstrated, DIG’s concept of “the civilian disabled” became 
adopted by both the Conservative and Labour governments as an object of policy, with new 
social security schemes created over the 1970s to begin to provide for this group. Hampton 
has shown this through comparing the 1960s and 1970s with earlier, post-war services and 
legislation.9 I have come to similar conclusions, while showing that this period not only marked 
a change from a previous era, but also set the foundations for policy for the rest of the 
century. 
At the same time, traditional classifications of voluntary organisation types are problematic 
in the disability case. It is unhelpful, from the perspective of the historian, to see a dichotomy 
between Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs) on the one side and “charities” on the other. 
Groups such as DIG, the Disability Alliance (DA) and the Royal Association for Disability and 
Rehabilitation (RADAR) do not fit neatly into this schema. Disenchantment with DIG and DA is 
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often credited as a catalyst for the creation of disabled-led organisations in the 1970s and 
1980s.10 In terms of British disability policy this became increasingly important as the Fabian 
incomes approach lost much of its capacity to influence government. By the same token, my 
research in the DA archive shows that the assumption that the “expert” groups were 
completely unaware of their problematic stance is unsustainable. Fundamental Principles 
clearly highlighted the naivety in key DA officials, but my research suggests this may have been 
the result of political grandstanding on the part of Paul Hunt as much as a genuine attempt to 
wrest control of the disability discourse from the academics. In many ways such an approach 
was understandable, and this analysis takes nothing away from the power of the document. 
But it does problematise some of the historical conclusions that we can draw from it with 
regard to the state of the disability lobby at the time. In the end, as Shakespeare also alludes 
to, social approaches to disability existed in the expert groups as well as in the hardcore social 
modelist ones.11 Co-operation between these organisations in the late-eighties and early-
nineties would also suggest that, on a pragmatic level at least, the groups themselves could 
understand the nuances in each others’ positions. 
The role of the state: ‘increasing returns’ 
The role of the lobby cannot explain the trajectory the welfare state took after 1965 alone. A 
critical juncture occurred when disability was accepted as a category of need. While the 
criticism can be made that disability was never truly seen as a homogenous entity (with 
preferential treatment based on insurance, tort and desert still in evidence), the creation of 
the Minister for Disabled People, various Private Members’ Bills and acknowledgements in 
election manifestos show that a concept of disability existed in the late 1970s in a way that it 
did not and could not in the early 1960s. These developments were crucial because they set 
the framework for disability policy. The work initiated by the Wilson government in the late-
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sixties (such as the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys  report and plans for the 
Attendance Allowance), building on DIG’s campaigns, set in motion the creation of the 
piecemeal benefit system which would be revised over the following decades. However, this 
does not explain why resources continued to be diverted towards disability in the 1970s during 
a period of economic fragility and competing claims from other poverty groups.12 Crossman, 
Joseph and Castle all believed that they were making small concessions in the short-term so 
that they could build towards a full disability income in the long-term once the economy was 
strong enough to handle it. Nor does it explain why the Thatcher governments resisted 
dismantling the system once it came to power, despite the growing costs of disability benefits. 
Indeed, the same processes that created pressure in the 1970s for expansion were pushing 
against retrenchment in the 1980s and 1990s. I argue, therefore, that disability had adopted 
many of the “deserving poor” qualities of “sickness”.13 Disability could not be attacked head on 
for much of the 1965-1995 period because of the electoral risks. Only in the later years was the 
government confident enough to try to redraw the distributive boundaries between “the sick” 
who could not work and “the disabled” who could be compelled to work.14 This followed a 
political belief that the growth in Invalidity Benefit claims over the 1980s could not be due to 
growing ill health and must be due to some sort of “abuse” of the social security system.  
Using the theory of path dependence in policy making,15 I therefore argue that historians 
must pay great attention to the non-financial costs of policy change, or as Pierson has called it, 
the ‘fairness issue’. Pierson’s own work on welfare retrenchment took for granted that states 
treated ‘able-bodied’ people differently to sick and disabled people. His analysis focuses only 
very briefly on disability benefits and the dubious financial rewards from creating Statutory 
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Sick Pay.16 I would challenge this ahistorical notion of attitudes towards disabled people, but 
the concept is useful in beginning to explain government policy, particularly in the 1980s. 
There were clearly rupture points where the direction of policy shifted, but the government 
was often limited in the choices it could make or the actions it was willing to take. It is too easy 
to dismiss many of the government’s actions over the period as a ‘sop’, or argue that money 
was the overriding concern. The success of the disability lobby was in establishing disability as 
an object of policy. As with environmentalism, gay rights and gender equality,17 governments 
and politicians were forced to consider the impact of their actions upon a new area of politics. 
In short, they could not be seen to be cruel to disabled people even if they believed that such 
policies would be better in the long run. We can see this in the refusal to remove the blind 
allowance in Supplementary Benefit, and the decision to construct the elaborate Motability 
Scheme to replace the invalid trikes. Thus, any wide-scale reform to disability benefits would 
require meticulous research and would have to show that those considered “deserving” did 
not lose out unjustly. This slow and laborious process meant that the bureaucratic and political 
costs of reforming disability policies were as important as the potential economic costs. 
Politicians for pragmatic and moral reasons were not willing to attack disability benefits in the 
way that they were for “less-deserving” groups such as unemployed people. 
The role of the state: ideas and beliefs 
These explanations are also insufficient in isolation. We need to say more than simply “history 
matters”. The beliefs of key actors did have an impact. I identified three overarching 
approaches that governments took towards disability policy: a social-democratic approach 
which saw disability as an equality issue and directed resources to citizens as a right; a liberal 
approach which saw disabled people as deserving recipients of state aid; and a neo-liberal 
approach which sought to reduce state expenditure to a minimum and encourage self-
sufficiency for those capable of it. The idea of a ‘consensus’ in welfare policy at this time has 
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been challenged.18 However, the case of disability shows a remarkable agreement between 
the two major parties. I argue that while we should reject the idea that there was a true 
ideological consensus, disability had become a cause to which both social democratic and 
liberal approaches could agree on a common response. During the 1980s, liberal concerns for 
disabled people as legitimately exempt from work meant that neo-liberal attempts to reduce 
overall social security expenditure excluded disability benefits for the most part. This changed 
in the 1990s once the overall cost of those benefits had clearly become too large to ignore.  
In taking this analytical line, I have been able to add new explanations to the policy 
decisions explored in Hampton’s work, while allowing further investigation into the 
governments and policies which came after 1975.19 The policy options chosen by the various 
governments never matched the demands of disability organisations. But they were responses 
to the lobby’s demands within the confines of their own political frameworks. 
Invalid definitions, invalid responses 
It would be churlish to suggest that services for disabled people were “worse” in 1995 than 
they were in 1965. The problem is that such “progress” was uneven, with “winners” and 
“losers” at various points along the way. And, perhaps most importantly, the pace of change 
was far too slow for disability organisations. To understand why, we must return to Stone, who 
has argued that medical impairment is not the same as the distributive category of disability. 
Impairment is determined by the medical profession and is only one of the criteria for entry 
into the category.20 For the welfare state regime in Britain,21 the other element has been 
poverty.22 By targeting benefits at the poorest (through means-testing HNCIP, for example), 
the unemployed and/or at the most impaired (through restrictive medical criteria in Severe 
Disablement Allowance or the Independent Living Fund) the government hoped to save money 
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in the immediate and long term by ensuring that schemes did not expand too quickly. By 
focusing on the “most in need” (however defined), wider concerns about participation in 
society and relative disadvantage were largely lost. Aside from feeble attempts to introduce 
Disability Working Allowance for low-paid disabled workers, ideas such as partial incapacity 
benefits for “civilians” were rejected even though they already existed in the war and 
industrial injuries pensions. Social model ideas which would have tackled structural 
inequalities in employment, education, housing, health care and so on were also rejected, save 
for broad commitments to “deinstitutionalisation” and planning law reform. As DIG noted in 
the 1960s, the welfare state remained ‘the ambulance waiting at the bottom of the cliff’23 
rather than ensuring disabled people did not become impoverished in the first place. This is 
the point – to be seen as disabled, one had to be impaired and in acute financial need. Even 
the more universal benefits (Attendance, Mobility and Disability Living Allowances) were 
targeted at those who were likely to be so impaired as to be at risk of poverty. Further, it was 
difficult for the government to distinguish between the chronically poor and those who 
became poor.24 Preventative policies were outside the concept of disability as understood by 
government at this time, even by the social-democrats. We can conclude that any social-
democratic approach to disability had disappeared by the 1990s, and the government was no 
longer willing to pool the risks of disability. The burden of self-sufficiency was placed on the 
individual through Incapacity Benefit and the restrictive terms of the Disability Discrimination 
Act.  
Future Research 
While this thesis has used material from DIG, DA and RADAR, there are many other voluntary 
organisations at the local and national level that were involved in the policy making process. In 
particular, the role of DPOs is under-researched by historians who do not have a personal 
connection to those organisations and the politics of the era. A wider study of the role of 
                                                          
23
 The Times, 1 February 1969, p. 2. 
24
 McKay and Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain, pp. 13-14. 
  286 
pressure groups and other voluntary organisations broadly described as “charities” by social 
modelists would provide a rounder picture of the public debate over disability policy. Many of 
these organisations have their own archives either in academic institutions or stored in their 
own warehouses,25 and the National Archives contains many of the submissions made by the 
national groups to government inquiries and investigations. 
This thesis has also concentrated on social security benefits, opening up two further lines 
of enquiry. The first would show the effects of Incapacity Benefit and reforms taken by the 
New Labour and Coalition governments up to the present day. There has been an increased 
focus on disability issues from a sociological and political science perspective in recent years, 
but many do not put these changes in a broader historical context. The second would be to 
increase the range of policies under investigation by including housing, health care, 
employment, “care in the community” and social services. This could bring in the role of the 
media, similar to the approach taken by Hampton for the 1948-1975 period26 and Borsay’s 
recent oral history project on thalidomide.27 This would test the ‘distributive dilemma’ thesis 
beyond wealth transfers and deal more specifically with care and citizens’ rights. With care for 
older and disabled people becoming a key political issue, investigating the historical roots of 
the systems we currently have in place would be of great benefit. 
The political history in this thesis would benefit from incorporating recent work on the 
lived experiences of disabled people. It should never be forgotten that policy reforms affected 
real people with differing experiences of impairment and disabling barriers within society. It is 
highly unlikely that the lay person understood changes to benefit criteria in the same way as 
the expert groups and politicians, while social modelist interpretations of the past tend to 
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obscure personal experience of impairment and of the political events going on around them. 
Oral histories and documentary sources are beginning to be used in this way,28 and from the 
historian’s perspective it would be illuminating to understand how individual experiences 
shaped and were shaped by the political events of the period. 
I have focused on the ways in which policies were formed, debated and rationalised, but I 
have paid relatively little attention on the practical consequences of those actions. Issues such 
as fraud, benefit take-up, service provision and legal protection cannot be seen solely in 
statistical or intellectual terms. How individual claimants interacted with benefit offices, how 
doctors and medical professionals understood their role within the system, how individuals 
resisted what were seen as negative policies, or exploited systems for economic gain; none of 
these issues can be adequately researched by focusing on the macro level of policy formation. 
Investigating the implementation of policy on the part of middle-managers, service users and 
public reactions to policies would provide a richer history of the period and help to explain, in 
part, why policy decisions do not always turn out how governments intend them. 
*** 
This thesis has challenged some of the established narratives of late-twentieth century 
disability policy. It was a dynamic period, both for the welfare state and for the voluntary 
organisations seeking to define disability and the disability movement. I have shown how 
different political traditions came to regard disability in very similar ways, with disability 
benefits being created and surviving in a hostile political and economic climate. By the 1990s, 
however, the sheer costs of disability benefits meant that economic concerns trumped those 
of disabled people – and disability was reframed beyond a simple dichotomy of “the sick” 
versus “the able-bodied”. 
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Today we are in another period of welfare state retrenchment. Since I began my research a 
number of the people mentioned in this thesis such as Jack Ashley, Alf Morris, Vic Finkelstein, 
Stephen Bradshaw, Oswald Denly, Tony Newton and, of course, Margaret Thatcher have 
passed away. So too, if the appeal at the High Court is unsuccessful, has the Independent 
Living Fund, with Disability Living Allowance to be replaced by a more restrictive Personal 
Independence Payment. Incapacity Benefit became Employment and Support Allowance under 
Labour in 2008 and continues to be squeezed under the Coalition government. I am sceptical 
about the capacity of history to teach concrete lessons for policy makers in the present. It can, 
however, provide evidence as to what has and has not worked in the past, and why. I hope 
that this thesis provides some of that evidence for those seeking to understand how and why 
we have such a complicated welfare system for disabled people – and why changes to it must 
be taken with the utmost care. 
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Appendix I – Note on statistical data 
Reliable and consistent statistical data for the entire period covered by this thesis is difficult to 
obtain. At various points, governments have changed their methods of calculating the 
expenditure on and claimants to different benefits. While Annual Abstracts of Statistics (AAS) 
often provide a run of figures for up to ten years on social security, very often the next year’s 
edition will include slightly different calculations or estimates, making reliable comparison over 
time difficult. 
Expenditure data are slightly easier to compare than claimant numbers. Raw expenditure 
figures can usually be found in departmental accounts. The Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP) in recent years has made this data available online and in Microsoft Excel format. This 
provides comparable data on some benefits as far back as 1948/49. Not all benefits are 
quoted, however, and as Table II.2 demonstrates I have had to use figures from National 
Insurance fund accounts in older AAS to create a sense of expenditure trends for industrial 
injuries disablement benefit before 1970/71. These data are not absolutely comparable and 
should be used as a guide to expenditure trends only. 
Claimant numbers are far more prone to fluctuation. A simple count of the numbers of people 
claiming benefit is not a useful measure of the caseload of a particular benefit. There will be 
seasonal variations (for example, more people claimed sickness benefit in winter, or during an 
influenza outbreak). Moreover, people can claim, cease claiming and re-claim certain benefits 
over the course of a financial year. Sickness and unemployment-related benefits are more 
prone to these variations than, say, retirement pensions, but the issue remains central. Thus, 
most estimates of “caseload” involve a sample of the number of people claiming a benefit on a 
particular day during the year. This is problematic because some AAS refer to the United 
Kingdom total; others just to Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland). Similarly, if the chosen 
day is changed, data become inconsistent.  DWP has provided some historical data in a 
comparable format, but not for all benefits. Thus, some have been recreated entirely from 
AAS, others partially. Again, data from DWP and AAS are not absolutely comparable, and 
should be used as a guide to claimant trends only. 
To provide inflation-adjusted data in the various charts throughout the thesis, I have used the 
average Retail Prices Index (RPI) for each financial year from data provided by DWP. These are 
detailed in Table II.5. 
Please refer to notes following each table in Appendix II.  
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Appendix II – Tables of statistics 
The data sources are quoted as follows: 
AAS1965 – Central Statistical Office. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1965, No. 102. London: 
H.M.S.O., 1965. 
AAS1968 – ———. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1968, No. 105. London: H.M.S.O., 1968. 
AAS1971 – ———.Annual Abstract of Statistics 1971, No. 108. London: H.M.S.O., 1971. 
AAS1974 – ———. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1974. London: H.M.S.O., 1974. 
AAS1977 – ———. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1977. London: H.M.S.O., 1977. 
AAS1980 – Lawrence, Ethel, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1980. London: H.M.S.O., 1980. 
AAS1983 – ———, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1983, No. 119. London: H.M.S.O., 1983. 
AAS1986 –———, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1986, No. 122. London: H.M.S.O., 1986. 
AAS1989 – Dennis, Geoff, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1989, No. 125. London: H.M.S.O., 
1989. 
AAS1992 –  ———, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1992, No. 128. London: H.M.S.O., 1992. 
AAS1995 – ———, ed., Annual Abstract of Statistics 1995, No. 131. London: H.M.S.O., 1995. 
AAS1998 – Wisniewski, Daniel, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1998, No. 134. London: TSO, 
1998. 
AAS2001 – Tyrrell, Keith, ed., Annual Abstract of Statistics 2001, No. 137. London: TSO, 2001. 
AAS2005 – Penny, David, ed. Annual Abstract of Statistics 2005, No. 141. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005. 
DWP2012 – Department of Work and Pensions. Abstract of Statistics. July 2012 < http:// 
statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/abstract/abstract_tables_2013.xls > (accessed 12 June 
2013). 
DWP2013 – ———. Benefit expenditure tables. March 2013 < http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/ 
asd/asd4/expenditure_tables_Budget_2013.xls > (accessed 12 June 2013). 
SSS1986 –Department of Health and Social Security. Social Security Statistics 1986. London: 
H.M.S.O., 1986. 
SSS1989 – ———. Social Security Statistics 1989. London: H.M.S.O., 1989. 
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Table II.1: Numbers of claimants to selected social security benefits, 1960/61 – 2000/01 (in thousands) 
  
Financial year: 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
Earnings replacement benefits                     
Total1 927
a 964a 975a 1011c 989c 1033c 1041d 1028d 1081d 1090e 
     Sickness Benefit 
          
     Invalidity Benefit 
               Incapacity Benefit 
          Compensation benefits                     
Industrial Injuries Benefit pensions 175a 181a 188a 193c 198c 201c 205d 205d 207d 209e 
War pensions2 
      
595e 577e 557e 539e 
Extra-costs benefits                     
Attendance Allowance 
          Mobility Allowance 
          Disability Living Allowance 
          Other non-contributory benefits                     
NCIP/SDA3 
          Social assistance, ‘sick and disabled’4 268b 267b 283b 285b 281b 287b 298f 310f 322g 326g 
Invalid Care Allowance                     
Other out-of-work benefits                     
Total5 298 295 394 513 313 266 310 499 478 466 
     Unemployment Benefit 213
a
 209
a
 281
a
 390
c
 220
c
 188
c
 208
d
 361
d
 331
d
 309
e
 
     Social assistance, unemployed
6 
85b 86b 113b 123b 93b 78b 102
f
 138
f
 147
g
 157
g
 
     Jobseekers' Allowance 
          Retirement pensions                     
State Pension 5661 5778 5919 5965 6142 6340 6523 6751 6955 7151 
310 
1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
                            
1105e 1011e 1027i 1064i 1064i 1037k . 1068k 1138 1119 1092 1154 1191 1123 
        
552 506 449 444 437 327 
        
586 613 643 710 754 796 
            
  
                            
211e 212e 208i 206i 207i 203k 205k 205k 204n 202n 201n 197p 194p 191p 
519e 502e 481i 464i 447i 430k 413k 397k 382n 367n 355n 341p 327p 314p 
                            
 
50h 85h 143 170 193 217 243 264 278 314 350 388 441 
      
34 55 75 105 147 177 214 263 
            
  
                            
      
103 107 116 153 178 186 196 209 
323g 305g 313j 295j 273j 254l 255l 241l 234o 207 205 221 240 241 
          
 
4.5m 5.4m 6.1m 6.4m 6.6m 7.1m 8m 8.8m 
                            
493 696 771 473 512 890 1148 1197 1115 1012 1569 2080 2589 2738 
327
e
 438
e
 451
i
 261
i
 272
i
 464
k
 572 552 503 461 823 901 978 925 
166
g 
258
g
 320
j
 212
j
 240
j
 426
l
 576 645 612 551 746 1179 1611 1813 
            
  
                            
7344 7495 7648 7803 7951 8128 8315 8436 8579 8727 8895 9074 9164 9261 
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1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
                            
1103 1154 1189 1273 1395 1522 1673 1876 2102 2273 2428 
   
242 233 215 206 217 222 232 253 276 283 286 
 
  861 921 974 1067 1178 1300 1441 1623 1826 1990 2142 
   
           
2490 2455 2437 
                            
186q 191q 189q 189r 189r 193r 196.9s 200.2s 204.3s 212.4t 225.6t 235.2t 249.2u 257.8u 
302.3q 290.9q 274.8q 266r 258.3r 252.2r 248s 249.6s 260.1s 292.9t 309.2t 315.4t 327.5u 320.7u 
                            
507 562 611 677 737 798 875 988 890 962 1046 1115 1152 1207 
314 367 422 474 520 565 607 654 
      
        
1045 1286 1466 1669 1846 2004 
                            
236 254 257 258 267 277 286 296 307 321 337 358 364 376 
273 301 327 352 247 290 330 375 425 527 618 739 786 849 
9.5m 10.3m 33 76 104 118 130 152 182 220 263 326 343 367 
                            
2798 2778 2756 2294 1795 1350 1335 2044 2413 2399 2287 2054 1838 1252 
913 886 924 716 546 319 328 603 660 609 487 395 377 
 1885 1892 1832 1578 1249 1031 1007 1441 1753 1790 1800 1659 1461 
 
             
1252
                            
9298 9495 9627 9700 9755 9755 9930 9990 10056 10061 10097 10384 10536 10680 
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1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
      Earnings replacement benefits 
   
Total 
   
     Sickness Benefit 
   
     Invalidity Benefit 
2371 2354 2391 Incapacity Benefit 
      Compensation benefits 
269.1u 278.2u 280.8u Industrial Injuries Benefit pensions 
302u 306u 295.7u War pensions 
      Extra-costs benefits 
1238 1256 1276 Attendance Allowance 
   
Mobility Allowance 
2092 2165 2255 Disability Living Allowance 
      Other non-contributory benefits 
378 377 376 NCIP/SDA 
898 932 994 Social assistance, sick and disabled 
373 378 384 Invalid Care Allowance 
      Other out-of-work benefits 
1110 1177 1022 Total 
   
     Unemployment Benefit 
   
     Social assistance, unemployed 
1110 1177 1022      Jobseekers' Allowance 
      Retirement pensions 
10782 10936 11004 State Pension 
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Sources and notes 
All data from DWP2013 unless otherwise stated. See Appendix I. No data for Sickness and 
Invalidity Benefits for 1976/77. 
1 Total of Sickness Benefit (SB) and Invalidity Benefit (IVB), later Incapacity Benefit. Figures 
were quoted in early AAS as both SB and IVB. Reliable series of separate SB and IVB figures not 
available for before 1978/79. No data for 1976/77 due to industrial action. From 1978/79 
onwards, author calculation from data given below. 
2 Consistent War pensions claimants data from 1966/67 only. 
2 Non-contributory Invalidity Benefit (NCIP) up to 1983/84. Thereafter, Severe Disablement 
Allowance (SDA). 
3 Social assistance includes National Assistance , Supplementary Benefit and Income Support. 
Category of ‘sick and disabled’ claimants. 
4 Total of Unemployment Benefit (UB), a National Insurance Benefit, and unemployed people 
of working age claiming social assistance but not claiming another out-of-work benefit. Author 
calculation from data given below. 
5 Category of social assistance claimants of working age and expected to be looking for work, 
but not claiming/eligible for another out-of-work benefit. 
a AAS1968, Table 43. p. 49. National Insurance Acts: Number of persons receiving benefit, At 
31 December. 
b AAS1971, Table 50. p. 55. Supplementary benefits: Number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, Great Britain, On a selected day in November/December each year. 
c AAS1971, Table 43. p. 50. National Insurance Acts: Number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
d AAS1974, Table 43, p. 56. National Insurance Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
e ASS1977, Table 3.16, p. 67. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
f AAS1974, Table 51. p. 62. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, Great Britain, On a selected day in November/December each year. 
g AAS1977, Table 3.26. p. 76. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, Great Britain, November or December. 
h SSS1989, Attendance Allowance: Table 14.35, p. 147. Allowances current at a point in time. 
i AAS1980, Table 3.16. p. 68. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
j AAS1980, Table 3.26. p. 77. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, November or December. 
k AAS1983, Table 3.15. p. 54. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
l AAS1983, Table 3.24. p. 60. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, On a day in November/December. 
m SSS1986, Invalid Care Allowance: Table 16.30, p. 131. Allowances current at end of year: 
analysed by age. 
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n AAS1986, Table 3.15, p. 54. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, At 31 
December. 
o AAS1986, Table 3.24, p. 60. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, On a day in November/December. 
p AAS1989, Table 3.15, p. 54. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, United 
Kingdom, At 31 December. 
q AAS1992, Table 3.15, p. 56. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, United 
Kingdom, At 31 December. 
r AAS1995, Table 3.15, p. 50. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, United 
Kingdom, At any one time. 
s AAS1998, Table 3.15, p. 61. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, United 
Kingdom, At any one time. 
t AAS2001, Table 10.5, p. 146. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, Great 
Britain, At any one time. 
u AAS2005, Table 10.5, p. 151. Social Security Acts: number of persons receiving benefit, Great 
Britain, At any one time. 
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Table II.2: Expenditure on selected social security benefits in nominal terms 1960/61 – 2000/01 (in £millions) 
 
1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
Earnings replacement benefits 
          Total1 135 155 162 191 201 249 262 323 348 383 
     Sickness Benefit 135 155 162 191 201 249 262 323 348 383 
     Invalidity Benefit 
               Statutory Sick Pay 
               Incapacity Benefit 
          Compensation benefits 
          Industrial Injuries Benefit pensions 28
a 33a 34a 40b 43b 50b 52c 55c 59c 62d 
War pensions 96 104 102 110 110 121 118 121 125 125 
Extra-costs benefits 
          Attendance Allowance 
          Mobility Allowance 
          Disability Living Allowance 
          Other non-contributory benefits 
          NCIP/SDA2 
          Social assistance, sick and disabled3 
          Invalid Care Allowance 
          Other out-of-work benefits 
          Total4 
               Unemployment Benefit 30 36 65 65 45 49 78 122 123 127 
     Social assistance, unemployed
5 
               Jobseekers' Allowance 
          Retirement pensions 
          State Pension 677 784 807 959 1015 1238 1272 1385 1543 1627 
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1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
                            
374 414 487 548 665 873 1059 1287 1536 1650 1804 2243 2397 2423 
374 323 291 306 345 425 496 585 696 655 654 680 554 265 
 
91 196 242 320 448 563 701 840 995 1150 1370 1593 1872 
           
193 250 286 
                                          
65 71 78 87 110 145 167 191 216 244 282 315 343 369 
128 137 150 164 204 258 283 310 340 375 424 479 504 524 
                            
 
6 23 36 62 96 127 167 168 201 260 330 403 495 
     
0 8 20 47 79 125 173 236 304 
                                          
     
12 34 45 69 85 108 130 154 182 
        
130 146 172 198 259 305 
      
2 3 4 4 5 6 8 10 
                            
        
1147 1176 2074 3214 4067 4754 
150 239 209 174 214 454 559 629 632 653 1280 1702 1500 1497 
        
515 523 794 1512 2567 3257 
                                          
1785 2068 2396 2780 3609 4825 5687 6628 7589 8852 10564 12165 13589 14654 
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1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
                            
2735 3033 3287 3577 4031 4565 4988 6261 7127 8068 8695 8542 8385 8447 
279 276 179 193 192 204 216 274 364 365 342 12 
  2142 2349 2674 2968 3359 3837 4431 5485 6210 7068 7705 271 
  314 408 343 416 480 524 341 502 553 635 648 639 724 1035 
           
7623 7662 7412 
                            
381 407 440 453 451 470 520 587 601 616 645 670 685 690 
544 581 590 599 610 641 822 987 1158 1286 1147 1258 1351 1288 
                            
576 686 779 897 1003 1159 1382 1706 1553 1795 1963 2194 2393 2521 
356 422 514 596 675 769 883 1062 68 
     
        
1973 2772 3125 3802 4498 4953 
                            
236 266 285 295 316 346 429 596 640 703 776 820 906 999 
353 432 539 587 772 902 1082 1399 1899 2358 2758 3222 3507 3679 
11 13 104 184 173 184 208 285 345 442 526 617 736 746 
                            
5308 5803 6070 5453 4152 3364 3810 5804 7139 7389 6482 5925 5112 3893 
1578 1589 1734 1468 1107 733 870 1604 1760 1652 1299 1102 587 
 3730 4214 4336 3985 3045 2631 2940 4200 5379 5737 5183 4823 2359 
 
            
2166 3893 
                            
15307 16625 17816 18686 19274 20732 22735 25579 26741 28219 28780 29998 32024 33586 
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1998/99 1999/00 2000/01  
      Earnings replacement benefits 
8542 7974 8084 Total 
   
     Sickness Benefit 
   
     Invalidity Benefit 
1291 1184 1318 Statutory Sick Pay 
7251 6790 6766 Incapacity Benefit 
      Compensation benefits 
710 700 708 Industrial Injuries Benefit pensions 
1264 1256 1396 War pensions 
      Extra-costs benefits 
2680 2823 2955 Attendance Allowance 
   
Mobility Allowance 
5316 5660 6044 Disability Living Allowance 
      Other non-contributory benefits 
984 1006 1014 NCIP/SDA 
3848 4051 4400 Social assistance, long-term sick and disabled 
782 835 867 Invalid Care Allowance 
      Other out-of-work benefits 
3558 3255 2882 Total 
   
     Unemployment Benefit 
   
     Social assistance, unemployed 
3558 3255 2882      Jobseekers' Allowance 
      Retirement pensions 
35603 37802 38745 State Pension 
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Sources and notes 
All data from DWP2013 unless otherwise stated. See Appendix I. 
1 Total amount spent on Sickness Benefit, Invalidity Benefit (IVB) and Incapacity Benefit (ICB). 
Author’s calculations from the data given below. 
2 Non-contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP) up to 1983/84. Severe Disablement Allowance  
(SDA) thereafter. 
3 Social assistance includes National Assistance , Supplementary Benefit and Income Support. 
Category of ‘sick and disabled’ claimants. Consistent data unavailable for the entire period. 
Older AAS use a different method of calculation to DWP2013. Data available only from 
1978/79. 
4 Total of Unemployment Benefit (UB), social assistance paid to unemployed people of working 
age but not drawing another out-of-work benefit and Jobseekers’ Allowance. Author’s 
calculations. Totals not given before 1978/79 as social assistance data not available. 
5 Category of social assistance claimants of working age and expected to be looking for work, 
but not claiming/eligible for another out-of-work benefit. Consistent data unavailable for the 
entire period. Older AAS use a different method of calculation to DWP2013. Data only 
available from 1978/79. 
a AAS1965, Table 40. p. 47. National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Funds, Years ended 31 
March. 
b AAS1968, Table 41. p. 48. National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Funds, Years ended 31 
March. 
c AAS1971, Table 41. p. 49. National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Funds, Years ended 31 
March. 
d AAS1974, Table 41, p. 55. National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Funds, Years ended 31 
March.
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Table II.3: Weekly rates of selected benefits at 31 March in each year 1960/61 – 2000/01 
 Unemploy
-ment 
Benefit 
National Insurance 
Retirement Pension 
Sickness 
Benefit 
Invalidity Benefit Incapacity Benefit 
Single 
person 
Married 
couple 
Invalidity 
Pension 
Invalidity Allowance 
Long term 
Short term, 
under 
pension 
age Higher rate Middle rate Lower rate 
1960/61 £2.50 £2.50 £4.00 £2.50       
1961/62 £2.875 £2.875 £4.63 £2.875       
1962/63 £3.375 £3.375 £5.45 £3.375       
1963/64 £3.375 £3.375 £5.45 £3.375       
1964/65 £3.375 £3.375 £5.45 £3.375       
1965/66 £4.00 £4.00 £6.50 £4.00       
1966/67 £4.00 £4.00 £6.50 £4.00       
1967/68 £4.50 £4.50 £7.30 £4.50       
1968/69 £4.50 £4.50 £7.30 £4.50       
1969/70 £5.00 £5.00 £8.10 £5.00       
1970/71 £5.00 £5.00 £8.10 £5.00       
1971/72 £6.00 £6.00 £9.70 £6.00 £6.00      
1972/73 £6.75 £6.75 £10.90 £6.75 £6.75      
1973/74 £7.35 £7.75 £12.50 £7.35 £7.75 £1.60 £1.00 £0.50   
1974/75 £8.60 £10.00 £16.00 £8.60 £10.00 £2.05 £1.30 £0.65   
1975/76 £11.10 £13.30 £21.20 £11.10 £13.30 £2.80 £1.70 £0.85   
1976/77 £12.90 £15.30 £24.50 £12.90 £15.30 £3.20 £2.00 £1.00   
1977/78 £14.70 £17.50 £28.00 £14.70 £17.50 £3.70 £2.30 £1.15   
1978/79 £15.75 £19.50 £31.20 £15.75 £19.50 £4.15 £2.60 £1.30   
1979/80 £18.50 £23.30 £37.30 £18.50 £23.30 £4.90 £3.10 £1.50   
1980/81 £20.65 £27.15 £43.45 £20.65 £26.00 £5.45 £3.45 £1.70   
1981/82 £22.50 £29.60 £47.35 £22.50 £28.35 £6.20 £4.00 £2.00   
1982/83 £25.00 £32.85 £52.55 £25.00 £31.45 £6.90 £4.40 £2.20   
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1983/84 £27.05 £34.05 £54.50 £25.95 £32.60 £7.15 £4.60 £2.30   
1984/85 £28.45 £35.80 £57.30 £27.25 £34.25 £7.50 £4.80 £2.40   
1985/86 £30.45 £38.30 £61.30 £29.15 £38.30 £8.05 £5.10 £2.55   
1986/87 £30.80 £38.70 £61.95 £29.45 £38.70 £8.15 £5.20 £2.60   
1987/88 £31.45 £39.50 £63.25 £30.05 £39.50 £8.30 £5.30 £2.65   
1988/89 £32.75 £41.15 £65.90 £31.30 £41.15 £8.65 £5.50 £2.75   
1989/90 £34.70 £43.60 £69.80 £33.20 £43.60 £9.20 £5.80 £2.90   
1990/91 £37.35 £46.90 £75.10 £35.70 £46.90 £10.00 £6.20 £3.10   
1991/92 £41.40 £52.00 £83.25 £39.60 £52.00 £11.10 £6.90 £3.45   
1992/93 £43.10 £54.15 £86.70 £41.20 £54.15 £11.55 £7.20 £3.60   
1993/94 £44.65 £56.10 £89.80 £42.70 £56.10 £11.95 £7.50 £3.75   
1994/95 £45.45 £57.60 £92.10 £43.45 £57.60 £12.15 £7.60 £3.80   
1995/96 £46.45 £58.85 £94.10   £12.40 £7.80 £3.90 £58.85 £44.40 
1996/97 £48.25 £61.15 £97.75   £12.90 £8.10 £4.05 £61.15 £46.15 
1997/98  £62.45 £99.80   £13.15 £8.30 £4.15 £62.45 £47.10 
1998/99  £64.70 £103.40   £13.60 £8.60 £4.30 £64.70 £48.80 
1999/00  £66.75 £106.70   £14.05 £8.90 £4.45 £66.75 £50.35 
2000/01  £67.50 £107.90   £14.20 £9.00 £4.50 £67.50 £50.90 
 
  
322 
 Attendance Allowance Mobility 
Allowance 
Disability Living Allowance Industrial 
disable-
ment 
pension 
War 
pension 
Higher rate Lower rate 
Care component Mobility component 
(100%) 
(Private, 
100%) Higher rate Middle rate Lower rate Higher rate Lower rate 
1960/61         £4.25  
1961/62         £4.875  
1962/63         £4.875  
1963/64         £5.75  
1964/65         £5.75  
1965/66         £6.75  
1966/67         £6.75  
1967/68         £7.60 £7.60 
1968/69         £7.60 £7.60 
1969/70         £8.40 £8.40 
1970/71         £8.40 £8.40 
1971/72         £10.00 £10.00 
1972/73 £5.40        £11.20 £11.20 
1973/74 £6.20 £4.15       £12.80 £12.80 
1974/75 £8.00 £5.35       £16.40 £16.40 
1975/76 £10.60 £7.10       £21.80 £21.80 
1976/77 £12.20 £8.15 £5.00      £25.00 £25.00 
1977/78 £14.00 £9.30 £7.00      £28.60 £28.60 
1978/79 £15.60 £10.40 £10.00      £31.90 £31.90 
1979/80 £18.60 £12.40 £12.00      £38.00 £38.00 
1980/81 £21.65 £14.45 £14.50      £44.30 £44.30 
1981/82 £23.65 £15.75 £16.50      £48.30 £48.30 
1982/83 £26.25 £17.50 £18.30      £53.60 £53.60 
1983/84 £27.20 £18.15 £19.00      £55.60 £55.60 
1984/85 £28.60 £19.10 £20.00      £58.40 £58.40 
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1985/86 £30.60 £20.45 £21.40      £62.50 £62.50 
1986/87 £30.95 £20.65 £21.50      £63.20 £63.20 
1987/88 £31.60 £21.10 £22.10      £64.50 £64.50 
1988/89 £32.95 £22.00 £23.05      £67.20 £67.20 
1989/90 £34.90 £23.30 £24.40      £71.20 £71.20 
1990/91 £37.55 £25.05 £26.25      £76.60 £76.60 
1991/92 £41.65 £27.10 £29.80      £84.90 £84.90 
1992/93 £43.35 £28.95  £43.35 £28.95 £11.55 £30.30 £11.55 £88.40 £89.00 
1993/94 £44.90 £30.00  £44.90 £30.00 £11.95 £31.40 £11.95 £91.60 £97.20 
1994/95 £45.79 £30.55  £45.79 £30.55 £12.15 £31.95 £12.15 £93.20 £98.90 
1995/96 £46.70 £31.20  £46.70 £31.20 £12.40 £32.65 £12.40 £95.30 £101.10 
1996/97 £48.59 £32.40  £48.59 £32.40 £12.90 £33.90 £12.90 £99.00 £105.00 
1997/98 £49.50 £33.10  £49.50 £33.10 £13.15 £34.60 £13.15 £101.10 £107.20 
1998/99 £51.30 £34.30  £51.30 £34.30 £13.60 £35.85 £13.60 £104.70 £111.10 
1999/00 £52.95 £35.40  £52.95 £35.40 £14.05 £37.00 £14.05 £108.10 £114.79 
2000/01 £53.55 £35.80  £53.55 £35.80 £14.20 £37.40 £14.20 £109.30 £116.00 
 
Source and notes 
Some rates show three decimal places. This is due to conversion from old money (e.g. Unemployment Benefit in 1961/62 was £2 17s 6d). Uprating of 
benefits was inconsistent until the 1970s, thus some benefit rates do not change within the financial year. Uprating dates are available in the sources used. 
Data taken from DWP2012 except for Invalidity Allowance, Attendance Allowance, Mobility Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, Industrial disablement 
pension and War pension. 1960/61 – 1969/70, AAS1971, Table 46, p. 43. Weekly rates of family allowances and the principal national insurance benefits. 
1970/71 – 1978/79, AAS1980, Table 3.13, p. 63. Weekly rates of principal social security benefits. 1979/80 – 1988/89, AAS1989, Table 3.13, p. 51. Weekly 
rates of principal social security benefits. 1989/90 – 1997/98, AAS1998, Table 3.13, p. 57. Weekly rates of principal social security benefits. 1998/99 – 
2000/01, AAS2001, Table 10.3, p. 142. Weekly rates of principal social security benefits.
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Table II.4: Total government expenditure on social security benefits 1960/61 – 
2000/01 
 
Contributory 
benefits 
Income-
related 
benefits 
Other Total 
 
£millions £millions £millions £millions % of GDP 
1960/61 908 180 303 1390 5.3% 
1961/62 1055 171 327 1553 5.6% 
1962/63 1117 200 329 1646 5.7% 
1963/64 1314 217 359 1891 6.1% 
1964/65 1369 223 370 1962 5.8% 
1965/66 1672 246 405 2322 6.4% 
1966/67 1753 298 406 2457 6.4% 
1967/68 1977 386 427 2790 6.8% 
1968/69 2169 429 574 3172 7.1% 
1969/70 2299 471 623 3392 7.1% 
1970/71 2522 564 551 3637 6.9% 
1971/72 2951 686 593 4230 7.1% 
1972/73 3340 845 712 4898 7.3% 
1973/74 3853 974 678 5505 7.3% 
1974/75 4918 1208 775 6902 7.7% 
1975/76 6584 1651 1103 9338 8.3% 
1976/77 7801 2082 1231 11114 8.5% 
1977/78 9082 2509 1776 13367 8.8% 
1978/79 10460 2692 2721 15873 9.1% 
1979/80 11937 2940 3900 18777 9.0% 
1980/81 14529 3830 4299 22658 9.5% 
1981/82 16863 5857 4978 27698 10.5% 
1982/83 18210 7917 5501 31628 11.0% 
1983/84 19798 9449 6085 35332 11.3% 
1984/85 20863 10783 6605 38251 11.4% 
1985/86 22448 12232 7088 41768 11.3% 
1986/87 24258 13176 7484 44918 11.3% 
1987/88 25406 13402 7893 46701 10.6% 
1988/89 26034 13252 8032 47318 9.6% 
1989/90 27702 14200 8412 50314 9.3% 
1990/91 30508 16798 9173 56479 9.7% 
1991/92 35252 20295 10755 66303 10.8% 
1992/93 37320 25526 12411 75257 11.9% 
1993/94 39539 28830 14069 82438 12.3% 
1994/95 39825 30339 14695 84859 11.9% 
1995/96 40702 31887 16118 88707 11.8% 
1996/97 42159 32437 17616 92212 11.5% 
1997/98 43120 31640 18582 93342 11.0% 
1998/99 45018 31213 19326 95557 10.7% 
1999/00 46884 30727 21427 99038 10.5% 
2000/01 47797 29667 23899 101362 10.3% 
Source: DWP2013. 
  
325 
Table II.5: Retail Prices Indices, average over the financial year 1960/61 – 2011/12 
 
Jan. 1987 
 = 100 
1960/1961 
= 100 
1995/96 
 = 100 
2000/2001 
= 100 
2011/12 
=100 
1960/61 12.5 100.0 8.3 7.3 5.3 
1961/62 13.0 104.0 8.7 7.6 5.5 
1962/63 15.5 124.0 10.3 9.0 6.5 
1963/64 13.7 109.6 9.1 8.0 5.8 
1964/65 14.3 114.4 9.5 8.3 6.0 
1965/66 15.0 120.0 10.0 8.8 6.3 
1966/67 15.5 124.0 10.3 9.0 6.5 
1967/68 15.9 127.2 10.6 9.3 6.7 
1968/69 16.8 134.4 11.2 9.8 7.1 
1969/70 17.6 140.8 11.7 10.3 7.4 
1970/71 18.9 151.2 12.6 11.0 8.0 
1971/72 20.7 165.6 13.8 12.1 8.7 
1972/73 22.1 176.8 14.7 12.9 9.3 
1973/74 24.4 195.2 16.3 14.2 10.3 
1974/75 28.8 230.4 19.2 16.8 12.1 
1975/76 35.9 287.2 23.9 21.0 15.1 
1976/77 41.4 331.2 27.6 24.2 17.4 
1977/78 47.2 377.6 31.4 27.6 19.9 
1978/79 51.1 408.8 34.0 29.8 21.5 
1979/80 59.2 473.6 39.4 34.6 24.9 
1980/81 68.8 550.4 45.8 40.2 29.0 
1981/82 76.8 614.4 51.2 44.8 32.4 
1982/83 82.2 657.6 54.8 48.0 34.6 
1983/84 86.0 688.0 57.3 50.2 36.2 
1984/85 90.4 723.2 60.2 52.8 38.1 
1985/86 95.7 765.6 63.8 55.9 40.3 
1986/87 98.8 790.4 65.8 57.7 41.6 
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1987/88 102.7 821.6 68.4 60.0 43.3 
1988/89 108.9 871.2 72.6 63.6 45.9 
1989/90 117.4 939.2 78.2 68.5 49.5 
1990/91 128.7 1029.6 85.7 75.1 54.2 
1991/92 134.9 1079.2 89.9 78.8 56.8 
1992/93 139.1 1112.8 92.7 81.2 58.6 
1993/94 141.5 1132.0 94.3 82.6 59.6 
1994/95 145.4 1163.2 96.9 84.9 61.3 
1995/96 150.1 1200.8 100.0 87.6 63.3 
1996/97 153.7 1229.6 102.4 89.7 64.8 
1997/98 158.8 1270.4 105.8 92.7 66.9 
1998/99 163.8 1310.4 109.1 95.6 69.0 
1999/00 166.4 1331.2 110.9 97.1 70.1 
2000/01 171.3 1370.4 114.1 100.0 72.2 
2001/02 173.9 1391.2 115.9 101.5 73.3 
2002/03 177.5 1420.0 118.3 103.6 74.8 
2003/04 182.5 1460.0 121.6 106.5 76.9 
2004/05 188.2 1505.6 125.4 109.9 79.3 
2005/06 193.1 1544.8 128.6 112.7 81.4 
2006/07 200.3 1602.4 133.4 116.9 84.4 
2007/08 208.6 1668.8 139.0 121.8 87.9 
2008/09 214.8 1718.4 143.1 125.4 90.5 
2009/10 215.8 1726.4 143.8 126.0 90.9 
2010/11 226.5 1812.0 150.9 132.2 95.4 
2011/12 237.3 1898.4 158.1 138.5 100.0 
Source: Retail Prices Index (RPI) for January 1987 = 100 from DWP2012. Other values author 
calculations from this data.   
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Table II.6: Breakdown of people claiming social assistance weekly and classified as 
‘sick and disabled’ 1965 – 1995 (in thousands) 
 
Drawing other 
National 
Insurance 
benefits 
Not drawing 
other National 
Insurance 
benefits 
Total ‘sick and 
disabled’ 
claimants 
Total 
supplementary 
benefit 
claimants (all 
categories) 
1965a 149 138 287 2012 
1966b 156 142 298 2495 
1967b 164 146 310 2559 
1968c 172 150 322 2637 
1969c 170 156 326 2688 
1970c 164 159 323 2738 
1971c 146 159 305 2909 
1972d 142 171 313 3015 
1973d 122 173 295 2772 
1974d 98 175 273 2778 
1975e 80 174 254 2897 
1976e 80 175 255 3049 
1977e 77 164 241 3106 
1978f 73 161 234 3048 
1979f 58 160 218 2970 
1980f - - 216 3247 
1981g 73 160 233 3873 
1982g 90 162 252 4432 
1983g 87 167 254 4524 
1984g 109 179 288 4780 
1985g - - 263 4771 
1986g 119 197 316 5122 
1987g 141 228 369 5089 
1988h 55 192 247 4352 
1989h 58 232 290 4161 
1990i 62 268 330 4180 
1991i 58 317 375 4487 
1992i 72 352 424 5088 
1993i 85 495 580 5643 
1994i 101 517 618 5675 
1995i 133 606 739 5670 
Sources and notes 
Social assistance includes National Assistance, Supplementary Benefit and Income Support.  
Dash indicates no data. Compiled using AAS, which used a different calculation than DWP2013. 
Data may not exactly agree with DWP2013 and/or table II.1.  
a AAS1971, Table 50. p. 55. Supplementary benefits: Number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, Great Britain, On a selected day in November/December each year. 
b AAS1974, Table 51. p. 62. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, Great Britain, On a selected day in November/December each year. 
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c AAS1977, Table 3.26. p. 76. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, Great Britain, November or December. 
d AAS1980, Table 3.26. p. 77. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, November or December. 
e AAS1983, Table 3.24. p. 60. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, On a day in November/December. 
f AAS1986, Table 3.24, p. 60. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, On a day in November/December. 
g AAS1989, Table 3.23, p. 59. Supplementary benefits: number of beneficiaries receiving 
weekly payment, On a day in November/December. 
h AAS1995, Table 3.23 Income support: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly payment, 
Great Britain, On a day in May. 
i AAS1998, Table 3.23, p. 67. Income support: number of beneficiaries receiving weekly 
payment, Great Britain, On a day in May. 
 
 
